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The Concept of Function in Osteopathy and Conventional Medicine: 
A Comparative Study 
Abstract 
This study compares and contrasts the uses of 'function' in osteopathy and in a closely 
related area of conventional medicine, viz., orthopaedic surgery. Function is a 
fundamental concept in both; but a survey of the literature, and an initial analysis of the 
language used by practitioners in a sample of case studies, suggests that while 
orthopaedic surgeons focus on local failures of physiological function (Fphyg), osteopaths 
are concerned with such failures in the global context of the whole body (FgIob). This is 
closely related to individual patients' expectations in relation to their overall ability to 
function (FP, ). The musculo-skeletal system, with which osteopaths are expert, is shown 
to be particularly significant for understanding Fphys, Fp, and Fg, ob. These uses of 
function 
are further analysed by drawing on the philosophical literature. This is shown to focus, 
like orthopaedic surgeons, mainly on biological function (Fb; o, which includes 
Fphyg). In 
consequence, it is argued, the philosophical literature has under-emphasised the 
significance of context in defining functional norms. Certain authors have recognised the 
importance of context for the functioning of people (i. e. as Fpt); in this thesis, by contrast, 
context is shown to be important in defining functional norms at all levels, including the 
physiological/biological. In respect of the relationship between osteopathy and 
conventional medicine, it is concluded that Fglob (as employed more by osteopaths) 
involves explaining the clinical significance of local dysfunction in the broad context of 
patients' activities, and Fphy, (as employed more by orthopaedic surgeons) involves 
categorising local dysfunction in terms of referential standards. The concept of agency, 
although not examined in detail, emerges as the key to linking the role of context in the 
meaning of function statements to the intentions and self-perception of patients in clinical 
practice. Because of the special role of the musculo-skeletal system in enacting agency, 
osteopathy offers particular insights into the contextual nature of function statements. 
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Part I- Setting the Agenda 
Chapter 1- Introduction and Background 
Chapter 1 establishes the aims and maps out the territory of the thesis. It identifies key issues 
regarding the historical development, practices and current challenges to osteopathy and 
conventional medicine and the way function informs them. A particular issue for both professions, 
though for different reasons, is the extent to which their identities are linked to science and the 
humanities. Function is introduced as a fundamental concept for both professions where it informs 
theory and guides practice. The Chapter concludes that practitioners in both professions use the 
concept of function in more than one way. I provisionally distinguish between these, possibly 
different, conceptualisations of function by using the notation FO5t (for osteopathy) and F, nea 
(for 
conventional medicine) plus a number of subcategories to depict different uses of function within 
each profession. Analysis of these sets the agenda for the thesis. 
Chapter 2- Function in Clinical Theory 
Chapter 2 explores the role function plays in medical and osteopathic theory. It establishes 
function's logical relationship with concepts of disease and illness which it informs in significant 
and necessary ways. The Chapter maps the relationships between elements in the basic function 
statement, 'The function of x is to do y', where x is some part (or behaviour) of an organism and 
y is a beneficial goal, and goes on to ask what this means for the way function informs dysfunction, 
disease (Fdj) and illness (F111). It concludes that the context in which y occurs is an essential, 
though usually covert, element requiring further analysis. 
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Part 2- Function Concepts in Practice 
Chapter 3- Linguistic Analysis: "a way of getting started" 
In this Chapter I use two Case Studies to begin to identify the way practitioners use function 
concepts in practice. Linguistic analysis, in particular Austin's views on 'ordinary language', is 
used as "a way of getting started" (Warnock, precising Austin) on the task. It concludes that all 
the practitioners use two significantly different concepts of function, one which assumes that body 
parts and behaviours have "proper" physiological functions (referred to as Fghy, a subcategory of 
biological function, Fb; o, 
), and the other that takes account of a person's global ability to function 
(expressed through actionlagency) in their physical and social environment (referred to as F,,,, b). 
Chapter 4- Function Concepts in Clinical Work 
Chapter 4 builds on the analysis of the Case Studies by focusing further on the suggestion, 
generated in Chapters 2 and 3, that practitioners use two concepts of function, focusing 
respectively on the behaviour of body parts and the behaviour of the person as a whole. A critical 
question is whether knowledge of and attention to Fg, ob is an essential part of practice or merely a 
veneer of humanity superimposed on the real work of medicine, which is dealing with issues arising 
from Fnhy, (and Fb; o, 
). I argue that enquiring into each of these two areas requires different 
strategies, an epistemological strategy to determine whether Fo,, y, is operating normally and an 
ontological strategy to determine which behaviours constitute Fg, ob. 
Part 3- Further Analysis of Function Statements 
Chapter 5- The Concept of Function in Biology 
Chapter 5 notes that most (and possibly all) the published work on the concept of function is 
concerned with biological function (FbI0, and its subcategory Fyhy, ). This assumes that medical 
concepts, and, particularly for my analysis, function concepts in practice, are based on and 
therefore explained by biological function. I question this assumption on the grounds that the work 
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of biologists is different from that of practitioners - each use function concepts to different ends, 
one to develop a scientific unifying body of knowledge and the other to understand particular 
medical problems. In addition I identify flaws in the claim that function ascriptions in biology are 
objective and value-free. I introduce Cummins's intrasystemic analysis because it makes explicit 
the difference between local biological properties/dispositions and the global functional ends served 
by them. 
Chapter 6- Re-examining the Concept of Function in Practice 
In Chapter 6I go on to apply, develop and adapt Cummins's account of systems and 
properties/dispositions, to the observation, made in Chapter 3, that practitioners use two concepts 
of function, the physiology of local parts (Fphy, ) and the global actions/agency of the person (F,,, ob, 
). 
A key question, requiring further clarification, is what is meant by a system and what the 
relationship is between systems and the physiological dispositions that constitute them. This 
makes explicit the role of context in defining function and (particularly for practitioners) of 
dysfunction. The function of artefacts is examined and found to operate in a number of ways, as 
items with intended function (such as chairs and can-openers), and as items whose capacities can 
be deployed in a range of functional uses (such as planks, paper and wheels). It is argued that this 
parallels function as it is used in practice, but requires a further concept of function to explain the 
derivation of FF, ob. Fp, denotes the expectations of patients and practitioners of what would 
normally be taken for granted with respect to actions/agency. (Fg, ob denotes the actual 
actionslagency of the individual. ) The Chapter also explores the röle that function plays in linking 
the concepts of illness and disease. 
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Part 4- Implications for Practice 
Chapter 7- Conceptualising Function in Osteopathy & Conventional 
Medicine 
In Chapter 71 return to the practice issues, first identified in Chapter 1 and further elucidated by 
the Case Studies in Chapters 3&4, to ask how we can now understand the various ways function 
terms are used by osteopaths and conventional medical practitioners. I argue that illness, disease 
and dysfunction (foundational concepts in both professions) operate as a hierarchy of concepts in 
which illness refers to the incapacity (or loss of agency due to the incapacity) of persons engaging 
with their physical/social environment; dysfunction is the (dys)capacity of particular parts that 
constitute the global incapacity (thereby vitiating agency). Diseases are nominalistically defined 
biological phenomena in which dysfunction, commonly described in pathophysiological terms, is a 
significant defining component. 
Osteopathy is distinguished by its unwillingness to accept an ideal norm for Fyt, (an implicit 
assumption of conventional medicine). Instead it takes FPt to be an evaluative concept informed by 
cultural, sociological, psychological and scientific insights into human-kind. I argue that the way 
Fnt is understood determines the way action/agency of persons is understood - the ability to engage 
with the world in taken-for-granted ways, the majority of which entail physical activities - and 
therefore the way illness and the work of practitioners is understood. Enabling patients to be 
effective agents (rather than trying to achieve a mythical ideal) is therefore the true work of 
practitioners. Because of osteopathy's primary concern with the musculo-skeletal system, it more 
naturally focuses on peoples' physical engagements with their worlds. 
Chapter 8- Conclusions 
I conclude that there are important differences in the way that function is conceptualised across 
and within disciplines and professions. The weightings given to Fphys and Fglob and the ways they 
(jointly) drive the diagnostic process, explain differences between primary and secondary 
practitioners and between osteopaths and conventional medical practitioners. Osteopathy has a 
special contribution to make from its explicit recognition of context in defining function all the way 
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down from the global functioning of the person to the function of constitutive local parts. By 
identifying agency as the key to linking the role of context in the meaning of function statements to 
patients' intentions and self-perception, three elements that are important for (all) practitioners are 
made explicit: the context in which people and body parts act plus the structures formed by 
systemic relationships; the mental intentions of the agent and the way intentions provide a focus 
for action; finally, the extent to which the ability/capacity to act in ways that are taken-for-granted 
defines a person's perception of themselves as an agent, and informs judgements of whether or not 
they are ill. 
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Setting the Agenda 
Part I- Setting the Agenda 
Chapter 1. Introduction and Background 
Chapter 1 establishes the aims and maps out the territory of the thesis. It identifies key issues 
regarding the historical development, practices and current challenges to osteopathy and 
conventional medicine and the way function informs them. A particular issue for both professions, 
though for different reasons, is the extent to which their identities are linked to science and the 
humanities. Function is introduced as a fundamental concept for both professions where it informs 
theory and guides practice. The Chapter concludes that practitioners in both professions use the 
concept of function in more than one way. I provisionally distinguish between these, possibly 
different, conceptualisations of function by using the notation Foss (for osteopathy) and Fmed (for 
conventional medicine) plus a number of subcategories to depict different uses of function within 
each profession. Analysis of these sets the agenda for the thesis. 
I. I. Aims of the study 
The primary aim of the study is to analyse the ways in which osteopaths and 
conventional medical secondary care practitioners (as illustrated by orthopaedic 
surgeons) use the term function in clinical practice. A secondary aim is to see whether 
and to what extent the concept of function both defines practice for and provides a point 
of contact between osteopaths and medical practitioners in primary and secondary care. 
Because the literature on function refers almost exclusively to biological function a key 
challenge is to analyse the concept of function as it is used by practitioners in practice 
without assuming that biological function explains all function. A further challenge is to 
begin to clarify what osteopaths mean by and how they actually use function concepts. It 
is anticipated that this work may additionally contribute to the clarification of function 
terms in conventional medicine. 
1.2. Plan of the thesis 
This opening Chapter establishes the background to and context of the thesis. It offers a 
brief description of osteopathy and conventional medicine and identifies that both face a 
similar challenge, which is to define their core activities in relation to science and the 
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humanities. I argue that because 'function' underpins other foundational areas such as 
physiology, dysfunction, disease and illness, and because osteopaths claim a special place 
for 'function' and 'dysfunction' in their diagnosis and treatment, it is a fruitful starting 
place for analysing not just what function means as a theoretical construct, but what it 
means for practice and how, covertly, the concepts that inform function use lie at the 
heart of osteopathy and conventional medicine. Chapter 2 examines the logical work that 
function ascriptions perform in relation to dysfunction, illness and disease, and why it is 
important to be clear about the constitutive elements in function statements; finally, 
context is identified as an important implicit element in function ascriptions. Part 1 thus 
sets the agenda for further philosophical analysis in Parts 2 and 3. 
Analysis of function as a concept in practice is the focus for Part 2. Chapter 3 calls on 
ordinary-language philosophy to examine case studies involving orthopaedics and 
osteopathy in order to understand the ways practitioners use function concepts in their 
work. Two distinct concepts of function emerge from the analysis, one which focuses on 
the (physiological) behaviour of body parts, and the other on the global actions/ agency of 
the patient as a whole. Chapter 4 further develops the conclusions from Chapter 3 and 
explores the significance for practitioners of working with different concepts of function 
to explain disease and illness. 
Part 3 enters into deeper philosophical analysis of these issues. Chapter 5 explores the 
concept of function by relating the outcome of Chapters 3&4 to the literature on 
biological function. Most of the literature on function focuses on biological function 
rather than its use in practice. It is argued that the interest in function for practitioners 
and biologists is different as is their use of function ascriptions to explain their work. A 
prime concern for biologists is to define function within biology, while for practitioners it 
is to explain a patient's illness. Chapter 6 applies the outcome of this analysis to practice 
by comparing and contrasting the concept of function in practice with that of artefact 
function. It builds on Robert Cummins's work by dividing (physiological) dispositions 
from (functional) capacities, including the "greater capacity" of the person themselves. 
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This is shown to have important implications for conceptualising dysfunction, disease 
and illness and the strategies for analysing them. 
Finally Part 4 signals a return to the professional agenda identified at the conclusion of 
Part 1. It asks how the concepts of function, as used in practice, apply to our 
understanding of dysfunction, illness and disease and what it means for the way 
osteopathy and conventional medicine define themselves. A key issue is which concept 
of function drives the diagnostic process. This leads to a discussion on the implications 
for communication and collaboration between the care professions and suggestions for 
further analysis. 
1.3. Terminology and limits of the 
investigation 
In-depth investigation of any aspect of health care inevitably comes across the problem of 
demarcating the limits of analysis. Legitimate interest in health and its breakdown is both 
extensive - it covers a wide range of disciplines from micro-biology to town planning - 
and rich in terminology. A cursory glance at 'illness' in Roget's Thesaurus reveals a 
multitude of synonyms and related terms to describe this particular area of human 
experience. Much of the terminology used by health workers to describe the experiences 
of health and illness has developed out of common usage, but many terms also have more 
specific and technical definitions when used by practitioners. To add to the confusion, it 
can't be assumed that, because a word has a specific meaning in one context, different 
practitioners using the same term in a different context understand the same thing by it. 
This, as I aim to demonstrate, is true of 'function' where biologists, conventional medical 
practitioners and osteopaths use the term with subtly, but significantly, different 
meanings. Even within a single discipline, such as conventional medicine, there can be 
differences of emphasis if not of meaning. 
A further consequence of the richness and complexity of health and illness terminology is 
that, in investigating one aspect, a number of terms will necessarily be referred to without 
opportunity fully to explore their meaning. It is important therefore to make clear what is 
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and is not being investigated in this thesis together with an explanation of how other 
important concepts will be dealt with. 
I will use the term 'patient' for anyone seeking professional care and 'practitioner' for 
anyone providing such care, in a purely descriptive sense without necessarily assuming 
roles or inferring values. Where I need to refer to specific professions, I will use the term 
'conventional medicine' to describe the thinking and practice that broadly forms the basis 
of State-endorsed medicine in Western societies. Complementary and alternative 
medicine (CAM) has become a recognised term for the disparate collection of health care 
practices that have developed outside main-stream medicine, but which have little in 
common other than that they are not (or until recently have not) been considered part of 
State provided (and endorsed) care? It is common for health care practitioners to be 
categorised as primary, secondary or tertiary according to which stage of investigation 
and treatment they are involved in. As I will discuss later, these terms can be interpreted 
in different ways and some professions incorporate elements of more than one. 
My use of the term illness requires some preparatory explanation. I will be using illness 
in the early part of the study in a phenomenological sense as a means of gaining access to 
patients' health experiences. In the Case Studies, illness will refer to the reason a patient 
consults a practitioner2 - their motivation for seeking a professional opinion. My interest 
at this point is in how different practitioners interpret the information with which a 
1 With State sanctioned self-regulation of CAM disciplines such as osteopathy and 
chiropractic, the distinction between practices inside and outside main-stream health care is 
becoming blurred. 
I am aware that most people don't use the term 'illness' to describe their back pain. In fact 
most specifically say that they do not feel ill, but are incapacitated, or just have pain. The 
terms 'problem' and 'complaint' are not suitable replacements; they are not medical terms 
nor do they refer specifically to health problems. Clouser, et al suggest the use of the term 'malady' to cover all those experiences for which patients seek health care. (Clouser, Culver 
& Gert, 1997) The problem here is that malady is not a term patients commonly use. As doctors, on the whole, use the term illness in a general sense to describe anything the 
patients comes to see them about, I will use it in this general sense. A patient may therefore have an illness (which includes incapacity) without necessarily feeling ill where ill equates to 
sick (in the American usage of the term). 
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patient presents, and in the semantic and ontological correlation between practitioners' 
professional interests. In other words, what kinds of experiences count as medically, 
osteopathically (or whatever) significant, and how the medical or osteopathic explanation 
relates to the original experience as perceived by the patient. 
These differences are further analysed in the context of the literature on illness and 
disease, in particular, the ways in which illness and disease concepts entail concepts of 
function. This becomes a more technical conceptualisation of illness than the 
phenomenological interpretation partly because it refers to the ways in which 
practitioners understand the term, and partly from the philosophical analysis which 
attempts to define illness more clearly by identifying the logical connections between it 
and disease, dysfunction and function. Finally, following further analysis of function, the 
concept of illness is re-examined in a phenomenological sense (as that with which a 
patient presents) to show that the understanding of function in osteopathy and 
conventional medicine has implications for our understanding of illness. 3 
For reasons that I will make clear, the main focus of my thesis is the concept of function in 
osteopathy and conventional medicine. My argument is that the concept of function is 
implicit in the ways practitioners conceptualise illness and disease and that a clearer 
picture of what is meant by function can be gained by examining the ways in which these 
terms are used. My bias is therefore towards conceptual analysis rather than theoretical 
definition. 
3 Interestingly, this parallels the order in which, according to Svenaeus, conventional 
medicine conceptualised the relationship between the patient, the doctor and the illness. (Svenaeus, 1999) Before 1800 the clinical encounter focused on what the patient reported; 
then the emphasis moved to finding and measuring pathological markers. Today, not only 
is the word of the patient given less weight in decision-making, it is actually mistrusted. 
One of the jobs of the physician is to check that what the patient says is true. Although they 
may not deliberately be concealing the truth or making symptoms up (though in many 
cases this is assumed) patients are regarded as poor reporters and judges of what is wrong 
with them. Objective evidence takes precedence over subjective accounts. But perhaps 
today under the influence of phenomenological analysis and with a new emphasis on 
cont ... 
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Inevitably, concepts of illness and disease will feature prominently in the main part of the 
discussion, with only a nod towards the concept of health. This is not because health is 
not an important concept; health, illness and disease are all fundamental, foundational 
concepts in health care. Without them there can be no meaningful communication 
between practitioners whether or not the concepts themselves are made explicit. My 
argument, as I aim to demonstrate, is that there is a logical connection between the 
concepts of function, dysfunction, disease and illness. It is possible to approach the 
concept of health from positive or negative definitions. Nordenfelt (1995) for example, 
defines health in a positive way in terms of "vital goals", Seedhouse prefers the term, 
"foundation for achievement". (Seedhouse, 1986) This implies that defining health will 
clarify deviations such as illness and disease. Other theorists, for example, Scadding 
(1988) and Boorse (1976), prefer to define health as the absence of disease on the basis that 
the role of health care is primarily to identify and remove disease and dysfunction. There 
is not sufficient space for me to get involved with this debate though by focussing 
primarily on illness and disease and defining function from the ways practitioners use 
function concepts, by default I appear to be lining myself up with those who prefer to 
define health negatively in terms of illness and disease. I need to do more analysis before 
being sure that that is my position. 
The concept of function is under investigation for a number of related reasons: first, 
because it is a central element in osteopathic theory. Although osteopaths hold it in 
special regard, in particular through the oft-quoted aphorism 'structure governs function', 
this special regard is inadequately explained. Second, function is a key feature of 
conventional medical theory. It is strongly linked with physiology, a key science of 
medicine, and in this sense is also adopted by osteopathic theory. Third, the use of 
patient-centred care, we are beginning to see a return to taking a serious interest in the 
patient's perception and interpretation of their problem. 
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function concepts in primary health care (as distinct from biology) is under-explored in 
the literature, presumably on the grounds that what applies to biology applies equally to 
health care. 
Prima facie function is logically related to dysfunction, which, in turn, forms the basis for 
disease ascriptions in conventional medicine. Similarities and differences between the 
ways that osteopathy and conventional medicine explain dysfunction, illness and disease 
are therefore likely to be predicated on function. I make clear at the outset the hypothesis 
that function is used by practitioners in a number of ways. I use a simple notation system 
to distinguish the possible different ways function might be conceptualised .4I use the 
term Foss is used to denote osteopathic conceptions of function and Fmed the 
medical/ orthopaedic concept. In addition, Fphy, denotes physiological concepts of 
function (as a subcategory of Fb101, biological function). F8, ob denotes the global capacity of 
an individual person/whole organism to function. (Later I introduce FP, to denote 
patient/ practitioner assumptions about how people in general expect to be able to 
function as agents in a social capacity - activities that are taken-for-granted. ) I identify 
other areas where function is an important concept: Fat and F,, 0R,,, refer to naturalistic and 
normative concepts of function; Fill and Fd; s, 
function concepts linked to concepts of illness 
and disease. Over the course of the thesis these are all shown to converge as subsets of 
Fb; oi and Fpt. 
1.4. Osteopathy 
Osteopathy is a system of diagnosis and treatment that lays most emphasis on the 
structural integrity of the body. It believes that the so-called structural components of the 
body - musculo-skeletal, connective tissue and so on - are vital parts of a total body 
economy (which includes viscera in a supportive capacity), the focus of which is the 
4 This is referenced in Chapter 10, Glossary of Function Terms & Notations (p. 315). 
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activities /behaviour of people. Implicit in this is the belief that good health requires these 
structures to function together in an integrated and co-ordinated way and that illness 
represents a breakdown or failure of some aspect(s) of this integrated activity. The 
concepts of structure and function are considered fundamental to osteopathic thinking 
and practice. 
1.4.1. Historical development of 
osteopathy 
As a profession osteopathy is in the strange position of owning an ancient heritage of 
manual treatment and at the same time being only recently recognised (by the State in the 
UK) as making a legitimate contribution to care provision. The reasons for this and 
challenges that arise from it set the scene for discussing the different interests of 
osteopathy and conventional medicine in relation to function. 
Although developing in its present form at the end of the 19' and during the 20`h 
Centuries, osteopathy's roots go back into Antiquity with bonesetting and other forms of 
manipulation. Osteopathy's American founder, Andrew Taylor Still emphasised 
'principles' of diagnosis and treatment (rather than specific techniques for particular 
diseases) which he believed to be God-given and which, when properly understood, 
could guide the osteopath into doing the right thing for the patient. Still's classical triad 
of principles5 structure governs function, the rule of the artery is supreme, and the body contains 
its own medicine chest, plus an over-arching assumption that there is an essential unity to 
the body, are generally acknowledged to lie somewhere near the heart of osteopathic 
practice. (Corson, 2000) But the extent to which they define osteopathic care and guide 
clinical decision-making, is unclear. 
5 Still's Principles are frequently quoted by osteopaths, but are not found in any of his 
writings. They are regarded as implicit in his general teaching. 
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1.4.1.1 Osteopathy - an emerging profession 
Osteopathy emerged during a period of intense development and change in medicine. In 
Europe, pioneers such as Pasteur, Koch, Jenner, Virchow, Simpson, and others were 
building modern medicine on the foundations of pathology, cellular biology, antiseptic 
control and scientific methodology. By comparison, America at that time was relatively 
backward with respect to scientific medicine, preferring instead more natural systems of 
healing. It was the era of the Christian Science movement and John Harvey Kellogg's 
Health Reform Institute which emphasised the importance of restricting diet, alcohol and 
sexual activity. Osteopathy, chiropractic, naturopathy, homoeopathy and many other 
alternative therapies emerged there at about this time. Roy Porter, the medical historian, 
characterises differences between Europe and America in the late 19th Century in the 
following way: 
If Paris pathology encouraged Old World medicine to stress the empire of disease and 
death, American alternative sects were more upbeat, taking their cue from phrenologists 
and other self-help groups confident that science and attention to nature's laws contained 
the secrets of health. Nature was benign and, if humans only heeded her, their bodies 
would be naturally healthy. Such was the hopeful message of the osteopathy movement, 
originating in 1874 with Dr Andrew Taylor Still (1828-1917), who established his college at 
Kirksville, Missouri. Still asserted the body's inherent capacity to resist disease and repair 
itself. Osteopathy also stressed the intrinsic unity of all parts of the body, attributing 
disease to 'structural derangements' or 'somatic components of the disease processes', also 
called osteopathic lesions. While he concentrated on the spine, Still's followers extended 
manipulation to include electric and water treatments, massage and eventually surgery. 
(Porter, 1997 p. 394) 
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Still, the son of an itinerant Methodist Minister cum doctor, 6 was greatly affected by the 
death of three of his children during an outbreak of meningitis, which the medicine of 
that time was ineffective to control. Still could not accept that God had made mankind to 
suffer in a world of guessing and, in trying to find meaning for his life in the midst of his 
tragedy, he set out to discover a cause of illness that would eliminate guesswork from 
diagnosis and treatment. He was inspired by the belief that if mankind is the pinnacle of 
God's creation and made in His image, then potentially we must be perfect and should 
not become ill; if we do then it must be because of a fault somewhere in the body. He 
believed in natural immunity and considered the body to "contain its own medicine 
chest". According to Still, the role of the physician is to free the body so that natural 
substances can be allowed to do their work. This broadly reflected the prevailing view 
among nature cure practitioners of his time and came many years before any formal 
discovery of immunity or more recent investigations into stress responses. 
Still developed his ideas from many hours spent studying anatomy - much of it from the 
exhumed graves of Native Americans - and gradually adapted a form of manipulation to 
correct the "slips, strains and subluxations" he found during the examination of his 
patients. In common with a number of other individuals who initiated 'fringe' practices 
at that time he appears to have been in antipathy to the 'heroic' medicine of Benjamin 
Rush. Still's principles have an interesting parallel to those of other aspects of fringe 
medicine and, like D. D. Palmer, the originator of chiropractic (in 1895), he was a 
magnetic healer and bone-setter for a period. Still claims to have 'discovered' osteopathy 
in 1874. If contemporary accounts are to be believed, he achieved some remarkable cures 
and there is no doubt that he had an enormous following. (Hildreth, 1942) The first 
school was opened in Kirksville, Missouri in 1892. By the time of Still's death there were 
6 Abram Still, Andrew's father, eventually left the Methodist Church over the issue of 
slavery. The Still family were strongly abolitionist which was unpopular in the Southern 
States. 
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about 5,000 osteopaths. In America, for constitutional reasons, osteopathy became state 
registered soon after its inception and osteopathic physicians took on the role of primary 
care practitioners. Today they have full prescribing rights, practise surgery and can sign 
death certificates. This contrasts strongly with the situation in Europe where osteopathy 
is officially outlawed in many EU countries. 
1.4.1.1.1 Osteopathy in the UK 
Osteopathy in the UK has been strongly influenced by Dr John Martin Littlejohn, a Scot 
with medical and theological credentials who emigrated to America for his health, was 
treated by Still and enroled on his course. He was soon appointed Dean at Kirksville 
from where he moved to take up the post of Dean at the Chicago School of Osteopathy. 
Following a dispute about the future direction of osteopathy in the USA, he returned to 
the UK in 1913 and opened the British School of Osteopathy (BSO) in 1917. He added 
physiology to Still's focus on anatomy and described osteopathy as "the science of 
adjustment". He viewed illness as a sign that a person is out of adjustment with their 
internal or external environment. (Littlejohn, 1874/1974) He described the role of the 
osteopath as being to identify where a fault lies and make appropriate 'adjustments' to 
allow the body to function correctly. This includes consideration of environmental, 
psychological and social factors as well as body structures. Littlejohn developed a 
complex model of ideal mechanical relationships based on the spine, which formed the 
basis of his mechanical postural assessment and treatment. 
From 1925 attempts were made to get osteopathy statutorily registered in the UK and 
culminated in a Select Committee of the House of Lords in 1935 whose brief was to 
investigate osteopathy's credentials. Registration failed due to internal disagreements, 
the opposition of the medical establishment, and the political naivete of Littlejohn and his 
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stubbornness in refusing to answer accusations made against him? The Select 
Committee recommended the establishment of a voluntary register which was established 
in 1936.8 The 1920s and '30s were marked by internal wrangling, in particular over the 
relationship between UK and American osteopaths. For a time, the British Osteopathic 
Association was a branch of the American Osteopathic Association to which it had to pay 
dues. Underlying the disagreements was the issue of whether osteopathy was a 
replacement for conventional medicine or an adjunct to it .9 This issue is still unresolved 
and continues to be a focus for debate today. 
Beginning in the 1950s and continuing into the 1960s and early '70s, osteopathy began to 
describe its practice in more conventional medical terms, though avoiding the medical 
focus on disease. (Dove, 1960) The 'osteopathic lesion', a hallmark of osteopathic 
diagnosis was deconstructed into its pathophysiological elements, and biomechanical 
explanations began to take the place of descriptions of altered position and lesioned 
segments. (Hawkins, 1985) In recent years, this perceived medicalisation of osteopathy 
has been heavily criticised from many in the profession and attempts made to reconstruct 
Littlejohn's claim to have a medical qualification and a doctorate in divinity awarded by 
Glasgow University, was questioned during the inquiry. Littlejohn regarded awards as of 
no consequence and refused to explain that his qualifications were gained at a college that 
was subsequently taken over by the University of Glasgow and that hence, he was not 
formally registered with Glasgow. 
The resulting General Council and Register of Osteopaths (GCRO) remained in existence 
until the General Osteopathic Council (GOsC) was established in 1998 following the 
Osteopaths Act (1993). 
The early UK osteopaths were all American trained and expected UK osteopaths to follow 
the same model of education and practice rights that they enjoyed in the USA. This 
included surgery and, eventually, full prescribing rights. Littlejohn foresaw that this would 
inevitably lead to conventional medicine absorbing osteopathy and he started the BSO for 
lay people to train as osteopaths in the drugless tradition Still originally intended. This was 
strongly opposed by the British Osteopathic Association with its American trained 
membership who opened the London College of Osteopathic Medicine (LCOM) to offer 
osteopathic training to British medical doctors. R. W. Puttick, an American trained 
osteopath, retains the pro-BOA and anti BSO bias in his account of the history of osteopathy in the UK even though his book was not published until 1956. (Puttick, 1956) The LCOM 
still exists today and offers a short course for doctors leading to full osteopathic registration. In 1998, with the coming together of the various factions in the profession, the title, British Osteopathic Association was resurrected as the professional body of all osteopaths. 
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a model of osteopathic care that pays more than lip service to its naturopathic heritage. 
(McKone, 2001) 
Osteopathy has developed on the boundary of Old World scientific and New World 
naturopathic medicine and is thus a micro-history of health care as a whole. Its theory 
crosses modern scientific medicine with Ancient traditions of healing. In this respect it 
continues to reflect what Porter identifies as "the ambiguities in nineteenth-century 
medicine. " He goes on: 
(Nineteenth-century medicine's) new scientific and professional movements generated 
counter-trends -a populist, anti-elitist backlash. While people wanted their diseases to be 
cured, they were also seeking far more from medicine: explanations of their troubles, a 
sense of wholeness, a key to the meaning of life. Craving reassurance from physicians, 
democratic generations also, paradoxically, wanted to take health into their own hands. 
Not least, so long as the message of orthodox medicine was pessimistic, alternative 
medicine instilled hope. (Porter, 1997. p. 396) 
This Janus motif generates challenges for osteopathy both in the UK and the USA. In 
particular osteopathy is challenged to opt for one or other tradition, scientific medicine or 
healing, but to date the profession has resisted, arguing that its body of knowledge is a 
unique blend of the scientific and humanitarian; reductionist and holistic. However, it 
has not responded to the more difficult challenge, which is to demonstrate how these 
form a coherent theory. This thesis is an attempt to address that question. 
The historical development and current status of osteopathy is described in the context of 
an emerging profession. The main point that is emphasised is osteopathy's lack of a clear 
sense of identity. Although claiming to be complementary (rather than alternative) to 
conventional medicine, through its utilisation of medical scientific knowledge and 
investigative methodology, it also claims to offer something different and distinct. This is 
usually taken to be based on key osteopathic principles, which are frequently quoted but 
rarely defined. 
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1.4.2. Osteopathic principles 
A fundamental assumption behind Still's ideas, is that the Body is a (functional) Unit. 
Anything altering or modifying one part of the body, affects the whole body and what 
affects the whole body has implications for every part. This raises the question of how 
practice is affected by that idea. Conventional medicine for example would accept that 
there is integrated activity within the body and that one part can affect another; however, 
it operates, and the whole edifice of specialisation is based on the assumption that it is 
possible to treat particular areas as if they are independent. 10 Perhaps osteopaths are 
over-zealous in their claim that change in any part has repercussions on the whole and 
from that, every other part. It may be that in practice, minor changes have little or no 
significant effect on non-local areas. 
Obviously there are empirical questions to be answered here about whether there are 
changes in remote areas, but there is also an important philosophical question that has to 
do with the way the body is understood. Fundamental to this is the concept of function, 
for it is through function statements that osteopaths describe the relationships between 
smaller and greater parts and with the whole body. It is probable that differences 
between osteopathy and conventional medicine will be posited ultimately on differences 
in the way that function is conceptualised and used to drive the diagnostic thinking of 
each profession. 
1.4.2.1 Still's Principles 
Having begun to map a little of the osteopathic landscape let us look in more detail at the 
other three of Still's Principles, 'structure governs function', 'the rule of the artery is 
supreme', and 'the body contains its own medicine chest'. 
10 Arguably, some of the professional conflicts that exist between GPs, who by their nature are 
generalists and naturally tend to have a more holistic outlook, and hospital specialists who focus on specific areas, are the result of different attitudes towards this assumption. 
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1. Structure governs function. Still's understanding of the body's ability to function 
effectively and the structural integrity of body parts, is both complex and subtle. To 
modern observers, the idea of a causal link between a structure and its function is 
uncontroversial, even trivial. As I will point out later, Still may not have understood 
function as physiology in the way that we do today. Of particular interest in the principle 
is the use of the verb "governs" to describe the link between structure and function. 
'Govern' can mean "rule or control", "influence or determine" or, "be a standard or 
principle for. " " (Allen, 1990) In addition, govern can mean "defining the boundaries of" in 
the sense that in a democratic society, for example, a government lays down laws that 
effectively define what is not permitted and by implication (and, in the UK, common law) 
allow people freedom to act within those boundaries. In this sense structure could be 
interpreted as the parameters that determine functional range. For example, structural 
degeneration in a hip joint has implications for the function of that joint because it limits 
the range of movement. 
We do not have any way of knowing for certain what Still meant - if he was sure himself. 
He doesn't provide us with any clear definition of either structure or function. We can try 
to interpret what he might have meant in the light of his and other contemporary 
writings, but it will be an interpretation rather than a defining principle. I have more to 
say on this issue later. 
2. The rule of the artery is supreme is an even more problematic statement. The use of 
"rule" and "supreme" to describe circulation seems somewhat bizarre. If, as is frequently 
assumed, Still intended to convey the idea that an efficient blood supply is important for 
the healthy functioning of body tissues, this too is uncontroversial, though perhaps a 
modern interpretation of Still. If he was claiming something more than this, for example, 
that all disease is the result of impaired or inadequate blood supply, which in the light of 
his writing could be a valid reading, (Webster-Jones, 1954) it is more contentious and a 
conclusion with which many practitioners might feel uncomfortable. It is likely that he 
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was reflecting some of the thinking of his day which linked blood vessels and the heart 
with the flow of vital energy - what Swedenborg called "God flow". 
3. That the body contains its own medicine chest, is an astute perception coming as it did 
before medical understanding of the immune system. But it is hardly a guide to 
treatment. Knowing that the body is capable of self-correction and homeostatic balance 
doesn't provide a practitioner with anything that tells him what to do in a certain case, 
only that the body, in a particular but unspecified state, has the capability of correcting 
itself. Based on his belief that the human body was a potentially perfect act of creation 
(and possibly influenced by the doctrine of Christian Perfection found in early 
Methodism) Still assumed that if body parts are properly arranged, i. e., if the structure is 
sound and the body-machine perfected, then access to the "medicine chest" is 
automatically gained and the body's innate healing systems will counter the disease 
process. This hints of serendipity rather than planned treatment with anticipated specific 
outcomes. If true, if it is possible to release endogenous chemicals to counteract specific 
diseases, then much more research is necessary to demonstrate the relationship between 
treatment and those physiological responses. 
Although these principles are interesting and, arguably, provide a basis for 
understanding and developing what Still understood osteopathy to be, they do not 
provide a firm enough set of guidelines on their own, to allow a practitioner to make 
decisions about what information is relevant or what treatment will be effective. If 
principles are to guide practice, they must be applicable in identified circumstances and 
indicate courses of action. Nevertheless, it is clear that they are all subsumed by the 
general principle that the body is essentially a unit in which function (whatever it may 
mean) is governed by structure (whatever that may mean) and where all tissues are 
dependent on a single effective blood circulatory system and where checks and balances 
to inappropriate activity in the body are carried out by the body as a whole. 
If the philosophical and theoretical accounts are somewhat patchy, how is osteopathy 
interpreted clinically? What are the clinical beliefs and rules of thumb? 
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1.4.2.2 The Osteopathic Lesion and Somatic 
Dysfunction 
A key concept in osteopathy is the 'osteopathic lesion' or 'somatic dysfunction'. This 
gives special significance to the common clinical finding of tenderness and irritability 
associated with one or more spinal segments. 11 The early osteopaths claimed that 
manipulation of these lesions not only corrected the irritability and discomfort associated 
with the spine, but had benefits for more remote parts of the body, and could counter 
disease. Still explained these in terms of mechanical dysfunctions preventing the flow of 
blood or blocking of nerves, relief of which allowed the body to restore normal health 
again. Littlejohn had a similar concept but saw the role of nerves as both adaptive and 
nutritive. (Littlejohn, 1874/1974) In particular he believed disease to be the result of 
"some pathological change in the vital, physical, or physiological adjustment of the body 
... " 
(ibid. p. 2) He associated specific segments of the spine with particular conditions 
determined according to their autonomic nervous system innervation - the lower thoracic 
spine for kidney problems and the lumbar spine for bowel disorders, for example. He 
also regarded the structure of the body as being constructed in accordance with triangles 
of forces such that if one part is out of adjustment, it has consequences for all other 
areas. 12 
The unforeseen result of Littlejohn and others' theoretical constructs is a system of 
diagnosis and treatment that focuses on 'lesion hunting'. Osteopaths look for spinal 
segments that are out of alignment (or adjustment) and correct them with appropriate 
manual techniques. So a lumbar segment diagnosed as held in rotation to the right, say, is 
11 For a full account of the history of the osteopathic lesion and somatic dysfunction see Colin Dove's Littlejohn Memorial Lecture. (Dove, 1967) 
12 These ideas continue in a branch of osteopathy referred to as Classical Osteopathy. These 
practitioners believe that osteopathy reached its pinnacle with Littlejohn and they continue to base their practice on his ideas and principles. 
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manipulated by rotating it to the left 13 Treatment logically follows diagnosis though 
diagnosis is only indirectly related to pathology. 
There are two important points to be made here. The first is that Littlejohn's diagnostic 
system, for all its naivete, conceptualises disease in the context of environmental change 
and physiological adaptation. Named diseases do not occur out of nowhere but are 
perceived to be natural developments from attempts by areas of the body to adapt 
(unsuccessfully) to harmful environmental insults. There is therefore a rational 
explanation for the disease based on physiological adaptation. Paradoxically, the second 
point is that it is possible to treat a patient without any understanding of pathological 
change or its possible consequences. Knowledge of anatomy is essential but it is enough 
to find spinal lesions. This led to criticism from the medical establishment that osteopaths 
can miss and inappropriately attempt to manipulate TB of the spine 14 Thus it became 
necessary to deconstruct the lesion and reconstruct it in another form. This new form was 
termed somatic dysfunction though in essence, it still describes the same phenomenon. 
1.4.2.2.1 Somatic dysfunction 
Irvin Korr is the person most closely associated with the 'osteopathic lesion' (later termed 
somatic dysfunction). Korr, an American physiologist joined Denslow's team at 
Kirksville in their work on the osteopathic lesion in the 1940s. (Denslow, Korr & Krems, 
1951; Korr, 1947) The concept Korr eventually came up with, was that mechanical 
changes in the spine exaggerate neurological activity at specific segments in the spinal 
cord. This established what he termed a 'neurological lens', a segment of the cord that 
13 Chiropractic technique was very similar in this respect, but X-ray plates were used to aid 
the diagnosis rather than simply relying on observation and palpation. Vertical and horizontal lines would be drawn on the plate and deviations from these by spinal segments 
would be noted and forceful manipulation applied specifically to those segments in order to 
reposition them. 
14 Interestingly, as TB became rare, this warning changed in the 1960s and 70s to focus on 
cancer of the spine. 
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magnifies the activity of any neurone that synapses within it. (Korr, 1947) This accounts 
for the tenderness, irritability and tissue texture changes commonly found at these 
segments and offers a theoretical construct to explain how distant changes can be effected 
by mechanical lesions. Viscera, including blood vessels and hence the distribution of 
blood, are innervated through the autonomic nervous system the neural bodies of which 
are located in the lateral horn of the spinal cord and synapse with descending fibres and 
lateral segmentally organised nerves. Korr described these links in terms of somato- 
visceral and viscero-somatic reflexes. (Korr, 1978) The effect of this work was to produce 
a concept that describes the dysfunctional effects of changes in the somatic (i. e. non- 
visceral) structures of the body. This places pathophysiological and pathological changes 
in the context of influences from many areas of the body and from environmental effects 
that necessitate adaptation by the body's homeostatic mechanisms. 
The concept of somatic dysfunction remains controversial. The research evidence for the 
effects of spinal cord facilitation on pathophysiological changes is patchy (Baskeyfield, 
2000; Beal, 1985); much of it relies on inference from other physiological research, such as 
research into the autonomic nervous system; (Korr, 1977; McC. Brooks, Uchizono & Uono, 
1979) in addition there is debate over how significant the lesioned segment is to 
osteopathic diagnosis and treatment. (Gibbons & Tehan, 2000; Lederman, 2000) It raises a 
question mark over the extent to which osteopathy is defined by this particular concept. 
Is it in fact a small (and dispensable) appendage to some larger more significant concept? 
Hence the focus for my thesis; what do osteopaths mean by function and dysfunction? 
Importantly, somatic dysfunction is not conceptualised in the same way that pathology is. 
Its amenability to being palpated is a key characteristic of somatic dysfunction. I pointed 
out that the common clinical findings of tenderness and tissue irritability stimulated 
Denslow and Korr to investigate the clinical implications and pathophysiological 
explanation of the phenomenon. Qualitative changes in the feel of tissues is a major part 
of the osteopath's diagnostic armoury whether or not pathological changes are present. A 
system of technique with its own diagnostic criteria, referred to as 'Functional Technique' 
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(Johnston & Friedman, 1994), uses palpatory information primarily, to guide diagnosis 
and treatment. From the sense of 'ease' and 'bind' and other distinct changes osteopaths 
make judgements about good and bad function in local tissues. (Nathan, 1999) 
During the 1970s osteopathy attempted to explain its theory using conventional medical 
terms. (Hawkins, 1985; Smith, 1985) One effect of this was to conceptually separate 
diagnosis from osteopathic technique. For example, if a medial collateral ligament of the 
knee is diagnosed as inflamed, osteopathic technique has no 'anti-inflammatory 
procedures' to counteract it; the same is true for diagnosis of, say, a herniated or 
prolapsed intervertebral disc. This is not to suggest that osteopathic techniques cannot 
effectively change these states, only that there is no obvious common concept to link 
diagnosis with treatment. The traditional diagnostic approach enabled an osteopath 
diagnosing a vertebral segment fixed in flexion relative to its contiguous segments to 
employ a technique to encourage extension; or to increase the range of movement in a 
restricted joint with an appropriate technique. But once the lesioned state is analysed in 
terms of tissues and pathologies rather than mechanically, it leaves standard osteopathic 
technique isolated. An inflamed ligament cannot be explained in mechanical terms of 
leverage, force, direction, velocity and so on, though of course the pathological state 
might have mechanical consequences. This issue has never fully been resolved. 
It is unclear as to what either 'somatic' or 'dysfunction' refer to. On Korr's own account, 
dysfunction is often no different, physiologically, from function, where it can be normal 
physiology responding inappropriately to particular circumstances. For example, it is 
normal (and not a sign of dysfunction) for blood pressure to be raised in response to 
strenuous activity, but that same response is judged to be dysfunction (or even disease) 
when it occurs without strenuous activity. I will address the 'somatic' in a moment. 
1.4.2.2.2 The Primary Machinery of Life 
It is helpful to distinguish the concept of somatic dysfunction from its physiological 
description and here Korr has made a particularly useful contribution to the debate. 
(Kori, 1970) He argues that 
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human life, the kind you and I live and see in each other, does not consist of visceral 
activity. 
Life is not a composite of the functions of the viscera. Man does not perform glomerular 
filtration and tubular reabsorption; he does not vasodilate; he does not constrict and 
he 
does not oxygenate; he does not peristalse and he does not secrete. Life is not the sum of 
the activity of our internal organs, despite the preoccupation of medicine with those 
internal organs. 
What does human life consist of? What does man do? Man does all the things that we see 
each other do. He moves, runs, works, plays tennis, builds buildings, paints pictures, 
makes ... love and war. 
He is creative. He teaches, learns, writes, educates, practises 
medicine, does surgery, gives osteopathic manipulations. 
... Human 
life is expressed through the contractile processes of striated muscle. Every 
aspect of human life is acted out by the body's muscles and joints. ... So we 
begin to see 
that even the highest intellectual activity is lacking in value except insofar as it can be 
acted out, in and upon the environment and by being communicated to others. ... the 
musculoskeletal system is the primary machinery of life. (Korr, 1979 ibid. ) 
On this account, the role of the viscera, blood vessels and nerves is to integrate and 
support the musculo-skeletal system and facilitate a person's ability to live a life 
characterised by activity. What Korr is rightly questioning, is the assumption implicit in 
contemporary medicine, that taking care of the internal organs will ensure that a person is 
healthy and that being healthy enables someone to live a fulfilling life. He focuses on 
those things that affect patients. Life is valued not for the general ability to be human, but 
for the specific activities that characterise our being human. Lewis Wolpert argues that 
movement explains the evolutionary development of the nervous system and the brain. 
(Wolpert, 2000) As organisms began to move to catch food and escape predators so the 
ability to co-ordinate and integrate muscle activity made nerves and a controlling brain 
necessary. Wolpert argues that consciousness owes its origins to movement; in order to 
move appropriately organisms are required to be conscious of their environment and able 
to make choices about how to move. The centrality of movement and actions is an 
important concept that I will return to later in the thesis. 
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There are problems with Korr's account; he rightly highlights the integrated behaviour of 
the body and argues that it has a particular focus, i. e., human actions, which is the 
purpose of all physiology. But by referring to the musculo-skeletal system as the 
'primary machinery' and placing it in a category different from and above that of other 
body behaviour he appears to undermine action's equal dependence on 'supportive' 
visceral function. In criticising conventional medicine for focussing over-much on viscera 
and ignoring the musculo-skeletal, he makes the same mistake by creating an imbalance 
to favour the musculo-skeletal structures. 
A second problem for Korr, referred to earlier, concerns how 'somatic' is to be defined. 
Conventional medical practitioners have difficulty understanding what osteopaths mean 
by 'somatic', for in conventional medicine somatic is contrasted with psyche to mean (as 
its Greek origin, soma, infers) the physical part of the body (including viscera). 
Osteopaths use somatic to distinguish between viscera and the musculo-skeletal system of 
the body and here the problem lies. Muscles cannot operate without a blood supply or 
nerves and, even on Korr's account, nerves are an essential part of the expression and not 
merely for the support of human behaviour. Where, then, does the somatic side of the 
body begin and end? It is not easy to give a definitive answer to this which suggests an 
inherent weakness in the concept. 
In addition, why is contraction of striated muscle more 'primary' than the contraction of 
smooth muscle in expressing human intentions? When someone just thinks about doing 
an activity, some of their viscera will change their behaviour to 'support' the thought- 
about activity. On this account, increased heart-rate, say, is as much an expression of 
intended action, as contraction of gluteus maximus and all human activity becomes the 
explanatory focus of body function whether musculo-skeletal or visceral. Running is 
characterised as much by changes in circulation as it is by quadriceps contraction, hence 
running as a cardio-vascular exercise. 
Nevertheless the general point, that people value life because life enables them to perform 
activities that are valued, is an important one. The concept of somatic dysfunction 
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whether or not it has physiological credence, is important for its emphasis on the body as 
an integrated and dependent whole, plus the idea that modifications to one part can have 
repercussions in other, distant, parts. 
1.4.3. The concept of function in 
osteopathy 
It is clear from the above discussion of osteopathic principles and basic beliefs that the 
concept of function is fundamental to osteopathic theory. 15 However there is no agreed 
definition of what function is and, as I shall argue below, there are a number of different 
ways in which the term function is used by osteopaths. Neither is it the case that function 
simply means physiology. Still, for example, focused primarily on anatomy, body 
structure and mechanics rather than physiology. In his Philosophy and Principles of 
Osteopathy, a chapter entitled 'Important Studies' includes a brief section on 'Physiology' 
which deals primarily with structure and castigates the local 'druggists' (sic) for deceitful 
practice. 16 (Still, 1902 pp. 29-31) Still is dismissive of the idea that physiology could add 
to knowledge derived from anatomy. For example, he begins his brief account of 
physiology with, "Works on physiology at the present date are compilations of many 
theories and a few facts. " (p. 29) The introduction of physiology (in a form we would now 
recognise) to osteopathic theory didn't occur until Littlejohn and others introduced 
European ideas. 
15 The most recent information put out by the Osteopathic Information Service, an arm of the 
General Osteopathic Council, describes osteopathy as "an established, recognised system of 
diagnosis and treatment that lays its main emphasis on the structural integrity of the body. It is 
distinctive in the fact that it recognises much of the pain and disability we suffer stems from 
abnormalities in the function of the body structure as well as damage caused to it by disease.... Its 
main strength, however, lies in the unique way the patient is assessed from a mechanical, functional 
and postural standpoint ... " Although I would argue that this definition further highlights 
osteopathy's ambiguity over its identity - whether it is a branch of medicine which 
emphasises disease or different from medicine because it emphasises something else - the 
description does give function a special focus. 
16 Still never lost his intense dislike and mistrust of drugs and medicines of all kinds. 
Osteopathy was publicised as 'drugless therapy'. He advocated surgery in extreme cases 
cont ... 
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Still's teaching was based on 'function' as a natural consequence of normal structure, 
where normal and abnormal structure could be assessed through palpation and 
observation. What is of interest in the context of my thesis is Still's reliance on palpatory 
findings (which, I argued in 1.4.2.3.1, is a characteristic of osteopathy's use of somatic 
dysfunction); he used what he felt under his fingers as the basis for his diagnosis and 
treatment. Webster-Jones (1954) for example describes Still as using "his hands on the 
spine ... and in so doing 
he felt with his fingers the abnormalities. " (p. 32) Puttick states 
that Still was led by his study of anatomy, "to consider first that the condition of the body 
could be determined by careful palpation, i. e., examination by feeling the surface of the 
body, and secondly that by careful manipulation, he could restore to normal functioning 
such abnormalities as he found. " (Puttick, 1956 p. 20) Hildreth, who was in the first 
cohort of osteopathic students and worked extensively with Still, describes Still's 
examination and treatment in terms of gentle tissue probing and stretching, plus long- 
lever articulation of joints, all of which was guided by extensive knowledge of anatomy 
and a sensitive regard for what the tissues could teach the experienced practitioner. 
(Hildreth, 1942) 
Careful reading of Still's writing and contemporary accounts of his work suggests that he 
didn't equate structure and function with anatomy and physiology in the way we do 
today. His philosophy was based on the idea that the body is a complex machine that 
will function, i. e., work well if it is properly adjusted in the same sense that a machine 
needs to be well adjusted 17 A vitalistic element runs through his accounts in the sense 
that a well structured and organised body machine will adapt and heal itself. 
for the removal of necrotic tissue for example, but believed passionately that all the 
medicines needed for health could be generated from within the well structured body. 
17 It is important to remember that Still lived at the time of mechanical technological 
innovation. Steam engines and mechanical aids held a particular fascination for him and it 
is natural that he took these as analogical for body function. 
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The different, some might argue muddled, ways in which function is conceptualised 
appear to have been inherent in osteopathy since the days of Still, for whom function 
equated to normal structure as observed and palpated by experienced 'thinking' fingers. 
At the same time, at a whole body level, the way a person stands, walks and moves is also 
regarded as a mark of their ability to function and the focus of the osteopath's corrective 
treatment. Added to these has been the conventional understanding of function as 
physiology. These differences will form a focus for further analysis. 
1.4.4. Key challenges for osteopathy 
The challenge for osteopathy at the present time, therefore, is to establish its identity as a 
distinct profession in relationship to conventional medicine and the science-based 
foundation of medical theory. 18 Osteopaths want to emphasise that their theory is 
rational and scientific, and yet that it takes account of the whole person including 
personal circumstances. This has led to an uneasy questioning of which side of the fence 
osteopathy belongs on as evident in the way political, educational and clinical decisions 
have been made in recent years. 
In the run-up to the 1993 Osteopaths Act the profession had to decide whether it was part 
of conventional medical care, with the attendant risk that it could become absorbed into a 
bigger professional grouping, or offer something distinctive with the risk that it would 
remain on the fringes of conventional health care. The middle road, for osteopathy to be 
18 Interestingly, the same issue is afflicting osteopathy on the other side of the Atlantic. 
Despite the greater size, wealth and status of osteopaths in the USA, they have never fully 
attained parity with their allopathic colleagues. In an editorial in the New England Journal of 
Medicine, Howell, an allopathic physician, outlined the history of osteopathy in the USA up 
to the present time and presents some interesting facts and figures relating to the 
contribution that the osteopathic profession makes to health care in the USA. (Howell, 1999) 
He concludes that there is little significant difference between the profession and that 
"many people - even osteopaths - question what osteopathy has to offer that is distinctive. " 
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integrated into the conventional system while offering a distinctive approach to care, is 
proving to be a difficult one to define. 19 
In 1992, an internal survey of BSO students soon to graduate, revealed confusion about 
the emphases on 'medical' and 'osteopathic' approaches to treating patients. (G. 
Dowdney & E. Adams, unpublished) Students felt that the distinctive osteopathic 
emphasis behind explanations and the management of clinical problems was being 
squeezed by a medical orthodoxy coming into the teaching of medical practice subjects. 
In other words, osteopathy had an interesting theory behind it, but at crucial times it was 
forced to fall back onto the medical model. 
The dilemma over whether osteopathy is essentially conventional, accepting the 
prevailing beliefs and mores of the medical model, or is coming from a different set of 
beliefs, will form a focus for debate over the next few years as the profession establishes 
itself in the public health care arena. It is not a problem unique to osteopathy, or even to 
CAM. The relationship between science and medicine and the extent to which science is 
an appropriate validating discipline is again a live issue. (Delkeskamp-Hayes & Gardell 
Cutter, 1993; Forstrom, 1977; Foss, 1989; Gatens-Robinson, 1986; Greaves, 1979b; Tyreman, 
1992) 
The current challenge for osteopathy both in the UK and USA is to define itself as a 
distinct care profession. The difficulty is to show how osteopathy is related to 
conventional medicine while retaining its traditional craft knowledge. Much of this is 
seen to focus on the roles that scientific validation and craft knowledge play in primary 
care, and the extent to which the whole of health care is based on scientific principles. 
19 For a fuller account of this issue see (Tyreman, 1998). Also see (Edwards, 1990) for an 
account of osteopathy's entry into Higher Education. Also of interest is Colin Dove's article in the inaugural issue of the forerunner to the British Osteopathic journal, in which he discusses "The place of medical diagnosis in Clinical Osteopathy. " (Dove, 1960) 
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This includes defining the key foundational concepts of function, dysfunction, illness and 
disease. 
1.5. Conventional medicine 
Because conventional medicine is such a dominant force in Western society, in 
comparison with osteopathy, it would seem reasonable to assume that the challenges 
facing the two professions are at opposite ends of a spectrum. However, although they 
present in different ways, the same fundamental issues are at stake. 
1.5.1. Conventional medicine: an 
established profession 
A distinct characteristic of conventional medical practice (and a direct consequence of 
scientific validation) over the last hundred years or so has been the development of 
technological secondary care. The tendency to focus on secondary care, both in resource 
allocation and as the focus for education and research, has led some analysts to critically 
examine the assumptions that illness can adequately be explained purely in scientific 
terms and that care is a technological issue. 20 This has had the effect of renewing 
professional interest in medical general practice, which, since the 1960s, has had its own 
body of knowledge and practice values under the aegis of the Royal College of General 
Practitioners. It has also given some of the professions allied (and previously subservient) 
20 Since publication of the GMC's Tomorrow's Doctors report there has been enormous change 
in medical education. The most recent recommendation is to develop what is referred to as 
a PRISMS strategy for education which is an acronym for Product-focused (emphasising 
clinical practice and making teaching practice based where possible), Relevant (to 
communities and to students), Interprofessional (encouraging multiprofessional learning 
and interprofessional collaboration), Shorter (four year programmes for mature students 
and reduced emphasis on accumulating information), Multisite (putting students into 
primary care and community based health care more and reducing the emphasis on 
hospital teaching), and Symbiotic (ensuring that the medical curriculum will be an organic 
whole. ) (Bligh, Prideaux & Parsell, 2001) This appears to be reducing the traditional 
emphasis on secondary technological care and beginning to recognise the importance of 
primary care. 
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to medicine - in particular nursing and physiotherapy - as well as CAM practitioners, the 
confidence to assert their own values with regard to patient care. 
A brief review of the historical development of modern medicine in relation to alternative 
forms shows how the various traditions have developed and why conventional medicine 
has come to focus so much on hospital-based scientific care. 21 A key battle is between 
practice based on rational theory, today represented by medical science, and that based 
on 'experience', professional judgement and non-scientific models. These have been 
described in terms of Rationalists and Empiricists or 'Empirics'. (Zaner, 1992) 
1.5.1.1 The battle for supremacy between 
Rationalists and Empirics 
In the Middle Ages in the UK there existed three groups of practitioners: licensed official 
doctors or Rationalists, who followed the theories of Galen, first expounded more than a 
thousand years earlier; unlicensed but skilled and knowledgeable practitioners, such as 
Paracelsus; and finally, the folk healers, otherwise known as 'Empirics' who used manual 
therapies, herbs and naturopathic remedies on an empirical basis. 22 Gradually, by the 18`h 
Century, the term 'Empiric' had given way to 'Quack' and become a term of insult, a way 
of questioning integrity, trustworthiness and competence. 
But even at the beginning of the 19' Century, the licensed regular doctors were unable to 
claim superiority over the Quacks on either the grounds of a superior knowledge base or 
personal integrity and a more professional approach to patient care. Neither group was 
effective in dealing with illness. The only difference that Porter (1989) is able to identify is 
that the regular doctors tended the affluent and well-to-do, while the Quacks' services 
21 A fuller account of this can be found in my MA dissertation (Tyreman, 1992) 
22 Midwives and the barber-surgeons are examples of unlicensed but knowledgeable 
practitioners. See for example Marie-Christine Pouchelle's thesis on the French medieval 
surgeon Henri de Mondeville in which she describes the medical practice of the day. (Pouchelle, 1990) 
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were utilised by society's poor. But social respectability alone wasn't sufficient to provide 
the status necessary to establish the regular doctors at the top of the health care pile - in 
fact doctors generally were well down the social order as Anthony Trollope's novels, for 
example, make clear. 
Three related events occurred to change the situation. The most important, because it 
gave credence and support to the other two, was the acceptance of germ theory and 
particularly the way in which Pasteur and Koch demonstrated, according to the scientific 
methodology of the 1870s and 1880s, that disease could be caused by microscopic 
organisms. This was aided by the use of Van Leeuwenhoek's microscope, which allowed 
these organisms to be seen. It was not a new theory, but derived from the ancient theories 
of contagionism which Semmelweiss, the Viennese obstetrician, had resurrected in its 
modern form some years before. The new feature was that it could be demonstrated 
according to scientific principles, a point later to be developed by Koch in his famous 
postulates. 23 
The second significant factor was political. The state was gradually realising the 
importance of having a regulated and controlled medical system, a notion derived from 
Bentham's utilitarian ideas. Disease is wasteful and, in the context of the well established 
industrial revolution, it was important that industry had healthy, reliable labour. Doctors 
were therefore appointed and paid for by governments, not only to treat, but to inspect 
and advise. 
Finally, the threat of cholera epidemics throughout the 19th Century, created fear in the 
population at large. Fear threatened law and order which made it necessary for 
governments to take action. (ten Have, Kimsma & Spicker, 1990 p. 15) 
23 These in turn were derived from a set of principles proposed by Henle in 1840. (Henle, 
1840) 
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So the end of the 19' Century saw a professionally controlled and legalised medical 
orthodoxy, responding to the challenges of plague and pestilence with a rationalism 
based not on Galen nor any ancient writer but on science. Science and scientific 
methodology would form the mould for the medical model in the hope that medicine 
could solve by reason what empiricism could only guess at. 
1.5.1.2 The medical model 
Twentieth Century medical endeavour can be characterised by two significant 
developments, the rise of technological medicine and the desire to base medicine on a 
secure knowledge base, specifically, one rooted in science. Gillett argues that this is the 
continuation of a scientific tradition reaching back to Hippocratic times for which the 
emphasis was on 'knowledge rather than opinion'. (Gillett, 1995) Underlying this is the 
belief that science provides the best means for understanding and combating illness with 
certainty and confidence. Scientific knowledge is, it is claimed, objective, verifiable, 
repeatable and rational, all the qualities that medicine seeks in establishing itself as the 
way of understanding and controlling illness. How then, does medicine marry the 
methods and assumptions of science with human health issues? What, in other words, is 
'the medical model'? 
The answer to this question is not simple, for at different levels different models can be 
seen to operate. To give some obvious examples: the work of a nurse in reassuring a sick 
and frightened child cannot be explained in the same terms as that of a surgeon 
performing a heart valve replacement (van Schie & Seedhouse, 1997); mental illness 
depends on some resolution of the mind-body problem. Added to this has been the 
acceptance that psychological, social and cultural factors have important parts to play in 
illness, but, as I will show later in my analysis of the case studies, it is unclear how they 
relate to biophysical explanations which remain core in conventional medicine. The 
establishment of double-blind trials as the gold standard for medical research further 
emphasises the deliberate exclusion of human influence from the effects of treatment. 
42 
Part I- Setting the Agenda 
At a more fundamental level, ten Have examines the effect that the cholera outbreak of 
the 1830s had on medical theory in Europe. (ten Have, 1990) At the time the theory of 
contagionism was competing with the theory of miasmatism as an explanation for illness 
in infections. By the end of the 19`h Century contagionism had become the dominant 
model and with it a method of investigation that continues to emphasise scientific 
biophysical explanations. 24 What form do these explanations take? 
David Greaves offers an explanation for the medical understanding of illness. (Greaves, 
1996 Chapter 5) He quotes from the same work of ten Have mentioned above, where he 
explains why contagionism finally defeated miasmatism. Ten Have writes: 
Because of its precise results as well as its explanatory power, the infection-model turned 
out to be the most powerful paradigm of modern scientific medicine; it still represents for 
many philosophers of medicine the core of the biomedical model of disease and treatment. 
This model has come to define the nature and role of modern medicine. (ten Have 1990 
p. 17) 
What won the day was Pasteur's demonstration that infections are passed on through 
vital particulate entities, plus the application of Koch's postulates, which provided a 
structure to enable investigators to gain secure knowledge of the cause and effect of 
24 Although contagionism boosted by Pasteur and Koch's discoveries became the 
predominant model, the situation is more complex and miasmatism is still seen in the claim 
that 'disease is not an individual affair but a product of the environment. ' (ten Have et al., 
1990 p. 21) This fits with Roy Porter's claim that human disease is largely the result of 
nomadic man 10,000 years ago adopting an agricultural and domiciled existence in which 
the new environment allowed disease to develop, by for example, crossing from animals to 
man, and for the agricultural 'reliance on starchy mono-cultures like maize, high in calories 
but low in proteins, vitamins and minerals, to reduce nutritional levels and allow deficiency 
diseases like pellagra, marasmus, kwashiorkor and scurvy to make their entry onto the human stage. (Porter, 1997 p. 17-21) Because of the initial dramatic success of infection 
theories in explaining disease and informing treatment methods, the role of the 
environment, or miasmatism in a modern form, was largely ignored. This despite the work 
of Virchow on emphasising cellular context in the development of pathology and of Claude 
Bernard on the interaction between organism and the environment. (Dubos, 1979) 
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diseases25 Greaves argues that Koch's central claim was that 'diseases exist as 
independent and factual entities which can be objectively defined for all time'. (op cit p. 52) 
Three elements entailed by Koch's account are necessary for properly defining a disease; 
the causal agent, pathological lesion and clinical syndrome. This trio has provided the 
basis of most scientific medical investigation since then. Clinical signs and symptoms are 
linked to a pathological lesion and to a causal agent. The main task for a doctor 
investigating a patient with a new illness is to interpret the clinical signs in terms of a 
pathology. 
Greaves makes a number of pertinent criticisms of assumptions associated with this 
model. It is not my task here to explore the criticisms as such, but to show the model's 
influence on medical theory and clinical thinking. These can be summed up in the 
following: 
V that illness is explainable in biological terms; 
V medical knowledge is scientific and value-free; 
V the proper function of the doctor is to find and eliminate disease; 
V health is the absence of disease; 
"" disease is a key conceptual component defined in terms of normal biological 
functioning and specific aetiology. It follows that there is a universal disease 
taxonomy that is potentially completely discoverable. (Adapted from Greaves, 1996 
p. 50) 
Greaves points out that Koch's original unifactorial disease model was modified in the 
light of experience to allow for multiple causal factors. However, as I have already 
25 The postulates state that: 
1) the organism is always found with the disease in accord with the lesion and clinical stage 
observed; 
2) the organism is not found with any other disease; 
3) the organism, isolated from one who has the disease and cultured through several 
generations, produces the disease (in a susceptible experimental animal). 
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hinted, the way additional factors, including psychosocial, are handled damages the 
elegance and simplicity of the original conception. The introduction of risk factors for 
example, provides the practitioner with little practical help in deciding what to do for any 
particular patient. 
Another assumption that underpins the medical model is that there is an ideal state of 
being human that is potentially definable in terms of physiological parameters. Once 
what is physiologically normal has been determined biostatistically, judgements of 
whether or not someone is healthy are made by measuring physiological activity. If all 
physiological measures fall within normal limits there can be no disease and therefore the 
person must be healthy. As the ability to measure becomes more sophisticated the 
confidence associated with these judgements should increase. This assumption is no 
different in principle from Still's assumption that normal structure must lead to good 
health and the absence of disease. Because this concept is fundamental to the concept of 
function - the extent to which good function is measurable by physiological parameters - 
it will form the focus for later analysis. 
1.5.2. Key challenges for conventional 
medicine 
A key challenge for medicine today is to continue to benefit from scientific knowledge 
and methodology without losing the humanitarian element from practice. The tendency 
to address illness through biology rather than from human experience may be seen to be a 
defining characteristic of modern medicine. 
This is linked to a debate about the relative roles of "instrumentalism" and "professional 
artistry" in medical education. (Fish & Coles, 1998) It is argued increasingly that practice, 
particularly primary care practice, is more than the competent application of skills and 
knowledge; that there is a 'practical knowledge' based on professional values and mores. 
(Eraut, 1994; Fish, 1999) Some commentators have linked this with the Aristotelian notion 
of phronesis. (Carr, 1995; Coles, 2000; Squires, 1999) The GMC's 1993 Tomorrow's Doctors 
report on medical education initiated a major shift in the focus of teaching institutions. 
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(See Footnote 20) This aimed to reduce reliance on knowledge accumulation while 
increasing the emphasis on critical analytical skills and the explicit development of 
professional values. 
This suggests that there is an ideological battle going on between those who believe that 
all important medical problems will be solved through things like the 'genome project', 
and critics of scientism who argue that human health is more than biological probity. 
Proponents of a welfare approach to health problems, such as Nordenfelt (1995), argue 
that loss of health entails such things as failure to achieve 'vital life goals'. 
Mori describes a more radical situation by claiming that medicine is undergoing a 
paradigm shift the effects of which, in his view, warrant a change of name from 
"medicine" to "health care". (Mori, 2000) His point is that knowledge of the fundamental 
workings of the body are now so advanced, 'the concept of health is no longer a "natural 
given" and interventions on the human body attempt not only to help "nature's 
teleology" but also to change it whenever doing so can satisfy human needs and wants: 
(p. 723) The focus of health care is moving from educated guesses about how to help 
nature achieve a cure to designer health, i. e., the ability to manipulate body mechanisms 
in order to achieve particular ends. Here, aesthetic surgery, reproductive techniques and 
transsexualism perhaps point to the direction health care (not medicine) will go. If so, 
then clearly these will be informed and guided by values rather than science which will 
merely provide the knowledge and technical support. 
Despite the apparent disparity between conventional medicine and osteopathy, the 
challenges facing both are similar, i. e., clarity and congruence with respect to the 
conceptual foundation of theory and practice. 
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1.6. Function: a prima facie point of 
contact between osteopathy and 
conventional medicine 
Conventional medicine and osteopathy remain unclear about the röle that science and 
science-derived disciplines play in practice and theory. A key claim of this thesis is that 
the concept of function crosses the theory-practice divide in both professions. Function 
both explains clinical phenomena theoretically, and contributes to clinical judgement 
practically. Specifically this focuses on two areas of function, 1. as the subject matter of 
physiological explanations (for which I use the notation, Fphy, and its parent, Fb; o) and 2. as 
the integrated activity/ abilities of a person (which I term FgIob to denote the actual global 
ability of an individual). The latter emphasis is perhaps more explicit in osteopathy than 
it is in conventional medicine, particularly hospital based secondary care. 
For the moment I will ignore problematic issues in the concept of function related to 
knowing which of a part's traits are functions and the (inferred) teleological implication of 
explaining the presence of a trait in terms of its purposive effect. These matters will be 
addressed later in the context of examining whether biological concepts of function are 
equivalent to medical usage. However the outcome of that analysis may turn out, 
function is a prima facie point of contact between conventional medicine and osteopathy. 
Both professions use the same term and, to the extent that they can communicate 
meaningfully with each other, share some degree of conceptual understanding. 
Function is used both clinically and theoretically. Practitioners judge how well a part is 
functioning and treatment can be aimed not just at eradicating (or managing) a disease, 
but at improving function. Dysfunction is commonly used in osteopathy to describe a 
biological state that is not actual disease, i. e., there may not be any pathological changes 
evident, but where the tissues are failing to function normally and, in the judgement of 
the practitioner, are causally linked to a patient's problem. In conventional medicine, too, 
the idea of functional disorders is common. Here it contrasts with organic or pathological 
disorders in which there is evidence of pathological change. At a theoretical level, 
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knowing what the normal function of a part is, is a prerequisite for understanding what 
role it plays in the body economy. Knowing an item's function (as opposed to just 
knowing what its properties are) allows it to be contextualised in relation to other items 
and events in the body. 
Despite the common ground that function terms create between the professions, it is clear 
that function is used in a number of different ways both between and within professions. 
Much of my analysis will be aiming to define these in order to identify the common 
ground and differences between them. 
1.6.1.1 Four uses of function in osteopathy 
From my review of the background and historical analysis of osteopathy four uses of the 
word function, Fas are tentatively suggested as typifying osteopathic usage: function as 
physiology, (which I denote as Fost-phys) function as an integrated global activity of the 
person (which I denote as Fost-glob); function as biomechanical integrity (which I denote as 
Fost_g, o, ýmecI )); and 
function as a palpable sense of tissue quality (as defined by a number of 
osteopathic writers including contemporaries of Still) (which I denote as Fost-palp)" The first 
sense of function is clearly shared with conventional medicine, there is some degree of 
common usage with respect to the second and possibly the third which may be a 
subcategory of the second, while the fourth, the attempt to describe function qualitatively 
in terms of palpable phenomena, may be a distinct feature of osteopathy. From this 
categorisation the question of what, if anything, they have in common, emerges. Either 
'function' is a homonym of four different and basically unrelated concepts, or there is 
some deeper unifying concept that is foundational to all four. (It is also possible that one 
is foundational to the other three. ) Until this can be resolved Fos, is assumed to entail Foss. 
physr Fost-glob, Fost-glob(mech) and Fost-palp" 
1.6.1.2 Two uses of function in conventional 
medicine 
Conventional medicine is largely defined by its technical skills and scientific knowledge, 
which together with the assumption that there is only one concept of function means that 
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the main focus of interest is on biological function in the form of physiology, (denoted as 
Fmed-phys)" However, as already noted, the craft/art element of medical practice, 
particularly in General Practice, has been receiving renewed interest. From the case 
studies and some published material this is seen to be based (as with osteopathy) on the 
notion of the ability of the person to perform taken for granted daily activities. Because 
the interest of the patient and practitioner is on restoring normal (or near normal) activity 
and thus to function normally in a global, context, the term Fmed-glob will be used to 
describe this use of function. 
Conventional medicine therefore appears to use two concepts of function, (Fmed_phys and 
Fmed_g, ob). Although Fost_paip does not appear to 
have a correlate in conventional medicine, it 
is possible that there may be parallel medical investigations that form an important part 
of conventional practice. It is also probable that conventional medicine has a number of 
subcategories of Fmed_glob relating to the special interests of cardiologists, urologists and so 
on. Nevertheless, these different foci on function are not as explicit in conventional 
medicine as they are in osteopathy. 
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Chapter 2. The use of Function in Clinical 
Theory 
Chapter 2 explores the role function plays in medical and osteopathic theory. It establishes 
function's logical relationship with concepts of disease and illness which it informs in significant 
and necessary ways. The Chapter maps the relationships between elements in the basic function 
statement, The function of x is to do y', where x is some part (or behaviour) of an organism and 
y is a beneficial goal, and goes on to ask what this means for the way function informs dysfunction, 
disease (Fd,, ) and illness (Fill). It concludes that the context in which y occurs is an essential, 
though usually covert, element requiring further analysis. 
The Introduction noted ambiguities and lack of clarity about the way practitioners, and 
particularly osteopaths, appear to use function ascriptions. Physiology is assumed to be 
the scientific study of function and physiological mechanisms describe a part's function 
(Fphy), but function also refers, in a global sense, to an overall ability of a patient where the 
aim of the practitioner is to restore the person, rather than just their biological parts, to 
'normal function' (FgIob) 26 In addition and perhaps entailed by this global sense, body 
parts, and for osteopaths specifically the musculo-skeletal system, are considered to 
function together in an integrated and inter-dependent way. A consequence of this for 
osteopathic evaluation and diagnosis27 is to emphasise, not just the normal functioning of 
26 Practitioners focus primarily on FgIob whether or not F lob = Fpt. My point is that the capacity 
of Fg, ob 
(as the actual global capacity of an individual to enable the person to do the things 
they take for granted is the primary reason for consulting a practitioner. It is FP1 that 
informs them of what they can take for granted, but usually remains covert. 
27 I deliberately link evaluation with diagnosis as this is the way that it is taught at the BSO. 
In an attempt to distance osteopathy from the medical emphasis on disease diagnosis and to 
encourage students to look at the way one part of the body is affecting other, perhaps more 
distant, areas they are asked to 'evaluate' what is happening. My thesis goes some way to 
make more explicit what this entails. 
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parts, but the way one part affects the whole and is itself affected by the behaviour of 
distant parts. 
Superficially it might be assumed that global function (Fglob) is no more than an 
aggregation of local physiological functions (Fphy, ) which would mean that Fglob is 
Fphysl+Fphys2+Fphy+... +Fphyg_,,. This is certainly a basic assumption of conventional medical 
practice which focuses, at least in its theory, on Fphys on the grounds that if Fphysl_ operates 
normally then Fglob will be normal as well. I will be challenging this assumption on two 
main fronts; the first by examining the way practitioners use function terms in practice. 
When actual cases are examined it becomes apparent that all practitioners, but 
particularly primary care practitioners, use Fphyg and Fg, ob in distinct and meaningful ways 
to make clinical judgements. The second challenge comes from examining the 
construction of function ascriptions to ask how we know what a part's function is and 
how this informs the foundational concepts of illness and disease. A key element for this 
examination is the role that context plays. 
2.1. The work of function ascriptions 
Clinical work involves two common tasks, assessing the contribution a behaviour or 
property makes to the total body economy and judging whether it is a significant factor in 
explaining a patient's problem. The usual assumption is that these constitute one task - 
knowing the operational properties of a part means knowing about the problem. 
I aim to demonstrate that this represents two separate events that are not necessarily 
connected. One entails knowledge of the 'normal' behaviour of a part, which enables a 
practitioner to judge how it is operating, and the other, knowledge that the part is 
causally related to the problem, which guides the practitioner in managing the condition. 
So a patient with condition c may demonstrate failure of body part p, but that doesn't 
necessarily mean that the failure of p is a cause of c- knowing that p is failing and 
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knowing that the failure of p is also causal in c are two separate, though equally 
important, issues 28 
If this is described using function terms, then, knowing which traits are the proper 
functions of p is different from knowing that p is a function, loss of which leads to c. 
Knowing how function terms operate in concepts of dysfunction, illness and disease will 
get us closer to knowing how the concepts embedded in function terms become covert 
parts of the language of disease and illness. 
Fundamental to both these tasks, and arguably the one that unites them, is the 
assumption that body parts do have functions - they do things that have purposes 
necessary for the good of the organism, however that is going to be defined. To judge 
that a part has failed, requires a referential standard. To know that these activities (or 
their failure/malfunction/absence) also has a causal role in some disease states assumes 
that there is a necessary connection between the (failed) function and the disease. Putting 
these together leads to the conclusion that what the part normally does is what it should do 
if the body is to avoid disease. Disease, on the medical model, is assumed to be a 
deviation from normal healthy activity. In other words, if parts function together in a 
proper way, health will be maintained as long as that proper behaviour continues. 
Function failure therefore leads to loss of normal, i. e., healthy, activity. 
This is usually summarised in the basic function statement, 'The function of x is to do y', 
where x is an item (structure or behaviour) and y its (proper) effect and goal. This 
requires further analysis for it is not clear how not doing or the inability to do y affects x, 
nor is it clear that the statement reveals all that can be said, for there are two additional 
implicit and assumed elements that are necessary to the formula: those particular 
28 This commonly occurs in musculo-skeletal problems where x-rays are taken just to see if 
something is wrong. If an abnormality is found it may be assumed (frequently wrongly) to be the cause of the problem. 
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properties (selected from all its properties) that give x its functional capacity, and the 
context in which y (the effect of the functional capacity) occurs that enables y to be the 
proper goal of x. This relates to the tasks I've already outlined, where it is for the 
practitioner to decide whether a part is functioning well which depends on knowing 
about y, and deciding whether x (doing or not doing y) is a causal factor in the problem. 
My argument will be that it is not possible to know these without knowledge of the 
context in which y is operating. One of my tasks is to discover how x and y are 
determined and what the (logical) relationship between them is. 
Although the concept of function is fundamental both to conventional medicine and 
osteopathy, it would be wrong to assume that the term is understood in the same way. 
Let us start by assuming that there are (at least) two different (and irreconcilable) 
concepts at work in these professions. (If we find later that these are the same, or that one 
of them is false, we can return to the hypothesis that there is only one (correct) concept. 
Or we might need to expand the range to include a large number of concepts. ) For the 
purposes of this analysis, function as emphasised by the osteopath is termed Fit and as 
emphasised by the orthopaedic surgeon, Fmea29 There are other conceptions that will 
need to be considered in the course of the analysis because I have already suggested that 
both professions might be using the same concepts though with different emphases. If 
they are different the differences are likely to be due to elements lower down the concept 
tree, i. e., Fit and Fmed are not basic concepts, but informed by others. What these others 
are is not yet clear, but it is likely that they will be linked to areas where function is an 
important concept, such as biology (Fb; o, 
), illness (Fill) disease (Fd; s), which 
have their own 
specific interpretations e. g. those of naturalists (Fnat) and normativists (Fno.,,, ). In addition, 
29 I have chosen to use the term Finedas a generic term to cover orthopaedics, general practice 
plus all the other specialisms within conventional medicine to avoid the confusion of using 
a variety of subdivisions such as Fmedorth, Fined-cri and so on. As I will attempt to 
demonstrate, the differences between the subdivisions (and between Fmed and F., t) lies in the 
way the constitutive elements are balanced. 
53 
Part I- Setting the Agenda 
comparison can be made with functions of artefacts, and it can't be assumed that Fb; ol 
encompasses all biological concepts of function though Boorse (1976), for example, 
assumes that Fb; oi is the same as 
his naturalistic account., Fat. 
These specific function terms share the same basic structure and can be expressed through 
a generic formula: 
(1) The function of x is to do y 
Where function can be F;,,, Fes,, Fmed, Fdi, and so on. 
In this formula function is defined in terms of two explicit components (though as I 
outlined above and will argue later, it entails others that are implicit), the item that is 
functioning, x, and the function that is being performed, y. What x refers to in this 
formulation is reasonably clear as the item (part or behaviour) under investigation, but it 
is less clear what y signifies. Is y more than the description of a property -a biological 
way of stating factually what x does - or does y entail additional covert factors? 
Answering this will require two stages of analysis; the first to discover what meaning is 
conveyed by y and whether the full extent of the meaning is explicit in the statement. If 
not, if there are implicit meanings, then the second stage is to make these meanings 
explicit in order to see how necessary they are to the concept of function. 
There will be two possible outcomes from this second stage of analysis; the first is that y is 
simply one property or behaviour of x that is selected by biologists, practitioners or 
whoever, for some reason, in which case the issue is why this rather than another trait is 
designated as x's function. The second possibility is that implicit factors not included in 
the formula are necessary, though perhaps not sufficient, for y to be the function of x. In 
the first, y is sufficient for assessing an item's function, once it is clear where y comes 
from; in the second, y is supplemented by other, yet to be identified, factors. 
The purpose of the analysis is to discover, in the first place, whether knowing what x and 
y are is sufficient for describing a function. Function statements are usually expressed in 
accordance with form (1); 'the function of the heart is to pump blood'; 'the function of the 
54 
Part I- Setting the Agenda 
Rectus Femoris is to flex the hip'; 'the function of flirting is to attract a mate', and so on. 
Does this way of describing function fully encapsulate the explanatory role of function 
statements? Is a function statement no more than a description of a particular state of 
affairs? If it is, then ultimately it will reduce to a form which is similar to other 
descriptions such as, 'the colour of grass is green', and represented by: 
(la) the function of x is y. 
The issue for my analysis is whether function statements are different in principle from 
formula (1a) and if so, what the difference is. The obvious difference between (1a) and (1) 
is that 'is' replaces 'is to do'. A great deal will therefore hang on what 'is to do. ''0 means. I 
will argue that the way this innocent sounding conjunction is interpreted is crucial for 
gaining a proper understanding of function. For example it does not follow logically 
from (1) that, if x, then y (though it might for 1a) and if there is no logical connection 
between x and y, then what kind of relationship is it? This forms a focus for analysis both 
here and in Chapter 5. 
I am looking to discover whether what is explicit in y is sufficient on its own to explain 
the function of x or whether other hidden factors are implicit and assumed by y. If y is 
sufficient on its own (with x accepted as a given), then y will be represented in definitive, 
categorical ways as describing x's function. If y is not sufficient, if it turns out that y 
entails necessary implicit conditions, we will need to know what those conditions are 
before we can know fully whether x is functioning. The primary task will be to define the 
conditions required to know the function of x. So, depending on the outcome of the 
analysis, where y is sufficient function can be described in categorical, non-conditional 
30 The verb, 'to do' is used here in a general sense but can be replaced by more specific 
conditions, such as 'to achieve', 'to produce', 'to provide', etc. However, the basic sense is 
not altered. 
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language, but where y is insufficient to define the function of x, function will be couched 
around with conditions and caveats. 
To give an example; if I am wanting to assess someone's knee using x-rays, I can make a 
judgement in two ways, first by comparing what I see with normal 'text-book' knee x- 
rays. This may lead me to make the judgement that there are degenerative changes in the 
joint that might indicate poor function. However if I am told that these are the x-rays of a 
ninety year old woman, I change my opinion and say that the joints look very good 'for 
someone of her age. ' In this case, I would expect her joints to function well, given her age. 
Clearly I am not making a judgement about how well x is functioning against y alone. In 
the same way, breathlessness in a person who has just moved to live at high altitude 
would not be regarded as dysfunction, unlike breathlessness in someone living at sea- 
level. Of course although the person's cardiovascular system may not be dysfunctioning, 
the person would be unable to function and this might prompt a practitioner to intervene 
therapeutically. If I have a number of patients' cardio-vascular functions to assess, I 
assume (as most doctors do) that they all live at similar altitude and I will judge their test 
results on that basis, or I will want to know where they have been living recently. In both, 
I assume or make explicit certain parameters that are implicit in statements about y. 
2.1.1. Issues for further analysis 
What emerges from my analysis is the suggestion that there are two distinct modes of 
enquiry related to function. One is concerned to know that a particular example of x is in 
fact doing y as it should, and assumes that y can be known unconditionally. The other is 
concerned to determine what the conditions are that make the doing of y x's function. A 
full analysis of these will require examination of a number of other issues: the significance 
given to particular traits and determining which traits are proper functions; the 
importance of goals or ends; the teleological implications of function statements; the role 
that context plays; and what kind of explanation function statements provide. In addition 
there is the question of whether function can be described in value-free terms or is 
necessarily evaluative. 
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The assumption with which I began this Chapter, that Fg, ob is Fphysl_, v 
is now seen to 
depend on secure knowledge of y. Examination of how secure that knowledge is forms 
the subject of Chapter 5, but there is further preparatory work to be done. First, we need 
to examine how function informs concepts of dysfunction, illness and disease in order to 
discover not just why function concepts are important for practice theory, but how the 
concepts entailed by function also inform illness and disease. 
2.2. Function in concepts of dysfunction, 
disease & illness 
Dysfunction, disease and illness are foundational concepts in medical and osteopathic 
theory but with differences in emphasis. The focus (and arguably, strength) of the 
medical model is in explaining illness in terms of diseases. Osteopaths tend to favour the 
term dysfunction rather than disease, particularly in cases where there is no gross 
pathology. 
Before examining the role that function plays in defining dysfunction, disease and illness, 
I will make a few general observations. It is widely agreed that illness, as the subjective 
experience of a particular state of health, is broad and evaluative. (Boorse, 1997, is an 
exception to this. ) By contrast, disease is more clearly a medical concept, that is, it is used 
in a technical way by medical practitioners and may entail significant differences from its 
lay use and meaning. In ordinary usage, disease and illness can be synonyms; to say 'he 
is suffering from a disease' is equivalent to saying 'he is suffering from an illness. ' We 
would not normally say that someone 'is diseased' though we might say that they are ill. 31 
So while someone would have a disease, they would be ill. Being ill is therefore a state of 
being of the person; it is something they are. Having a disease is assumed to affect and to 
31 Interestingly we would say that a plant was diseased rather than ill, but the situation with 
animals is ambivalent. We might describe our pet cat as ill, but not an earthworm, for 
example. Some sentient ability seems to be necessary for illness to be experienced. Where 
cont ... 
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be knowable from examination of a (abnormal) part. Focussing on illness provides a 
broader perspective and requires knowledge of the whole person or, at least, greater parts 
than is required by disease, while focussing on disease entails analysis of the abnormal 
behaviour of local parts. 
Although it is assumed that illness and disease are related to each other, there is no clear 
agreement about what the relationship is. The conventional view is that disease explains 
illness and the logical development goes from pathology (abnormality or dysfunction in 
tissues), to disease (the biological consequences of the pathology plus its aetiology), to the 
effects of that disease on the person, i. e., illness. The progression from normal health to 
illness is thus, normal function -4 abnormal function (dysfunction) -3 disease 4 illness. 32 
This is based on the assumption that because disease is a causal explanation of illness, 
illness must be logically dependent on disease. 
Fulford (1989; 2000) argues for a "reverse view", i. e. starting logically from illness and 
moving to disease, on the grounds that illness is the primary experience that prompts 
investigation and diagnosis. In clinical practice a person consults a practitioner because 
they feel themselves to be ill or fear they might become ill and seek an explanation for the 
illness. Diagnosis, as the explanation for the illness, comes (secondarily) usually, in the 
form of a diagnosis of disease or dysfunction. So, although disease may be causally linked 
to illness, illness logically precedes disease. The point is reinforced by Fulford's additional 
claim that disease is an evaluative concept. (1989; pp. 57-71) Dysfunction and disease are 
simply human states that are valued negatively because they cause pain, disability or in 
other ways impair human activity, all of which are normally associated with illness. This 
our intuitions suggest that an animal is suffering, we use the term illness, in other cases, 
disease. 
32 Fulford refers to this as the "naturalisation cascade" which he contrasts with his 
evaluationism in which the cascade is reversed so that illness (with all its values) cascades 
down to disease, dysfunction and function. (Fulford, 2000) 
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leads him to conclude that illness is "action failure". (ibid. pp. 109-149) 1 have more to say 
on this later. 
It is clear that the way function is conceptualised is important for the way illness and 
disease are understood. A key issue is what drives what; does function as a value-free 
scientific fact inform dysfunction, disease and illness, or is illness the dominant concept 
that determines which behaviours (which ys) are functions? What is the relationship 
between function and dysfunction? 
2.2.1. Function & dysfunction 
That there is a logical relationship between function and dysfunction is prima facie self- 
evident from the language terms. What the relationship is, in particular what 
differentiates an item that is functioning from one that is dysfunctioning and what kind of 
'not-function' dysfunction is, is more problematic. Dysfunction is a key logical stage in 
explaining the change from normal (healthy) function towards disease and illness, and 
infers an outcome that is bad for the organism. Much rests, therefore, on how 'normal' 
function is determined. 
The literature broadly divides into naturalists, who argue that function can be described 
non-evaluatively, (See, for example, Boorse, 1975; Lennox, 1995; Millikan, 1989; 
Wakefield, 1992), and normativists, who argue that values are unavoidable features of 
function ascriptions. (Agich, 1983; De Vito, 2000; Fulford, 1989; Nordenfelt, 1995b) 
Neither camp fully agrees on what their accounts should look like and I will be examining 
some of these in more detail later. For the moment it is enough to recognise that a 
fundamental difference between the two views rests on how y should be interpreted in 
statement. (1) 'The function of x is to do y. ' On the naturalistic account (Fea), y is 
determined from statistical analysis or examination of its history, and if x is not doing y 
then it is dysfunctioning, which can mean failing to do y, or doing something other than y. 
On the normative account (F...,, ), y depends on additional contextual factors and the focus 
of interest is on what those are. On both accounts, the doing of y is the proper outcome 
and goal of x. 
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It is generally accepted that Christopher Boorse's formulation of disease is one of the 
strongest defences of the naturalistic view that diseases are real states and can be known 
through the science of pathology. Boorse, (1997) takes pathology to be the study of 
disease, and claims that pathology is therefore medical science par excellence. (p. 52) He 
stresses that his main purpose in describing what Nordenfelt terms the Biostatistical 
Theory (Nordenfelt, 1995b p. 15), is to analyse the normal-pathological distinction, which 
he claims is the theoretical basis of Western medicine. (Boorse, 1987) (From now on I will 
follow Nordenfelt and Boorse's convention and refer to Boorse's biostatistical theory as 
the BST. ) Boorse is especially keen to emphasise that the BST is a theory and not an 
attempt to describe the practice of medicine which he agrees is value-laden. e 
Boorse explicitly bases his BST on function in accordance with Sommerhoff's definition of 
the goals of an organism. (Boorse, 1997 pp. 8-10) He states, quoting his own previously 
published work: 
An organism or its part is directed to goal G when disposed throughout a range of 
environmental variation, to modify its behaviour in the way required for G. ... On this 
analysis of goal-directedness, most behaviour of organisms seems to contribute to many 
goals at once: "individual survival, individual reproductive competence, survival of the 
species, survival of the genes, ecological equilibrium, and so forth" (Boorse, 1977 p. 556). 
... since physiology was the subfield on which somatic medicine relies, medical functional 
normality was presumably relative to the goals physiologists seem to assume, viz., 
individual survival and reproduction. (p. 9) 
Thus for Boorse (and Sommerhoff) goal-directedness is the key feature 'dividing living 
organisms from dead or inorganic matter'. Boorse accepts that it would be possible to 
base his theory on a different concept of function, such as Wright's aetiological theory 
(Wright, 1973), which uses the historical analysis of traits to explain an organism's 
presence. But both the goal-directed and aetiological theories are based on a view of 
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function that assumes that the "proper" function of an item can be known 33 The key 
point is that living things can be distinguished from non-living because they exhibit 
proper natural functions, where a proper function is a trait that aids survival and 
reproduction, whether this is known from examining the organism's history or its present 
behaviour. This is a crucial distinction between naturalism and normativism. The 
normativist view is that health is a welfare-like concept -a state that is good for us and 
which we therefore value. If Boorse is correct in his assumption that the natural inorganic 
world does not engage in functional activity, on the naturalistic view it remains only to 
distinguish biological functions from the functions given to artefacts? 4 
Boorse explicitly bases his BST on one particular conception of function (Boorse, 1976; 
Boorse, 1997, pp. 8-10). According to this view, by knowing what an item's function is it 
is possible to know when an item is failing to function and therefore to identify when 
there is or is not a disease. On this account, disease is the result of dysfunction and 
though logically it is possible to have dysfunction without disease - an uncomplicated 
fractured bone for example - all disease necessarily entails dysfunction. The concept of 
disease is thus based on the ontological assumption that there are real states of function 
and dysfunction, plus the epistemological assumption that these normal and abnormal 
states can be known through biostatistical analysis. It follows that, according to the BST, 
disease and function must both be real ontological states - there are real diseases defined 
according to disturbances in proper functions. This conception of function (usually 
referred to as "proper function" and analysed in depth in Chapter 5), assumes that the 
33 Boorse uses the fact that he could adopt either theory of function as the basis of his BST to 
support his claim that his analyses of health and function are separable, i. e., one is not 
logically dependent on the other. (1997, p. 10) But he fails to address exactly what it is 
about function that leads him to assume that it is the basis of health and disease despite it 
not being logically dependent. He cites Sommerhoff's beast-dung distinction and claims 
that goal-directedness is the defining factor, but then seems to adopt survival and 
reproduction as the basis of his theory. 
34 It would be difficult to defend the view that the natural inorganic world engages in functions. However that doesn't preclude the possibility of developing a teleological view 
of the natural world. (Stout, 1996) 
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statement, 'x is the function of y', describes a biological item factually, i. e., is descriptive 
and value-free. Function language as it is used in relation to disease is therefore based on 
the biological properties and behaviours that an item properly has. Analysing function 
thus involves judgements about whether what is observed falls within normal limits. 
Naturalists view living organisms as semi-autonomous, goal-seeking mechanisms whose 
primary purpose is to survive and reproduce. At the individual level survival is 
demonstrated through the way an organism seeks to adapt to environmental challenges 
in order to live long enough to reproduce, and at the species level survival is expressed 
through reproduction and the ability of organisms to thrive from generation to 
generation. The focus of interest is the internal processes and organisation of the 
organism. Functions are judged to be healthy when the organism's internal processes 
cause it to behave in species-typical ways. In principle, if the parameters of an organism's 
physiological activity can be measured against the species-typical standard, it is possible 
to make a definitive judgement about whether or not it has a disease or is healthy. 
Function, on this analysis,, is described in terms of whether or not the behaviours and 
properties of specified parts meet the referential standards that are typical of the species. 
Naturalists and normativists agree that function statements are informed by goals. The 
disagreement is about what those goals are and how they can be known. Normativists, 
emphasise 'goal' as some purpose of the whole organism. For them, good function is not 
just a matter of operating within normal physiological parameters and adapting to hostile 
environmental conditions, it is about being an agent and engaging with the external 
world in ways that meet personal goals. (Nordenfelt, 1995b) For,,, is therefore described in 
terms of the activities of the person in the context of their social and environmental 
circumstances. These activities include internal mechanisms similar to the ones the 
naturalist focuses on - the inability to achieve a goal may be due to the failure of some 
important part to operate - but will not be confined to them and, importantly, will not be 
defined by them. The normativist / welfare view of 'goal' depends on understanding the 
external environment, or context, in which an item is operating. Without knowledge of 
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the context in which 'goal' is located, it is not possible to make a judgement about good 
and bad function. 
Two prima facie differences between the naturalist and normativist's understanding of 
'goal' in function can be summarised: for the normativist, 'goal' ultimately depends on 
the interests of the whole person (and by analogy the animal, the plant or other life form). 
The normativist cannot judge what an organism's goals are, or whether it has achieved its 
goals, without explicit reference to the goods of the organism and the context in which 
functions take place. The naturalist defines 'goal' in terms of species typical behaviour 
without explicit reference to the organism or the context of the behaviour. Goal, here, is a 
subcategory of survival and reproduction, knowledge of which is not dependent on the 
context in which it takes place, only that it happens successfully. Neither does it have to 
relate to the goals of the whole organism; component items can have 'goals' in the sense 
that a cell has a particular function to achieve in the context of an organ, and the organ in 
the context of the organism. Given, say, a muscle, the function of actin and myosin 
filaments can be known from knowledge of the behaviour of the muscle alone - it's not 
necessary to know which animal the muscle is from or even which muscle it is or what 
action the muscle enables. From this information it is possible to make judgements about 
the function of similar filaments without reference to the organism or the context in which 
it is operating. 
For the normativist functions are ascribed to actin and myosin filaments because their 
properties contribute significantly to the goals of the muscle, which in turn contributes to 
the ability of the organism to engage with its external environment and fulfil 'vital goals', 
to borrow Nordenfelt's term (1995). The naturalist need only know what is statistically 
determined typical behaviour in order to judge what the goals are, on the assumption 
that, because it is there, it aids (or has in the past aided) the survival and/or reproduction 
of the organism. This leads on to the second difference, which is that, for the naturalist, 
the focus is on the internal processes and mechanisms of the organism; whereas for the 
normativist, it is on the way in which the organism engages with its external 
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environment. This second difference may be illusionary - descriptions of and a focus on 
internal processes may be shorthand for `internal mechanisms that meet external goals. ' 
For the moment we must carry forward for further analysis the issue of how explicit the 
goal must be for understanding the function of an item. 
A crucial difference between naturalists and normativists rests on the source of 'goal' - for 
the naturalist it is derived from the ability of the organism to survive and reproduce, 
while for the normativist it is linked to particular ways of engaging with the external 
environment. 
Boorse sums up the differences nicely when he quotes from one of his earlier papers, 
On this normativist view, health and disease belong to the welfare-harm family of ethical 
concepts. The normativist writer's job is to distinguish medical from nonmedical evils ... 
Other writers ... seem to begin instead with an intuition that places health and disease in 
the life-death family of biological concepts. (Boorse, 1997, p. 10) 
The relationship between function and dysfunction far from being simply a matter of one 
failing to meet the standard of the other, also depends on whether function can be defined 
non-evaluatively as naturalists claim. It is clear that naturalistic accounts are closely 
related to biological accounts of function. Normative accounts are much less clear about 
their relationship with biological function. 
A problem for the naive view of dysfunction, (naive in the sense that it is assumed to be 
the opposite of function) is that there are a number of variations on'not-function' (used as 
a generic term for traits that aren't functions); there are alternative terms to dysfunction 
that also distinguish it from function. Non-function refers to something that has no 
function at all; the stone lying on the beach has no function, and neither do the 
adventitious properties of biological items, e. g., the space occupying properties of the 
heart has no function and neither does the whiteness of bone. There are unused 
functions, such as bee stings that never sting, or uteruses that don't bear off-spring. 
These don't function but neither do they dysfunction. Function failure is perhaps a 
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subcategory of dysfunction where some constitutive part of the function process goes 
wrong, such as heart failure or the pancreas's failure to produce insulin in diabetes. 
Finally, dysfunction (and its semantic equivalent, malfunction) describes a process that 
has harmful or unpleasant consequences for the organism. Dysfunction can include 
'normal function in inappropriate conditions', as was described for the osteopathic 
concept of somatic dysfunction and might also apply to some diseases of the immune 
system. Loss of function, then, is not necessarily dysfunction and dysfunction is not 
necessarily function failure. 
This is important for the conventional interpretation of function and disease, for unless 
there is clear conceptual development from function to dysfunction and disease, the 
simplicity of the scheme breaks down. 'Not-function' might be function failure, but it 
could also be non-function or inappropriate function. Knowing which requires additional 
information. 
The equivocation between function and dysfunction is true in non-biological as well as 
biological items; for example, a door bell that is placed too far from the living room fails 
to inform someone sitting in there that someone is at the door. The bell clearly fails in its 
function - its action fails to achieve its purpose - but is not dysfunctioning. This appears 
to lead to the paradox that the bell is both functioning normally and failing to function. 
The paradox is explained when it is recognised that different interests are being 
considered. The 'bell functioning normally' refers to the actual bell on the door together 
with its switch and electricity supply. The 'bell failing to function' refers to all that's 
entailed by the ' bell functioning normally' plus the living room and its occupants. In 
other words, the two judgements describe different systems, a global and partial one, in 
which the partial may be working according to its intended purposes but the global one 
isn't. 
This is an important example for my argument for it appears to parallel differences 
between pathology as local tissue changes and the way this might (or might not) affect the 
person in a broader context. It brings us therefore into discussing the issues of disease 
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and illness and the way that function informs dysfunction (or some form of not-function) 
and how that relates to disease and illness. 
2.2.2. Function and disease 
Much of the literature on disease is concerned, not surprisingly given the assumption that 
dysfunction leads to disease, with the same key issues described above, defined variously 
in terms of naturalistic/normative, value-free/value-laden, descriptive/ evaluative, 
natural kind/nominalistic, distinctions. Behind the former of each of these is the belief 
that proper/normal function can be distinguished from abnormal or pathological states. 
Boorse, as previously cited, states that the goal of his BST is "to analyse the normal- 
pathological distinction, which I claim is the basic theoretical concept of Western 
medicine. " (Quoted in Boorse, 1997, p. 7) What is sought is a definitive, descriptive 
standard against which normal human health can be measured in order to provide an 
answer to the question: 'does this person have a disease, or is he healthy? '35 Boorse 
believes it is possible, though as he himself admits, he is in a minority among 
theoreticians. The issue then is whether disease is a natural kind defined by the proper 
function of body parts and known through empirical investigation and statistical analysis; 
or normative, that is, dependent on some arbitrarily, but rationally agreed standard of 
good health. If it is normative, it must also be evaluative because the act of setting a 
standard entails evaluative judgements. 
On a naturalistic account, it is simply a matter of fact that one state is outside the 
statistically determined parameters and is therefore termed a disease. The fact that 
disease has negative connotations that human beings happen to disvalue is contingent on 
the fact that these states actually are bad for us, that is, they shorten or otherwise reduce 
35 This admits Boorse's assumption that health is no more than the absence of disease. This is 
not an assumption I wish to make, but for the purposes of the present analysis I will hold to 
it. 
66 
Part 1- Setting the Agenda 
the quality of our lives. The opposite view is that disease is not a natural kind. According 
to Reznek there is no "deep or theoretically interesting underlying nature which explains 
the cluster of properties each member of that class shares. " (Reznek, 1995 p. 571) Diseases 
as a whole do not have any unifying underlying explanatory features other than the fact 
that they are disvalued. Diphtheria, schizophrenia, arthritis and melanoma are all 
diseases but it is difficult to say what common features they share that represents disease- 
ness. (Reznek, 1987) D'Amico counters Reznek's claim by pointing out that in the clinical 
situation diseases present in classes and are recognised by practitioners who are experts at 
diagnosing even when the symptom pattern varies from case to case. (D'Amico, 1995) 
This he argues indicates that there must be underlying factors detectable only by an 
expert practitioner, suggesting that disease is a natural kind. 
Reznek's point is that individual diseases may be of a natural kind but that disease as a 
whole is not. (Reznek, 1995 p. 574) He accepts that particular conditions, such as 
osteoarthritis, for example, represent a natural kind, that is they have a cluster of 
properties that marks them out from, say, rheumatoid arthritis, but that there is no over- 
arching natural kind called 'disease'. This observation fits with clinical practice where for 
a number of diseases, particularly those where the aetiology is unknown or difficult to 
investigate, diagnosis is based on characteristic features. For example, in the case of a 
stroke, it is defined clinically in terms of four components: 
V The neurological deficit should be of sudden onset; 
4- There should be focal rather than global cerebral dysfunction; 
V The symptoms should last for more than 24 hours or lead to death; 
V The symptoms are presumed to be of non-traumatic vascular origin. (Bamford, 1991 
p. 890) 
Symptoms that match that pattern are presumed to have a common, "deep, theoretically 
interesting" explanation even though it may be unknown. 80% of first strokes are due to 
cerebral infarcts but in 40% of cases the pathophysiological mechanism remains 
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unknown. (ibid. p. 899) Migraine, myalgic encephalitis (ME), most of the neurological 
degenerative diseases, cancers and heart disease, are diseases in which the 
pathophysiological causal mechanisms are largely unknown and where diagnosis relies 
on identifying a core set of features that is assumed not only to characterise the disease, 
but to define some real natural state. 
The question is whether it is the underlying explanatory microstructure or the 
'stereotype'36 that is significant in disease designation and treatment. Disease is the focus 
for diagnosis in conventional medicine. What is meant by disease and how it is 
recognised is therefore an important area for analysis; in particular the extent to which 
function terms define disease. On the conventional medical model disease is explained in 
terms of dysfunction(s). Therefore the issues identified with reference to dysfunction 
apply also to disease, though perhaps more covertly. This raises a further issue that will 
need clarifying; how are we to understand pathology? Many if not most of the advances 
in modern medicine have come from scientific analysis of pathological states but it would 
seem that a consequence of the normativist view is that pathology (as dysfunction) is not 
a natural value-free entity but a disvalued variation of function. Disease, with its 
pathological core, must somehow be defined in such a way that what is properly subject 
to scientific analysis can be distinguished from what requires a different kind of 
judgement. Questions about the properties and causes of pathological states need to be 
separated from questions about "deep, theoretically interesting" differences between 
pathology and normal physiology. This is the basis for much of the debate about the 
concept of disease. 
3' Putnam differentiates between things of a natural kind that are explained by their common deep microstructure, and things that just look to be the same, e. g., things that are red or 
square. These superficial similarities he terms stereotypes. (D'Amico, 1995) 
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2.2.2.1 Theories of disease 
The medical model is based on the idea that illness is explained by pathological changes 
that pervert normal physiological activity. By diagnosing in terms of known diseases, 
practitioners link patient illness with a specific body of knowledge concerning aetiology, 
pathology, prognosis and treatment. Diseases in turn are defined in terms of signs and 
symptoms, pathological lesion and aetiological agent(s). (Greaves, 1996) Pathology is one 
end of a continuum with physiology at the other and pathophysiology somewhere in 
between. On the assumption that physiology is the study of function, there is a logical 
connection between function and disease where function is a key element in defining the 
tissue states that are pathological which, in turn, (partially) defines a disease. 
This takes the naturalistic/ normative debate further into the realm of disease concepts 
and asks whether disease (as the explanation of illness) can, in principle, be defined in 
value-free terms. In naturalistic accounts it is the functional standard that defines what is 
abnormal and therefore dysfunction and disease. In normative accounts it is the outcome 
of the disease that determines which dysfunctional states are identified as deserving of 
special (medical) attention; in particular, those factors that are involved in the aetiology of 
the illness. The functional focus in disease on either account is therefore on the 
dysfunction of the part, but where dysfunction is defined differently. 
2.2.2.1.1 Naturalistic theories 
In the Introduction (p. 42) I described the medical model of disease as entailing a 
pathological lesion, a causal agent, plus clinical signs and symptoms. (Greaves, 1979a 
p. 32) Knowledge of these is both necessary and sufficient to understand a disease. On 
the naturalistic account, a pathological lesion represents the sum of abnormal events in 
the affected tissue(s), i. e., a change in (the biostatistically defined) normal function, that is 
detrimental to the organism. On the assumption that abnormal function (at least where it 
leads to detrimental consequences for the organism) is dysfunction, it follows that 
dysfunction is central to the concept of disease. On the naturalistic account, practitioners' 
interest in function is focused on identifying dysfunction where dysfunction is any 
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detrimental deviation from normal function. The attraction and strength of this account 
lies in its claim to offer a value-free and therefore objective account that can be tested 
empirically. It is a matter of fact that certain states are bad for us; few would dispute that 
on most parameters disease is bad for human beings in the same way that high winds are 
bad for garden fences and bright sunlight is bad for soft-furnishings. If the sun causes the 
colour of the curtains to fade, we regard it as a matter of fact not of value, even though we 
might value the brightness of the original colours. The judgement that they have faded 
does not depend on holding any values about the curtains. The judgement would be the 
same if the observer preferred the faded colours. So, it is argued, disease is a biological 
state that just is bad for human beings because it impairs survival, reproductive capability 
or fitness. Making that judgement does not require that anyone holds values about those 
states 37 
(At least) two criticisms can be made of the naturalistic account of dysfunction; first 
dysfunctions are not ascribed in the same non-judgemental way that physical effects are, 
e. g., sunlight on curtains. Biological variations are not all treated equally. Some states are 
selected as more significant than others. For example, some (abnormal) reddish-brown 
marks on the skin are regarded as significant because they indicate a melanoma, while 
others are disregarded as mere moles or skin blemishes. It is not the fact of an 
abnormality that is assessed, but the (possible) consequences of that particular 
abnormality. Prima facie there is no difference between a melanoma and a mole, and 
37 A variation on this theme argues that these matters of fact form the basis of the values we hold about human beings refguerred to as objectivist theories. (See for example, Lennox, 1995; 
Sade, 1995; Stempsey, 1999) Lennox argues that life is the ultimate value because it 
differentiates living from non-living things. Life is therefore the basis for survival and 
reproduction which are the biologists' foci of interest, and preserving and maintaining life 
is the fundamental goal of medicine. On this understanding, health is a value concept 
based on empirical fact If life is the ultimate good, then those empirically determined 
processes and events that facilitate life must also be good. This offers the possibility of defining an objective value base for function and all that function informs. Critics argue 
that there may be goals that are more important than continued living. (De Vito, 2000) A 
mother may protect her young with her life, and someone in extreme pain with no hope of 
relief may choose death rather than 'poor quality' existence. 
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many people consult their doctor about a mole because they think it is a melanoma, it is 
only because we value the consequences of each differently that we define one as a 
disease and not the other. The fact that everyone agrees that the consequences of 
melanomas are bad does not change the fact that it involves an evaluation. 
A further problem, which is a variation on the 'heap paradox'38, is deciding at what point 
normal function becomes dysfunction. On the homeostatic principle that normal 
physiology is adaptive, plus the empirical evidence that long-term or inappropriate 
adaptation tends to lead to pathophysiology and ultimately, via structural changes in cell 
and tissue structure, to irreversible pathology, at what point does dysfunction actually 
materialise? What is the point at which a previously benign mole becomes cancerous? 
The second criticism concerns a difference between biology and curtains and fences. With 
the latter the outcome state is compared with the former ideal state. The curtain is faded 
in comparison with how it was designed. The epistemological issue for naturalistic 
accounts of function and dysfunction is how to define the referential state. Here the 
criticisms of Boorse's biostatistical theory have been well rehearsed. (See for example, 
Agich, 1983; De Vito, 2000; Engelhardt, 1984; Fulford, 1989; Nordenfelt, 1993; van der 
Steen & Thung, 1988) These focus on the circularity of having to select and examine a 
normal population in order to define normal. Abnormal and diseased specimens are 
excluded, but this requires that we already know what normal is, the point we are trying 
to define. In addition, the fact that one state lies outside a biostatistically defined norm 
depends merely on an arbitrary decision, i. e., the confidence level set by statistical theory; 
38 The heap paradox, which appears in various forms, starts with a grain of sand and asks 
whether a grain constitutes a heap of sand. The answer evidently is no. If there are two 
grains, is that a heap? So, one grain at a time can be added and there is no criterion to say at 
what point a collection of grains becomes a heap. The same argument can be applied to 
baldness - if a man with a full head of hair loses one does that make him bald, ... etc. In 
physiology how much change is necessary before normal adaptation become 
pathophysiology and then pathology? The answer to the heap paradox, is that nouns like 
'heap' and 'bald' that describe groups or collections, are definitively vague and therefore do 
not reduce to specific definitions. 
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and the issue of how extensive deviations have to be. For example, everyone has 
abnormal or dead cells - our entire cellular structure is replaced over time - and it is 
unclear how many abnormal cells are statistically significant. Second, what is normal 
depends in many cases on environmental circumstances - normal blood pressure at rest is 
different from normal blood pressure on exertion; the level of red blood corpuscles in the 
blood is different at altitude from sea level, and so on. The idea of a statistical normal 
runs counter to homeostatic intuitions, which focus on adaptation and variation. Third, 
deviation from normal can bestow hyper-fitness as well as hypo-fitness. On Boorse's 
account it is not possible to differentiate between these without making the prior and 
evaluative judgement that hyper is good and hypo is bad. Fourth, the theory takes no 
account of endemic diseases, such as dental caries, which are present in a statistically 
significant number of people. Although caries is clearly a disease on the subjective basis 
that it causes pain, pathological change and disrupts normal life, it would not be 
identified on the BST. Finally, Fulford (1989) argues that value judgements are implicit in 
naturalistic/ descriptive accounts. He analyses Christopher Boorse's claim that health and 
disease can be described in value-free terms and concludes that, in key places, Boorse, on 
his own account, is compelled to use evaluative language. In his robust reply to Fulford, 
Boorse defends his view by claiming that, "Fulford has failed to pay attention to my 
empirical view of functions based on Sommerhoff goal-directedness. From that view, in 
every case it is, I think, easy to see how to restate the point in descriptive language. " 
(Boorse, 1997 p. 20) But he doesn't actually do it. His case would be strengthened 
considerably if he demonstrated how he would "restate the point in descriptive 
language. " One is left thinking that he doesn't because he can't. As we will see in the 
Patient Studies, it is difficult, if not impossible, to describe health matters without 
recourse to evaluative terms. While these may seem to be value-free, careful analysis 
reveals values implicit in the assumptions on which the terms are based. This doesn't 
prevent them being used as if they are value-free, and later I will be arguing for a 
nominalistic conceptualisation of disease based on agreed criteria which are evaluative. 
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The point I will be making is that disease can provide an agreed standard against which 
practitioners test their diagnoses, even though it entails key evaluative concepts. 
2.2.2.1.2 Normative theories 
The claim of the normative theoretician is that, fundamentally, the only thing that 
distinguishes disease from non-disease is the way in which each is valued in the context 
of human life. I have already cited Reznek's claim that there is no common factor of 
disease-ness uniting the variety of conditions that are given the ascription disease, from 
measles to hypertension, melanoma and schizophrenia, other than that they are 
disvalued. (Reznek, 1987) I argued that the progression from normal (healthy) 
physiology through adaptive physiology to pathophysiology and finally to pathology is a 
continuum without natural divisions. The normative claim is that the decision to define 
pathology in a particular way is informed implicitly from judgements of what is good or 
bad for human life. 
Normativists argue that there is no finite and potentially knowable taxonomy of diseases 
which we have to 'discover'. Neither are diseases different in principle from normal 
physiology. Nothing different happens; there are no special laws that come into effect in 
disease situations; what is known about physiological activity in normal function applies 
equally to disease and dysfunction. Lester King quotes Sir Clifford Allbut writing at the 
end of the 19th Century who stated, 
disease is a state of a living organism ... the disease itself contains no elements essentially 
different from those of health but elements presented in a different and less useful order. 
(p. 108, quoting Allbutt, 1896; in Lennox, 1995) 
Lennox regards as "nonsense" physiology's claim to study normal function while 
pathology studies abnormal or dys-function; he argues that most of physiology's 
'advances' are made by examining highly abnormal conditions "like animals without a 
liver or without a larger portion of brain or lacking a thyroid; while pathology is 
intelligible only by reference to the 'normal'. " (ibid. p. 109) He concludes that, "Disease is 
an arbitrary designation. " Both Scadding and Reznek concur with this by arguing that 
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disease is a nominalistic concept. (Reznek, 1995; Scadding, 1988) This doesn't mean that 
there can't be agreement. Time is an arbitrary measure but it can be defined accurately 
and non-controversially down to fractions of a millisecond. For disease it means that 
certain human states of health as defined by explicit criteria are designated as diseases. 
States that fall outside those criteria are either not diseases or are different diseases. There 
are no criteria for disease as a whole, only for specific diseases. 
Whether or not diseases are natural kinds or arbitrary designations, it is possible for 
professionals to agree what the defining criteria are. The critical issue thus becomes 
terminology rather than clinical ability. It also means that the defining criteria are open to 
scrutiny and modification. (See for example Rosenberg & Golden, 1992) As Lynn Payer 
points out, this can lead to cultural differences. (Payer, 1989) Only recently, the criteria 
for defining hypertension was changed; treatment is now recommended for systolic 
pressure of 150 mm Hg and above rather than the previous higher level. (Ramsay, 
Williams & G, 1999) The effect of this is to increase the number of people who have the 
disease without any material change to their physical state. 
A key issue, as identified above, is whether disease is defined by its stereotype, (to use 
Putnam's term) or its microstructure. Naturalistic theories assume that microstructure is 
definitive with the stereotype being informative in coming to a diagnosis; normative 
theories, while accepting that microstructure provides interesting and useful knowledge 
about diseases, argues that the stereotype, i. e., how the 'state' is perceived by both patient 
and practitioner, provides the basis of actual clinical decisions. Two further examples will 
make explicit some of these issues: 
I referred to the fact that conditions like stroke that have a number of different causes are 
defined according to their stereotype. The diagnosis of stroke encompasses a 
heterogeneous group of disorders united by their clinical manifestation and outcome. 
Stroke is closely related to a less serious (in terms of outcome) condition, transient 
ischaemic attack (TIA). Stroke and TIA "are arbitrarily distinguished by the persistence of 
symptoms for 24 hours. If the symptoms ... resolve within 7 days of onset the term 
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reversible ischaemic neurological deficit (RIND) might be used, although in North 
America strokes resolving within 3 weeks are considered as RINDs. " (Bamford, 1991 
p. 892) So, the same symptoms lasting for less than 24 hours are diagnosed as TIA, if 
lasting 1-7 days (or 3 weeks in North America), a RIND, and if longer than that, a stroke. 
The underlying microstructure that explains the effects of all of these is cerebral 
ischaemia, which may be caused by a number of events, the most common of which is 
cerebral infarction. This means that the same underlying microstructure explains (at 
least) three diseases. Differences in the management of these is a reflection, not of 
differences in microstructure or cause, but stereotype. 
Bamford notes that between 30% and 50% of "clinically definite" strokes show no 
abnormality on CT scans. He goes on to report that "with the increased use of CT for 
many neurological condition, patients with asymptomatic areas of ischaemia are 
encountered. " (p. 892) In other words, microstructure is disregarded in the diagnostic 
process in many cases. If Cr confirms the clinical diagnosis so much the better, if not, the 
clinical evidence contra D'Amico, "trumps" the scientific. 
On the normative account, changes to the 'normal' function of a part is a necessary but 
not sufficient basis for ascribing disease to it. Other factors are also necessary, which are 
conditional on special sets of interests. Disease can be defined according to the special 
interests of clinicians, as the study of stroke classification demonstrated. Because 
different stages of a 'condition' respond best to different kinds of management, the stages 
are distinguished as different diseases. In other situations, the interests of the patient are 
paramount. De Vito (2000, p. 539) describes the fact that the presence of helicobactor pylori 
in the gut is a cause for alarm because it causes gastric ulcers, while that of escherichia coli 
is largely benign and can safely be ignored. Other than the outcome for people with these 
infections, there is nothing that makes infestation by one a disease and the other not. 
In addition to naturalistic and normative theories of disease, naturopathy (from which 
osteopathy emerged) claims that much of what is described and negatively valued as 
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disease is an organism's (appropriate and efficient) evolutionary response to 
environmental challenges. 39 
2.2.2.2 Summarising the role of function in 
disease concepts 
It is now clear that function concepts play a major role in informing dysfunction and 
disease. I've suggested that much rests on the ability of naturalists to provide a secure, 
value-free account of function. Whether or not this can be achieved, on naturalist and 
normativist accounts, disease is explained by dysfunction which both assume to be 
defined by function. A full account of this must wait until later, but I have already 
suggested that the relationship between function and dysfunction, especially on the 
normativist account, is not straight-forward. There are various kinds of dysfunctions to 
explain disease, not all of which are failed functions. It is possible to have dysfunction 
(and disease) when a part is functioning perfectly well, as in allergic and hypersensitivity 
reactions. A pathology such as inflammation is explained by body mechanisms 
functioning normally. 
In summary, then, disease is a relatively straight-forward matter - it is what physicians 
define it to be - what is less clear is what informs disease, what is meant by dysfunction, 
this is much more problematic. Once again we are up against defining y though this time 
it is its negative form that is of interest, what kinds of behaviours count as dysfunction? 
We need to remember that it's dysfunction that is of primary interest to practitioners. 
Accounts of function, dysfunction and disease are only useful to practitioners, as opposed 
to being of academic interest to theoreticians, if they inform what to do to heal the patient 
or manage a problem effectively. The naturalist's account with its relative certainty and 
clear criteria will always be preferable to one that requires lots of judgements with 
39 The broad thrust of naturopathic arguments has received philosophical support from those 
arguing for an examination of disease in the context of evolutionary theory. So called 
cont ... 
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weighing up of possibilities. At least that's the theory, it remains to be seen whether that 
is how practitioners actually work, and we still have to examine the evidence for defining 
biological function before accepting the naturalist case. 
In the meantime, the foregoing analysis suggests that, on the naturalist account, it is 
possible to conflate some of the concepts of function I distinguished earlier. Fd appears 
to be derived from Fat (which is assumed, at least by Boorse, to be the same as Fb; O1, on the 
grounds that, in biology, items are assumed to have natural functions determined by 




2.2.3. Function and illness 
The work of function concepts in the concept of illness is less clear than it is in disease. 
Apart from the work that has been done on phenomenology, the concept of illness has 
attracted less philosophical attention than has that of disease 40 This may be due to an 
assumption that illness is disease plus an array of variable factors brought by individual 
patients and circumstance, and therefore doesn't demonstrate a clear area for analysis. It 
may also be due to the fact that illness is generally assumed to be heavily value-laden and 
that the interesting work comes from stripping away the superfluous layers in order to 
reveal the objective hard core of disease which is assumed to be the real work of 
(scientific) medicine. 
Behind much of modern medicine lies a rhetorical question that might be formulated as, 
"why does scientific medicine still need a concept of illness, when illness is explained in 
'Darwinian Medicine', argues that certain disease symptoms, such as pyrexia and cough, 
are adaptations that aid survival. (Gammelgaard, 2000; Ness & Williams, 1995) 
40 This is not to be dismissive of phenomenology which offers an informative and helpful way 
of thinking about illness. It explains the experience of illness much more comprehensively 
than the medical model. But it suffers because it doesn't offer an easy solution or path for 
the (busy) practitioner. The medical model with its seductive offer of identifying and fixing 
damaged parts will always win even if it doesn't offer such a complete account or has 
obvious flaws. 
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terms of disease? " Modern medicine is successful, it is claimed, because it is able to 
explain illness in terms of disease, which in turn is based on the science of biology. 
However, as I have already indicated, the concept of disease itself is far from settled. My 
main concern, though, is to explore the extent to which the concept of function is implicit 
in concepts of illness and whether it does the same philosophical work as it does in the 
concept of disease 41 
This leads me to explore the two main theories of illness; first as an evaluative element in 
the meaning of dysfunction, and second as loss of agency. The main difference between 
them is not so much the constituent elements, which are broadly the same for both 
accounts, but the logical relationship between the broader general concept of illness and 
the narrower one of disease. 
2.2.3.1 Theories of illness 
Despite the general lack of literature on the concept of illness, two distinct concepts can be 
identified; one based on the medical model, and the other a "reverse view" (Fulford, 
1989)). The former assumes that Fglob = Fphysl_,,. and that illness is explained by one or 
more functions failing and causing global function failure. The latter begins by asking 
what it is that makes some experiences illness or more specifically, how patients make the 
judgement that they are ill. This, I will argue, is based on a personal perception of agency. 
2.2.3.1.1 Illness and the medical model 
The medical model assumes that disease explains and is therefore foundational to illness 
both aetiologically and logically. On this account the concept of function works in illness 
in the same way that it does in disease: dysfunction is defined by function (on the 
assumption that it is possible to know what the proper functions of items are); diseases 
41 For an exploration of the issues entailed in explaining illness including the classification of diseases, giving social meaning and the implications for clinical practice, see Aronowitz, 
1998; Svenaeus, 1999 
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are caused by one or more dysfunctions and results in specific clinical signs and 
pathological lesions; finally, illness is the personal experience of these changes and may 
include suffering and psychological responses to the disease. (Nordenfelt, 1995a) 
On this account, the primary role of function is to inform dysfunction and disease and 
explain why someone is ill. But there is a secondary role which is to explain some of the 
additional effects of illness. These can be broken down into two areas; the biological 
effects of just being ill - general responses of the body to stressors. Hans Selye, for 
example began his investigation into stress responses by recognising that patients in 
hospital not only had the symptoms associated with a specific disease, but shared a set of 
common symptoms that he termed a General Adaptive Syndrome (GAS). (Selye, 1976 
pp. 15-27) These he described as general symptoms of being ill. More recent research 
suggests that his original concept, that the body's GAS was the same no matter whether 
the stressor was an infection, hunger or fear, was too simplistic, nevertheless there are 
general reactions that contribute to a person's experience of illness over and above the 
symptoms of a disease. 
The second experience of illness is described by van den Berg in his essay on The Meaning 
of Being Ill. He describes waking up in the morning, "not feeling too well. " He gets up 
intending to carry on as normal but various symptoms prompt him to get back into bed. 
He refuses his wife's invitation to have breakfast; he goes on, 
I am really ill. I give up my coffee and toast, as I give up everything the day was to bring, 
all the plans and the duties. And to prove that I am abandoning these completely I turn to 
the wall, nestle myself in my bed, which guarantees a comparative well-being by its warm 
invitation to passivity, and close my eyes. (van den Berg, 1984) 
This is a clear demonstration of incapacity, he feels incapable of doing his usual activities 
which he identifies with being ill. He is unable or reluctant to engage in normal life 
activities - he loses his appetite, interest in family matters, and all the usual things that 
mark out human life. This can range from the physical inability to do something because 
of weakness or pain for example, to loss of energy and motivation. 
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In both these cases, the experience of the patient is not simply due to a particular disease, 
but to a general loss of ability. Today stress, for example, is recognised as an illness and 
deserving of medical care in its own right, though it is not a disease and is not caused by a 
specific dysfunction. This is a problem for the medical model for it means that not all 
illnesses are explained by disease. It is argued that in these cases there is a question mark 
over whether they really are medical problems. In any case, because these secondary 
effects normally disappear once the disease has gone, for all practical purposes they can 
be ignored and the practitioner can focus on the disease. 
2.2.3.1.2 The "reverse view" 
The idea that illness is logically dependent on disease has been challenged by a number of 
authors, notably Fulford (1989), who argues for a "reverse view"; that illness determines 
which physiological states are categorised as disease on the basis of (disvalued) pain and 
disability. Because illness is evaluative, those states identified from a range of states 
because they explain it, must also be evaluative. Therefore, rather than disease logically 
defining illness, it is illness that defines which physiological states are dysfunctional 
states, and diseases. A person judges that they are ill, as distinct from having a disease, 
when they can't do the things they ordinarily just do 42 Disease is logically related to a 
particular kind of dysfunction, but illness is logically related to a particular kind of 
"action failure" which in turn is derived from a failure of "ordinary doing". 
In Fulford's account, the (primary) symptoms associated with a specific disease and those 
(secondary) symptoms associated with general stress and loss of ability, are reversed. It is 
the incapacity or "action failure" that is the determining factor in the primary experience 
42 Using J. L. Austin's concept of "ordinary doing" to describe those activities that we 
ordinarily expect just to do, like getting up out of a chair, walking to the front door or 
picking up a pencil. What focuses our attention on activities of this kind is not our ability to 
do them, but our disability when we can't and when there are no external reasons for our 
disability, such as being restrained in a chair or wearing mittens for example. (Austin, 1979) 
This is further expounded in Chapter 3. 
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of illness. Thus when someone is ill, that is, incapable of doing what they expect to do (or 
do with customary comfort and ease), they are unable to achieve specific actions in the 
usual expected way, such as getting out of a chair easily. Achieving purposive actions 
entails functions in the sense that certain functional activities enable the purpose to be 
achieved. It requires the person to be capable of doing certain things. Here, Fulford 
distinguishes the actions of the person as "ordinary doing" from the functioning of, say, 
the person's arm, which he describes as "functional doing". This, he argues, clarifies the 
equivocation between illness and dysfunction in everyday use (ibid. p. 126). On this 
account illness provides a logical link between the global experiences of the person who 
feels incapable because they can't do the "ordinary" things they just expect to do, like 
getting up in the morning and eating breakfast, and dysfunctioning body parts, like arms 
and legs (and normally defined by disease) that are failing to carry out the mechanics of 
those doings. 
2.2.3.1.2.1. Criticisms of Fulford's account 
However, although Fulford's account is clear, it doesn't completely answer the 
equivocation between function and dysfunction. I noted earlier in 2.2.1 on page 59, that 
the relationship between function and dysfunction is not clear, that there are a number of 
different ways of construing dysfunction in relation to function. The significant factor, as 
in the case of the door bell that can't be heard from the living room, is the context in 
which the activities take place. This is particularly true when conditions such as stress are 
considered; the same stress reactions, such as stimulation of the sympathetic nervous 
system and adrenal cortex, that cause illness are no different from those that are necessary 
for ordinary living. Without glucocorticoids we would be unable to react to 
environmental challenges such as cold, hunger or crossing a busy road. What makes the 
same reaction an illness in one case and normal physiology in another is the context in 
which it takes place. It is theoretically possible for all the component parts, examined 
separately, to be functioning normally, i. e., operating within (biostatistically) normal 
limits, but for there to be a global failure of function. In non-biological items this might be 
described as a design fault. In biological systems it is more complex. 
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There appear to be similarities between my example of the door bell and Fulford's 
example of not being able to raise an arm (given that this can't be accounted for by 
external restraint and so on). Fulford's argument is that the person who finds they can't 
lift their arm, an action they ordinarily just expect to be able to do, would seek medical 
help to explain their incapacity (action failure). This, he argues, can be examined at the 
two levels described above: the dysfunction of the arm, which is derived from "functional 
doing", and the illness of the person, which is derived from "ordinary doing". Given that 
arms don't function in isolation, i. e., apart from the person whose arm it is, in the same 
way that door bells only function in the context of a house and the people who need to be 
informed that someone is at the door, there appears to be an equivalence between door 
bells and arms, and houses and people. If so, then it is logically possible for the person to 
be ill, but for there to be no actual site of dysfunction. The person might be "stressed" or 
"paralysed with fear", for example, conditions that would not be explainable in terms of 
dysfunction of any constituent part, but would nevertheless represent action failure. 
The idea that there could be an illness without a disease, although fully consistent with 
Fulford's "reverse view" (Fulford, 1989, Chapter 2), is problematic for a medical 
profession that bases so much on the belief that disease explains illness. The history of 
myalgic encephalitis and issues relating to industrial "injuries" are illustrative on this 
point. (Aronowitz, 1997; Markowitz & Rosner, 1997) There is still much antipathy 
towards "stress" as a diagnosis. 
The distinction Fulford draws between the person and their arm requires further 
clarification. I accept Fulford's point that people are not defined by their functions in the 
way that hearts and livers are defined (in part) by their functions. But on that basis, 
neither do arms and legs have functions in the way that hearts and livers have functions. 
The function of the heart is to pump blood, but what is the function of the arm? Arms, 
like people, can function in a variety of different contexts; to carry a bag, paint a wall, etc. 
Fulford agrees that people do function in the sense that they enter into functional 
relationships. So someone may function as a mother, footballer or gardener or perhaps all 
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three. A person's general capability plus the specific capacity of body parts to do these 
kinds of things, and others, unites, at least superficially, Nordenfelt's holistic welfare 
theory of vital goals with Fulford's illness as action failure. This line of thinking resonates 
with Korr's thesis, outlined in the Introduction, that human life is valued for the general 
ability to act rather than the (necessary but secondary) activities of internal organs and 
tissues. But the point that none of these authors sufficiently emphasise, and that is a 
central claim of this thesis, is that the context-dependence of function statements goes all 
the way down. It is not a feature solely of the global functioning (the "actions") of people, 
but of the functioning of body parts, and, even, of the physiological functions (Fphy, ) and 
other biological processes (Fb; ai), on which these 
higher functions depend causally. 
Finally, Fulford distinguishes between the actions of people and the function of parts such 
as arms (accepting for the moment that this will require further clarification) and he 
correctly notes that "ordinary doing" defines a person's perception that they are well or 
ill. But this also depends on the context in which actions take place, the environment in 
which "doings" happen. Although context is implicit in the sense that all activity has to 
occur somewhere, the precise role that context plays is unclear. It might be that 
clarification here will also help to clarify what is meant by the function of things like arms 
and legs. For example, normal and "ordinary" actions of my hand are gripping by 
making a fist, and spreading my fingers in order to play the piano, say. However if, when 
I want to play the piano, my hand makes a fist instead of spreading to cover the keys, I 
would, rightly, consider it to be a failure of some kind even though both are "ordinary" 
actions. This is not the same kind of function failure as the inability to raise my arm. 
After all, if I want to hold something tight in my hand, making a fist is perfectly normal. 
"Action failure" on its own is insufficient to determine whether or not the failure of any 
particular action constitutes an illness. By not making context explicit, Fulford is open to 
the accusation that he is attempting to define 'normal' and 'failed' actions within the 
context of a standardised human being. 
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My disagreement with Fulford is not with the broad thrust of his argument, but with his 
use of the term "action failure" to define illness. My point is that knowing whether any 
particular "action" has failed entails knowing the context in which there was an intention 
to act. By defining illness in terms of "loss of agency" rather than "action failure", the 
context in which an action takes place and the mental intentions behind it are made 
explicit. Fulford rightly emphasises the sense of "ordinary doing" that underpins our 
"ordinary" actions. Walking is a good example of "ordinary doing", but even here, 
without explicit acknowledgement both of the intention of the person and the context in 
which walking occurs, it is not possible to assess failure. If I want to get from my house to 
the shop I just walk without thinking about how I walk. Walking, as "ordinary doing", is 
one element (though conceptually an important element) in "going to the shop". Entailed 
by the action of "going to the shop" is the "ordinary doing" of walking, my intention in 
and the context of going to the shop. If my nearest shop is 50 miles away, then my 
'failure' to walk there, while it might represent "action failure", is unlikely to be 
construed as illness. (Though see footnote 76) Without explicit reference to context and 
the intention of the agent, sleep-walking would be regarded as normal. However, on my 
account, sleep-walking is loss of agency because the person is acting ("ordinary doing" 
acting) in an inappropriate context and without the (conscious) intention to act. 
If illness necessarily entails value judgements, a core claim of Fulford's account, then all 
the elements that contribute to those value-judgements need to be made explicit including 
the context in which actions take place. My point is that if Fulford's idea is pushed a little 
further and the patient considered to be an agent operating in a specific context, then 
failure to do those things that are taken for granted in that context (which is very close to 
and probably entails the idea of "ordinary doing") more clearly defines illness. Illness 
here is not just "action failure" in an unspecified context, but loss of agency in the specific 
context of the environment in which the patient is actually acting and where they 
normally take it for granted that they can do these kinds of activities as and when they 
would ordinarily do them. 
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2.2.4. -A theoretical framework for moving 
between illness and disease 
I have started to describe how function concepts inform the foundational concepts of 
dysfunction, disease and illness but not yet in a very clear way. A number of issues 
remain for further analysis; a) defining what kind of dysfunction is being referred to as 
there is no clear conceptual opposite to function; b) defining disease in value-free terms, 
or, if values are innate features of disease ascriptions, determining the epistemological 
basis for (evaluative) diagnosis; c) determining what the role of context might be in 
defining function and dysfunction in the concept of illness. 
Crucial to the concept of illness is the notion of people being unable to act in ways they 
take for granted. Not only does this make the focus of the practitioner explicit - what is 
important is the ability of the person to do the things they ordinarily expect to do and not 
simply the presence of pathology-indicators - it also makes explicit the conceptual 
dependence of disease on illness rather than the other way round as the medical model 
assumes. It is the inability to function in a global sense that determines whether 
particular body states are regarded as diseases, rather than changed local function 
determining whether or not someone has a disease. 
An implicit claim of the medical model is that illness is explained by disease. On this 
account, illness is explained primarily in terms of disease; other factors associated with 
illness, such as psychosocial and environmental, are secondary because they aren't 
causally responsible for the pathological lesion. Instead they are predisposing factors 
because they make it more likely that pathological disease states will develop. This relies 
implicitly on the fact of function being a value-free concept. 
My analysis may inadvertently have strengthened medicine's claim to separate illness 
from disease. If, as I seem to be indicating, disease and illness are informed by different 
concepts of function, disease by the proper function of body parts and illness by the 
function of the person, then disease, with its scientific biological roots, is both useful to 
practitioners and easier to investigate by researchers. It might seem that medicine is 
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justified to ignore illness and focus on disease. The problem is that if illness and disease 
have different function concepts driving them, disease cannot logically explain illness - at 
least not without finding another factor that is common to both concepts. On this 
analysis, illness and disease are different in kind; the terms are not interchangeable and 
the diagnosis of illness is different from the diagnosis of disease. Illness tells a story about 
a person not being able to act effectively in their world, and disease tells a story about the 
pathophysiological state of their body parts. 
Clearly practitioners do explain patients' illness stories biologically and the fact that 
patients continue to consult them suggests that it is largely successful. The question is 
how they achieve it, how the two notions of function that separately inform disease and 
illness are brought together in a coherent way. This is addressed first by looking at the 
ways in which the practitioners in the Case Studies used function, and then in Part 3, from 
in-depth philosophical analysis of the key issues. 
2.3. Summary of Part I 
Chapters 1&2 have established the agenda for the thesis, which is to examine and begin 
to clarify the ways in which function ascriptions inform and are used in osteopathic and 
conventional medical practice. This embodies a number of issues some relating to the 
professional identities of osteopathy and conventional medicine and others to the logical 
work of function statements and links between biological function ascriptions and 
function concepts in practice. 
What has begun to emerge, but requiring further analysis, is the suggestion that, in 
practice at least, two or more concepts of function are at work, one focussing on the 
behaviour of local parts (Fphyg) and the other on the global activities of the person (F. , ob). I 
have begun to enquire whether Fglob is any more that the aggregation or summation of 
Fphy, and the answer to that is seen to rest, at least in part, on the ability of Fb, oi (and hence 
Fphy, ) to be defined scientifically. 
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Chapter 3. Linguistic Analysis: "a way of 
getting started" 
In this Chapter I use two Case Studies to begin to identify the way practitioners use function 
concepts in practice. Linguistic analysis, in particular Austin's views on 'ordinary language', is 
used as "a way of getting started" (Warnock, precising Austin) on the task. It concludes that all 
the practitioners use two significantly different concepts of function, one which assumes that body 
parts and behaviours have "proper" physiological functions (referred to as F¢hy, a subcategory of 
biological function, Fb; o, 
), and the other that takes account of a person's global ability to function 
(expressed through actionlagency) in their physical and social environment (referred to as FB,,, b). 
3.1. Background to the Case Studies 
Chapter 1 identified prima facie differences between osteopathy and conventional 
medicine based around their commitment to the medical model. These differences relate 
historically to the context of their development and, in particular, to conventional 
medicine's adoption of scientific methodology as a means of validating its practice claims. 
Osteopathy, on the other hand, while incorporating significant aspects of the medical 
model into its theory, has maintained a resistance towards categorising patient illnesses in 
terms of specific diseases, as is inferred by the medical model, preferring instead to focus 
on the patient as a unique individual. Consequently, in very general terms, osteopaths 
tend to emphasise the complex interactions of different parts of the body, and 
conventional practitioners focus on finding and correcting specific physiological 
abnormalities. This broad and sweeping generalisation must now be examined in more 
detail not just to test its truth, but to analyse what each profession is claiming by 
emphasising different elements. Rather than being different in principle, it might be that 
both professions are simply emphasising different aspects of the same thing - the blind 
men feeling different parts of the elephant and disagreeing about what an elephant is - in 
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which case the next task is to contribute to the development of the picture of the whole 
elephant. 
Chapter 2 highlighted a central claim of the medical model, that illness is explained by 
disease, which in turn is explained in terms of dysfunction, which (it is assumed), is failed 
function. I noted that for this "naturalisation cascade" (Fulford, 2000) to work it must rest 
on something solid and that function must be definable in scientific, i. e., objective, value- 
free, ways. I will address the question of whether function can be defined in such a way 
in Chapter 5, but, it's important that my broader enquiry - what the concept of function 
means for practice - doesn't rely only on biology's failure to provide a convincing non- 
evaluative account of function. The issue, even if function can be defined scientifically, is 
what role do the humanities play in practice; are they fundamental or mere accessories to 
the real (scientific) work? A scientific concept of function would strengthen the case for 
considering disease as the logical foundation of illness and the proper focus of scientific 
enquiry, but what would it mean for practitioners? If the average osteopath or GP was 
able confidently to base their diagnosis on a complete scientific understanding of the 
physiological working of the body (Deep Space Nine medicine), would there still be a 
place for considering patient function in global terms? This is the subject of this Chapter - 
how function is actually used in practice. 
By holding to certain parts of the medical model, principally that illness can be explained 
biologically, while disclaiming others, such as the ability to categorise all illness in a 
common nosography, osteopathy appears to demonstrate a lack of theoretical congruity. 
This might explain the distinctly osteopathic gestalt, described by Dowdney and Adams 
(see 1.4.4), where novice practitioners jump between medical and osteopathic 
interpretations of symptoms. 
In osteopathy, evaluation and enhancement of function are considered to be defining 
characteristics of practice; the aim of diagnosis is to identify dysfunction and treatment 
aims to modify/correct dysfunction by applying manual techniques to body structures. 
This is assumed to be implicit in the oft quoted principle, 'structure governs function'. 
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However, as I pointed out in Chapter 1, it is not clear what osteopaths mean when they 
talk about these things. 
Osteopathic educational institutions, in common with medical schools, assume that 
function is known through physiology, with standard medical texts providing knowledge 
of normal and abnormal function. But it seems that osteopaths hold a more subtle 
meaning of function which refers to how effectively a part is performing in relation to 
other local structures and the patient as a whole. In addition, judgements about good and 
bad function are based on an assessment of local tissues using palpation and observation. 
This is assumed to be relative with respect to individual patients. Osteopaths make 
judgements about the function of tissues by comparing their experiential knowledge of 
what 'good' tissue feels like with what they find in a particular patient. The judgements 
refer to what they think is appropriate for a particular patient bearing in mind age, sex, 
morphology, occupation, domestic circumstances, psychosocial factors and so on. A 
consequence of this kind of analysis is that the same tissue state, i. e., tissues with the same 
functional capacity, may be interpreted differently in two different patients (and by two 
different osteopaths). This leads to the claim that osteopaths focus on the individual 
patient rather than disease. Not only is each patient considered to be a unique individual 
with their own experiences and life history, but their tissue state must be interpreted 
individually as well. 
The claim to focus on individuals rather than disorders may not be unique to osteopathy, 
though the significant question is, what does it mean for practice? Evidence from 
unpublished studies carried out as part of the undergraduate and postgraduate degree 
programmes at the BSO suggest that the differences between them and GPs say, may not 
be as significant as many osteopaths believe. More pertinently for this study, though, is 
the question, do osteopaths and conventional practitioners use the same conceptual 
models for understanding patients' illnesses? Unfortunately there has been little or no 
published work comparing the ways in which conventional practitioners and osteopaths 
(or, for that matter, any complementary or alternative practitioners) understand patients' 
problems. There are many outcome studies comparing the effects of treatment, and 
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psychological studies examining clinical decision-making, but little interest 
has focused 
on conceptual modelling in manual therapy 43 
It is important that my analysis is rooted in clinical practice. In the absence of suitable 
published material most of this chapter analyses two studies in both of which I was 
directly involved. I am aware of the possible criticisms of lack of objectivity here; 
analysing one's own work is not normally considered good science, though this is not a 
scientific study in the sense that psychologists or sociologists, for example, would require. 
Rather it is an attempt to identify concepts that practitioners use to describe the health 
problems of their patients. In both cases my contribution to the studies were written 
blind, that is, I did not know what the other contributors had written before I wrote mine 
and I did not modify any of my text in the light of what others had written. In the case of 
The Practitioner article, I did not have the opportunity to make any changes. 
43 This is also true for Conventional and Alternative Medicine (CAM) generally. There are 
many published works that claim to explain what CAM practitioners believe and the field 
abounds with assumptions. For example, following a series of Colloquia initiated by 
Prince Charles on CAM to which conventional and complementary practitioners were 
invited, the chairman, Sir James Watt, edited a collection of essays on various aspects of 
conventional and complementary practice, which was published by the Royal Society of 
Medicine. In one paper, George Lewith, a much respected doctor who has promoted CAM, 
tried to identify what distinguishes the two approaches: "One of the main ideas that 
underpin all complementary therapies is that of biological energy, which in the case of 
traditional Chinese medicine is termed chi. The homoeopath, osteopath, naturopath and 
acupuncturist all view the manipulation of indefinable vital force as the essential factor in 
successful therapy. ... Conventional medicine 
does not have such concepts and therefore 
finds difficulty in defining health. " (Lewith, 1988 p. 20) Quite apart from the interesting but 
controversial idea that health is defined, or can only be defined, in terms of vitalism, it 
simply is not true that osteopaths, for example, believe in an "indefinable vital force as the 
essential factor in successful therapy. " While some individual osteopaths hold that view, as 
do some doctors, it does not feature as a key element in the teaching in any of the main 
osteopathic educational institutions. Mark Woodhouse, in his contribution to Humber and 
Almeder's book on the concept of disease, elucidates the concept of disease (and by 
implication, the concept of health) in the paradigm of holistic medicine. This paradigm also 
carries the label of "alternative" or sometimes "complementary" medicine. ' (Woodhouse, 
1997 p. 327) Some of the views he presents may be recognised by a selection of CAM 
practitioners, but are by no means universally held. In general I agree with David Greaves 
who argues that the "only unifying feature would appear to be the negative attribute that 
alternative medicine is not orthodox medicine. ", (Greaves, 1996 p. 102) and highlights the 
lack of proper investigation and analysis in this area. 
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These accounts do not claim to be representative (in an empirical sense) either of 
osteopathy or conventional medicine. But that is not their purpose, which is to begin to 
map the conceptual landscape of practice. Having sketched some of the features, as I see 
them, I use philosophical analysis to explain their significance for the practice and theory 
both of osteopathy and conventional medicine. It will then be for others to test this by 
devising empirical tests and analyses of practice. 
I do not claim, therefore, to represent the views of all osteopaths. As I made clear in the 
introduction, osteopaths, perhaps more than conventional practitioners, are a disparate 
group. In effect, the following pages are an in-depth reflection on what I, as a 
practitioner, claim to be doing. The original papers, on which I comment, were produced 
in the context of the aims of each study and were honest attempts to describe something 
that most practitioners just do and rarely spend time analysing. I am aware that some 
osteopaths might produce quite different reports in response to the same patients. My 
claim to be an appropriate person to (in a weak sense) represent osteopathy here rests on 
more than twenty years teaching on and developing undergraduate and postgraduate 
educational programmes and over twenty five years in practice. This has brought me into 
contact with a wide range of views and opinions and I believe that the ways in which I 
think about health problems and treat patients is representative of a significant core of 
osteopaths. It is for my colleagues to judge whether I have accurately represented 
contemporary osteopathy, but if my efforts prompt informed discussion and publication, 
I shall be content. 
In the final analysis my thesis does not rest on whether or not the interpretation of these 
patients is a correct osteopathic account, but on the way in which fundamental practices 
and beliefs are conceptualised and on the logical relationship between the terms used to 
describe those concepts. Part of my claim is that there is no clearly articulated account of 
what 'osteopathic' consists in, though, to a lesser extent, much the same claim could be 
made about conventional medicine in the sense that, though conventional practitioners 
could describe what good medical practice is in terms of their own speciality, few could 
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define medicine. I do not believe there is a Platonic ideal called osteopathy, any more 
than one called medicine, of which one day we will have full knowledge. The truth, or 
perhaps mere 'usefulness', of osteopathy and conventional medicine lies in the way in 
which these disciplines understand and manage health problems. On this basis, the 
assumptions and claims of both are subject to critical analysis, which, I would argue, 
requires a return to the mutual regard of philosophy and medicine for each other's 
insights. My critical reflection on what I consider to be the basis of how I work, whether 
or not it correlates with how most osteopaths work, is a legitimate contribution to that 
analysis. 
3.2. Analysis of ordinary language use 
Donald Schön, perhaps best known for his promotion of 'reflective practice', famously 
claimed that the espoused and practised values of professionals often fail to match. 
(Schön, 1983) What is claimed for a profession and what is done by individual 
practitioners in practice are often different. Reflecting on actual practice incidents is 
claimed to be a way of bringing the two together. Many see this failure of correlation as 
practitioners failing to live up to their profession's standards. But there is another 
explanation, one proposed by the Oxford philosopher J. L. Austin, which is that the real 
values of a profession only become explicit when what its practitioners actually do and 
say is examined. The ways professionals use and apply terms in real situations reveals 
the concepts that actually drive practice. This is based on the idea that we use concepts in 
more complex and subtle ways that we are able to explain or define them. We use concepts 
such as 'time' or 'colour' easily, naturally and meaningfully, where we would find it 
difficult, if not impossible, to define them. It is very likely that professionals, engaged as 
they are with complex and underdetermined situations also use concepts that they would 
find difficult to define. The "ordinary language" that is used to describe actual situations 
(as opposed to general theories) is derived from generations of use, and coloured by 
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allusions and metaphors, the origins of which may be long-forgotten. More technical 
meaning may be added, 44 which, in theoretical accounts, can obscure almost completely 
its ordinary use. Austin's claim was that "ordinary language", "the first word" on the 
matter, "embodies ... the inherited experience and acumen of many generations of men. 
" 
(Austin, 1979 p. 185) 
An osteopath and an orthopaedic surgeon, for example, might discuss prolapsed 
intervertebral discs (PID) and, using the same terminology, be in total agreement about 
what it was and how to deal with it. If, however, they both saw a patient with a PID who 
was suffering pain and distress, although they might agree on the diagnosis, it is highly 
likely that they would disagree on their explanation of the problem in the wider context 
of what it means and how the problem should be managed. Written (or verbal) accounts 
of the case might well emphasise different things and explain significance differently. It is 
here therefore at the level of actual case explanations and interventions that the values 
and practice mores of a practitioner become evident. 
Austin argued that examining the words practitioners use to describe actual cases reveals 
more about what is driving their work than text-book explanations. (Austin, 1979) If I am 
going to discover what osteopaths and conventional medical practitioners mean by 
function, I will need to examine how they describe and deal with real cases. Austin never 
claimed a complete method or theory of linguistic analysis. In fact he expressly states that 
his 'ordinary language' analysis is not the last word, but "the first word", (ibid. p. 185), or 
as Geoffrey Warnock in his book about Austin describes it, "a way of getting started". 
(Warnock, 1989, p. 5) This Chapter then, is "a way of getting started", of beginning to 
uncover the concepts that drive osteopathic and conventional medical practice, but with a 
particular eye to how function concepts are used. 
44 For example, use of the term 'chronic', to describe pain or disability: in ordinary usage it 
means nagging, in contrast with acute, which means severe. In professional use, it defers to 
cont ... 
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Uncovering values and mores involves scrutinising verbal, in this case written, accounts 
of cases in order to identify concepts implicit in the language used. In explaining signs 
and symptoms, e. g., of a disease (or whatever), practitioners communicate the "inherited" 
(Austin) concepts that make those explanations significant. So, for example, subtle 
changes in tissue texture in the lumbar paraspinal soft-tissues are regarded as more 
significant, i. e., valued for their explanatory power and as indicators to treatment, for an 
osteopath than they are for an orthopaedic surgeon. The concepts embodied in both the 
act of palpation and the meaning given to it are covert but highly significant. 
Although illness embodies a rag-bag of experiences and expectations, which explains why 
practitioners prefer the conceptual simplicity of disease diagnosis, implicit concepts are 
more likely to be evident where practitioners interpret real situations rather than 
(medicalised) text-book descriptions. Conceptually illness is much more interesting than 
disease. It embodies biological, cultural, social and psychological elements. For ordinary 
language analysis it is a veritable treasure house. More significantly, it is illness that 
drives a patient to seek medical care and it is illness that the practitioner's treatment must 
address 45 Analysing how patients describe and practitioners deal with illness will 
provide a way of uncovering their conceptual understanding of it. 
3.3. The Case Studies 
The first study is a paper published in The Practitioner (Myers, Tyreman Sr Gardner, 1995) 
in which a GP, an osteopath and an orthopaedic surgeon were invited to comment on and 
give an account of their management of a clinical situation posed by the journal. 
Although this study did not set out to assess concepts explicitly, they are implicit in that 
its etymological root and means something that has existed for a long period of time. 
45 See, for example, van den Berg's (1984) simple, but illuminating example, already cited, of 
waking up feeling different and coming to the conclusion that he "is really ill". For some 
reason this chapter was omitted from the 2nd edition of the Open University's Health and 
Disease reader. 
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the accounts reflect the focus of interest and approaches to patient care held by the three 
respondents. The second is a Patient Study which aims to compare the ways in which an 
osteopath, an orthopaedic surgeon and a physiotherapist assess and describe the same 
three patients. In this study each of the three practitioners examined and provided a 
written report on three patients. Each of the patients had attended one of the 
practitioners for the first time in the preceding few days and agreed to be examined again 
by the other two. The reports were written up independently, then collated and 
compared. No editing or other modifications were made. 
In both studies I will refer to my reports in the third person. This is an attempt to apply 
the same analytical force to all the accounts equally. 
3.3.1. Comparison of responses to a Case 
Vignette (osteopath, general practitioner 
and orthopaedic surgeon) 
In 1994 I was asked to write a piece for The Practitioner in its 'How I treat ... ' series. The 
scenario is a 50 year old foundryman, Bill Marshall, who presents with an episode of low 
back pain. He has had three previous episodes in the past five years and is worried that a 
prolonged period off work will increase the likelihood of him being made redundant. His 
wife is partially disabled and he anticipates financial difficulties if he loses his job. He 
asks his GP for referral to a specialist and an osteopath to speed his recovery. A GP and 
an orthopaedic surgeon were also asked to contribute. The published article appears as 
Appendix B. (Myers et al., 1995) 
In the paper, the GP deals with the initial consultation and request from the patient; the 
consultant and the osteopath describe what they would say and do if the patient was 
referred on to them. The GP focuses on the way she would deal with Bill's situation, 
specifically, "management and referral". She doesn't offer any treatment, and her 
diagnosis is based on her experience of "simple mechanical back strain", which is 
assumed to be typical of (and similar to) hundreds of others she has seen. She knows 
there is little she can offer in the form of treatment, but that the prognosis is generally 
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good. Most of the account is therefore about managing the situation Bill is in and offering 
advice for the future. Her concern is to support him in his desire to stay at work, which 
includes referring to an orthopaedic surgeon if he wishes, despite the fact that she doesn't 
believe that an orthopaedic surgeon will be able to do much for him. If he chooses to see 
an osteopath she would give him a brief medical report to take with him. 
The osteopath displays a more structured approach to the situation; these kinds of 
problems are the 'bread and butter' of osteopathic practice and, unlike the GP, the 
osteopath has a range of diagnostic and therapeutic tools (literally) to hand. There is a 
greater focus on explaining Bill's particular problem in contrast to the management of 
simple mechanical back strain problems in general. Despite the fact that the osteopath 
will be performing the treatment, the approach is more towards information gathering 
and hypothesis generation than prescribing treatment; in fact, there is little attempt to 
offer a definitive diagnose from the given information. 
The orthopaedic surgeon also offers a structured approach, but one that is more narrowly 
focussed. The context is his personal knowledge of spinal problems, as "a consultant with 
a major interest in managing spinal disorders, " and the published literature in this area. 
There is much more emphasis on possible treatment, which ranges widely from 
reassurance to spinal surgery, depending on what the diagnosis turns out to be. 
Analysis of the differences will be discussed after describing the second study. 
3.3.2. Comparison of responses to a 
Patient Study (osteopath, physiotherapist 
and orthopaedic surgeon) 
In the second study three practitioners, an orthopaedic surgeon, a physiotherapist and an 
osteopath, examined and provided a written report on three patients. Each of the patients 
had attended one of the practitioners for the first time in the preceding few days and 
agreed to be examined again by the other two. The reports were written up 
independently, then collated and compared. No editing or other modifications were 
made. 
97 
Part 2- Function Concepts in Practice 
3.3.2.1 Methodology 
The three practitioners each selected a patient from their practice who had recently 
presented with a complaint that was typical of the kinds of problems normally seen by 
them and who they would expect to benefit from their treatment and management. In 
each case it was the first visit by the patient to that practitioner and at the conclusion of 
the case-history taking and examination they were asked if they would be willing to take 
part in the study. They were each informed that this would involve attending for further 
examination by the two other practitioners a few days later. The patients signed consent 
forms after being told what would occur during their visit. It was made clear that no 
treatment would be given at that time and that they would remain under the care of the 
practitioner they had first consulted. 
Each patient was seen and examined privately on the same day by the two practitioners 
they had not previously visited. No discussion about any of the patients took place 
between the practitioners though x-ray reports, where they existed, were made available. 
Each practitioner then wrote a report on each patient describing his main findings and his 
understanding of each patient's complaint. It was made clear that it was not the purpose 
of the study to make any kind of judgement about the correctness of diagnosis, but to 
examine similarities and differences in the way each practitioner understood the problem. 
As a follow up, each patient was contacted by letter thanking her for taking part and 
inviting comment on the experience and to identify any differences between practitioners. 
Two of the patients replied and their letters are included in the case reports. 
3.3.2.2 Reports 
As might be expected, there were differences in the style of report writing. Each report 
presents the findings and conclusion of each practitioner in the format felt by them to be 
most appropriate. No format or standard of report was agreed beforehand as it was felt 
that this would impose a value system on the practitioners. 
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Although there were differences between them, each practitioner was consistent in the 
presentation of his findings in that he used the same categories for each patient. This was 
despite the fact that not only did each patient present with a different kind of problem, 
but there was also a wide age range and varied clinical histories. This suggests that the 
headings reflect each practitioner's professional values. The headings are presented in 
Table 1 on page 101. 
There were no fundamental differences of opinion about the ontology of the diagnosis for 
each patient; there was general agreement that each patient's problem could best be 
explained biomechanically. Where differences exist they relate to the significance given 
to particular items of information; in other words, the total picture was described 
differently by each practitioner but it was clear that the descriptions had a common 
derivation. 
The orthopaedic surgeon (NM) focused on particular items of information from the case 
history plus a standard set of signs and symptoms elicited from the examination. These 
were: the Presenting Complaint and History, Past Medical History, Drug History and 
Social History. The examination looked for general systemic signs such as jaundice, 
anaemia, cyanosis, clubbing and lymphadenopathy, plus a comment on the patient's 
weight. Additional items were noted, namely, gait, spinal curves, spinal joint 
movements, lower limb movement, neurological signs, pulses, and abdominal signs. 
Absence of clinical signs were recorded in addition to 'positive' findings. Finally, there 
was a section giving an impression of the problem and suggested treatment. 
The physiotherapist (HS) provided the most extensive report. This covered Current and 
Previous History, General Health, Occupational History, Pain Patterns and Modifying 
Factors. Examination included comments on Posture, Movements, Palpation to identify 
areas of tenderness, and Neurodynamics. Finally there was a section on Aetiology, a 
Treatment Plan, and Prognosis. 
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The osteopath (ST) provided only a summary of those findings that he felt significant and 
relevant. These were categorised under Case Presentation Summary, Aggravating and 
Relieving Factors, plus, he noted any previous medical history judged by him to be 
significant. Most space was devoted to Opinion which covered examination findings, the 
aetiological development and diagnosis of the problem, and in providing a Management 
Plan. 
For the purposes of this study the analysis was limited to a comparison between the 
orthopaedic surgeon and the osteopath on the basis that if there is a polarisation of views 
related to the medical model, it would seem reasonable to expect these two to represent 
opposite ends. The physiotherapist's view might be expected to include elements of both 
as physiotherapists are manual therapy specialists who work primarily within a 
conventional medical environment. Analysis of all three reports indicate that this is 
indeed the case, but this will be commented on again later. 
The report headings are laid out and expanded with examples, below. The full text of the 
reports is found in the Appendix. 
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3.3.2.3 Report Tables 
Orthopaedic surgeon Physiotherapist osteopath 
Presenting complaint & Current history Case presentation 
history summary 
Previous history 
Past medical history Condition aggravated by... 
General health 
Drug history Condition relieved by... 
Occupational health 
Social history Not significantly affected 
Occupational history by... 
On examination: 
" Gait Pain patterns & modifying Opinion 
" Upper limbs factors: 
" Spine " Sleep Management plan 
" Lower limbs " A. M. day, evening 
" Abdomen " Sitting, sustained 
flexion, standing, 
Impression " walking 












Table 1. List of headings used by the orthopaedic surgeon, physiotherapist and osteopath to 
format their reports on the Patient Study. These headings were used consistently by each 
practitioner despite their being no compulsion to do so. It is argued In the text that this suggests 
that the headings represent an important conceptual framework for organising the information 
coming from a patient examination. 
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Orthopaedic 




"Mrs A complained of low back pain of 11-12 years duration. The 
pain was cited in the lumbar sacral region and started gradually. She 
initially sought advice from her GP who performed an X-ray which 
was found to be normal. She was treated symptomatically. " 
Past Medical History "1991: RTA, wedge fracture Ll" 
Drug History "OCP; paracetamol" 
Social History "Doesn't smoke 
Occasional alcohol 
3 children: no epidural" 
On Examination: "Generally fit. No evidence of jaundice, anaemia, cyanosis, clubbing 
or lymphadenopathy. Slim. " 
Gait "Normal" 
Upper Limbs "Psoriasis of elbows" 
Spine "No obvious scoliosis" 
"Tender L5/S1 region and Right PSIS 
Flexion 6cm toe-touch, lateral flexion and extension some pain but 
full ROM 
No inappropriate signs. " 





Impression "This 22 year old lady presents with a 1-2 year history of increasing 
low back pain with pain referred to her legs with no neurological 
symptoms. The features of the pain suggest that it is a mechanical 
type of pain not involving the spinal nerves. Her pain is probably a 
mixture of the old wedge fracture, muscular and possibly 
intervertebral disc related. There are no features to suggest a sinister 
pathology and there does not appear to be any increase in her wedge 
compression fracture to account for her upper lumbar pain. Her pain b d hi an t s may be all may be modified when she stops her present jo 
that is necessary. " 
Treatment "She would benefit from a programme of spinal mobility and muscle 
strengthening exercises under the care of a physiotherapist. If the 
symptoms do not respond to this after three months, further Imaging 
studies may be required. " 
Table 2 Headings as used by the Orthopaedic Surgeon together with indicative examples drawn 
from all three patients. The left hand column lists the headings chosen and used by the 
practitioner and the right hand column gives actual quotations from his report. It Indicates the 
main information that is of interest to him and the kind of explanation provided. A full copy of the 
report can be found In the Appendix. 
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Physiotherapist's Examples (not necessarily from the same patient) Headings 
Current History "Complained of constant aching across the base of her back with 
intermittent aching into the right buttock extending postero-laterally 
into the right thigh to the mid thigh level. She rated her pain at 4.5 
on the Visual Analogue Pain Scale. The backache has been present 
on and off since the birth of her children now aged 7,8 & 11, but has 
become much more constant in recent months with the leg reference 
appearing around six months ago and gradually developing in 
severity. It is this latter development that has triggered her 
determination to do something about it. " 
Previous History "She recalls an episode of back pain 15 years ago when she visited an 
osteopath and a similar episode 10 years ago which settled within 3-4 
days with bed rest. She has suffered intermittently since. " 
General Health "She reports having had an ovarian cyst removed - the abdominal 
scar is noted. She enjoys swimming, has ambitions to cycling and 
has a skiing holiday in prospect which is giving her some concern. 
She feels that she is less 'fit' than she should be. " 
Occupational History "She is a teacher working with those with learning disabilities and is 
community based which involves her in a lot of driving. " 
Pain Patterns and "Whilst she prefers to sleep on her right side she is unable to do so 
Modifying Factors: comfortably so finishes up on her left side. Currently she is woken 
Sleep up by her backache after 2-3 hours. " 
A. M., Day, "There is no alteration in the pattern or intensity of her discomfort in 
Evening relation to time. " 
Sitting, sustained "Her tolerance to sitting for long periods is reduced with some 
flexion, difficulties transferring to being upright again. Similarly, she can 
standing, react to periods of sustained forward bending. Her standing is 
walking limited to 1 hour tolerance and walking to 2 hours. " 
Aggravates/Eases "Riding a bicycle, lifting and carrying will aggravate her pain. It can 
be eased by stretches into extension. 
She has no problems with coughing and sneezing. 
She uses paracetamol, ibuprofen and warmth for pain control. " 
X-ray "Lumbar Spine: "Spondylotic changes at several levels, fairly minimal 
- some disc space narrowing - particularly posteriorly at L3/4, L4/5 - 
more marked at L5/S1. " - August 1997" 
Expectation "She has no overwhelming problem but wants to ease the pains in 
her back. Whilst she feels that she will never be rid of all her pains 
she would like to have more 'control' over it. " 
Examination: "There is no scoliosis, lateral deviation or pelvic asymmetry but she 
Posture does show a slight swayback with increased thoracic kyphosis and 
compensatory, cervical lordosis. " 
Movements "A restricted range of lumbar spinal movements is evident with 
extension at 50% of expected range, flexion at 35cm fingertips to floor 
and side bending left and right 3 and 4 finger breadths from the knee 
crease indicating a significant degree of restriction. 
She demonstrated a mild restriction of her right hip, but the SI joints 
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appeared not to contribute to symptoms. She demonstrated a poor 
quality of stabilising muscle control when asked to tension 
abdominal (transversus) and deep back muscles (multifidus). " 
Palpation "Palpation revealed tenderness over the I. 4 and L5 segments on the 
right side in particular. " 
Neurodynamics "S. L. R. was at 80° bilaterally with reflexes, sensory perception and 
muscle strength normal. Neck flexion plus trunk forward bending 
produced the target back pain which was increased by adding right 
knee extension but not left knee extension. " 
Aetiology "Mrs A presents with a lumbar dysfunction that appears to have a 
degenerative base. It might be expected that if a current x-ray were 
available that it would show a degree of I. V. space reduction. 
The resulting increase in pressures acting on the facet joints have 
been accentuated by her posture in association with her weight 
distribution - her standing intolerance being significant in this 
regard. 
The lack of flexibility noted in the lumbar segments and the 
myofascial thickening over the left paravertebral structures has 
reduced her ability to absorb the energies of movements and 
mechanical stresses. Previous 'flares' of her symptoms leaving scar 
tissue from the micro trauma caused. 
There is also evidence to suggest some restriction of neural mobility 
which will undoubtedly contribute to her ongoing symptoms. 
The associated restrictions in the right Si joint and ? ilio-tibial band 
on the right have added to her vulnerability as well as producing 
local symptoms. " 
Treatment Plan "To explain to the patient the probable cause of symptoms, set goals 
in conjunction with her and explain the treatment plan. 
Supple the affected lumbar spinal joint segmental restrictions. 
Release the myofascial tightness in the left paravertebral tissues. 
Mobilise the neural restriction. 
Re-educate postural control - dynamic and static. 
The above would be achieved physiotherapeutically by the use of 
manual mobilisation /manipulation techniques, myofascial release 
(trigger point release using manual or acupuncture methods or PNF 
methods), neurodynamic mobilisation, home exercise plan, advice 
and encouragement with regard to weight loss and a general increase 
in activity that would lead to greater fitness e. g. swimming or water 
based fitness and exercise groups. " 
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Prognosis "It would be reasonable to expect to be able to restore a painless and 
functional spinal unit although this in large measure would depend 
on the patient's determination to accept the obligation that I would 
place on her to fulfil her role in the treatment. This would require 
her to be dogged in the performance of her exercise routines and 
their application in functional and dynamic situation. 
There is little doubt that she will suffer future episodes of backache, 
but their frequency, severity and duration will be significantly 
diminished if she can be diligent in maintaining her back fitness 
programme. " 
Table 2 Headings as used by the Physiotherapist together with indicative examples drawn from 
all three patients. The left hand column lists the headings chosen and used by the practitioner and 
the right hand column gives actual quotations from his report. It indicates the main information 
that is of interest to him and the kind of explanation provided. A full copy of the report can be 
found in the Appendix. 
Osteopath's 
Headings Examples 
(not necessarily from the same patient) 
Case Presentation "22 year old Home Care Assistant (also does some dog grooming). 
Summary Presented with bilateral LBP and an aching pain down the lateral aspect 
of her left leg as far as the knee. There were no sensory disturbances. 
In 1989 (age 14) she had been knocked off her bike by a car in a RTA. 
She hit the windscreen and incurred a wedge fracture at U. Since then 
she has had problems with her back. She had physiotherapy exercises 
prescribed but they didn't improve the problem. The symptoms have 
gradually been getting more frequent and more severe, possibly 
aggravated by "pulling" her back when taking the weight of a patient in 
her care. She has had some treatment from a bonesetter which helps for 
about a day afterwards. " 
Condition "Lying on the left side; bending forward. In bed it can wake patient 
Aggravated by ... after 2-3 hours. It is stiff after walking a moderate distance. " 
Condition 
Relieved by... "Moving; using a reclining chair; on 
first going to bed" 
Condition Not 
Significantly "Warmth; coughing or sneezing" 
Affected by ... 
Opinion "1. The patient has severe pes planus which has resulted in eversion of 
both feet and a genu valgum deformity, plus a tendency to internally 
rotate both hips. These mechanical changes in the lower extremity have 
put strain on the lateral postural muscles; in particular the tibialis 
anterior and peroneus longus. The biomechanical changes in the hips 
are inhibiting normal flexion and extension in the course of which, 
additional strain is imposed on the gluteal muscles and through to the 
lumbo-sacral fascia effectively splinting the lumbo-sacral joint. Lumbar 
spinal mobility has therefore been focused on the mid and upper lumbar 
region. This situation will also account for the aching and swelling in 
the left knee. 
2. Spondylotic changes in the lumbar spine have resulted In reduced disc space and further restricted lumbar mobility. The poor range of 
movement in the lumbar s ine has meant that local circulation is 
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impaired both accelerating the degenerative process and embarrassing 
muscle function. 
3. The patient, although quite tall (5' 9") is carrying a considerable 
weight (15st 31b). This is putting further strain on the postural spinal 
muscles causing fatigue and circulatory embarrassment 
4. A predisposing factor has been the patient's former occupation as a 
security officer in a shop. This involved long periods of standing and 
slow walking, both of which exercise the postural muscles of the spine, 
pelvis and lower extremity which have become hypertonic and 
contractured as a result. Slow sustained contraction fatigues skeletal 
muscle quickly. The loss of elasticity impairs local fluid flow and has 
contributed to the ischaemia. " 
Management Plan "My main aim in management would be to improve muscle function 
through gentle soft-tissue massage. At the moment the chronic fatigued 
state of the muscles is both responsible for many of the symptoms and 
also masking the underlying tissue state. Once the muscles are 
functioning efficiently it should be possible to assess the postural 
biomechanical changes more accurately and evaluate how the body is 
trying to compensate and adapt. 
It was noticeable that the posture and biomechanical relationships 
altered during the time of the examination. After lying down, the spine 
was straighter, but in the course of a few minutes reverted to the pattern 
described above suggesting that muscle fatigue is a significant factor in 
the problem. 
Ultimately the ideal would be to improve the mobility and functioning 
of the thoraco-lumbar area. This should be possible, though the chronic 
state of the tissues would indicate that this might take some time and 
would require quite a lot of treatment to bring about the necessary long- 
term changes. " 
Table 3 Headings as used by the Osteopath together with indicative examples drawn from all 
three patients. The left hand column lists the headings chosen and used by the practitioner and 
the right hand column gives actual quotations from his report. It indicates the main information 
that is of interest to him and the kind of explanation provided. A full copy of the report can be 
found in the Appendix. 
3.4. Findings from the studies 
I propose to analyse the studies by comparing the osteopath with the orthopaedic surgeon 
and then to compare this with the approaches of the GP and physiotherapist. This is 
followed with comments on differences between the interests of patients and practitioners 
generally as reflected in the language of the consultation and finally, I will contrast 
primary and secondary care practitioners. 
The reason for this structure is to attempt to clarify where differences lie. In contrasting 
the osteopath and orthopaedic surgeons' approaches three possible sources of difference 
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can be identified: the first is that each comes from a different clinical tradition, one rooted 
in conventional medicine and the other in CAM. Second, orthopaedics is hospital-based 
secondary care, while osteopathy is primary care, i. e., the first point of contact for most 
patients. Third, the studies used two different orthopaedic surgeons one of whom was 
very experienced, the other relatively inexperienced (senior registrar level), but with the 
same (experienced) osteopath. Differences found could therefore be due to fundamental 
differences in the professions of osteopathy and orthopaedics (or their roots), differences 
between primary and secondary care, or between experienced and inexperienced 
practitioners specialising in musculo-skeletal problems. 
3.4.7. The osteopath and orthopaedic 
surgeon 
Similarities and differences between the osteopathic and orthopaedic accounts can be 
identified. I will describe these under the headings of Report Structure, Identifying and 
Interpreting Significant Information, and Dealing with External Factors. 
What appears to be a clear difference between the orthopaedic surgeon and the osteopath 
in the Case Vignette is the extent to which they are prepared to commit themselves to a 
diagnosis and management plan on the basis of the brief information provided. The 
osteopathic account is guarded, cautious and, although broadly indicating what kind of 
problem it is thought to be and offering likely explanations and a management plan, falls 
far short of the more definitive account provided by the orthopaedic surgeon, who, while 
not committing himself to say exactly what is happening in this case, does offer a limited 
range of possibilities each of which is clearly defined. However, in the Patient Study 
where the osteopath has more opportunity to gather information the willingness of each 
to commit themselves to a diagnosis is similar. 
3.4.1.1 Report structures (See Table 1, p. 101) 
In both studies, particularly the Patient Study, a clear structure is evident. In the (more 
theoretical) Case Vignette the osteopath sets out his thinking more clearly though all the 
factors that are mentioned as being of importance can be found in the Patient Study 
107 
Part 2- Function Concepts in Practice 
report. His examination findings are included in the Opinion section rather than listed 
under specific examination items as the orthopaedic surgeon's are . The surgeon on the 
other hand has definite headings for gait, upper and lower limb, spine examination and 
so on, whether or not there were any actual findings. This suggests that he examines each 
patient in broadly the same way. It may also indicate an earlier stage in the clinical 
decision-making process. 
In the Case Vignette, the osteopath works to four clear stages: 
V Investigating the underlying pathology 
V Assessing postural and other ergonomic factors 
V Considering psychological and other background stress factors 
V Developing short-term and long-term management plans 
The orthopaedic surgeon starts with three questions: 
V How can the present attack be terminated quickly? 
:" How can future attacks be prevented? 
V What is the long-term prognosis? 
These are much more clearly focused on doing something, or determining what can be 
done, than are the osteopath's, which are more investigative and focused on 
understanding the problem - with the exception of the last stage, though even this is not 
explicit. In order to answer his questions, the orthopaedic surgeon depends on "a 
reasonably accurate working diagnosis. " The osteopath, on the other hand, makes no 
mention of diagnosis as such at this stage. I will return to the issue of diagnosis later. The 
difference between the two may reflect differences between primary and secondary care 
practitioners. Orthopaedic surgeons are normally the last call for patients, after 
consulting their GP and other therapists, and may therefore feel obliged to 'do 
something'. 
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To answer his questions the orthopaedic surgeon in the Case Vignette focuses on four 
diagnostic categories and three treatment choices, namely conservative treatment 
consisting of exercise and manual therapy, spinal injection or surgery. 
The Patient Study reports are much more explicit than is the Case Vignette, probably 
because they describe real clinical situations. Although broadly similar, there are 
differences. The osteopath has main headings for aggravating and relieving factors while 
the orthopaedic surgeon has a list of examination findings. This may suggest a different 
emphasis on relating the condition to specific activities and on trying to understand the 
various ways in which the trouble affects and is affected by the patient's life. The 
orthopaedic surgeon places more emphasis on assessing specific structural and 
physiological parameters where he records both negative and positive findings. 
The other noticeable difference is between the heading of Treatment from the orthopaedic 
surgeon and Management from the osteopath. This may reflect a different emphasis in 
their approach to care. 
3.4.1.2 Identifying and interpreting significant 
information 
There is agreement that a mechanical problem accounts for at least some part of the 
complaint in both studies. In the Case Vignette, the osteopath thinks it "probable that the 
case history would indicate that this episode is the latest stage in an ongoing mechanical 
problem"; while the orthopaedic surgeon believes that, "If he has predominantly midline 
pain and tenderness, the likely diagnosis is lumbar instability syndrome. " There is 
therefore broad agreement (assuming the pain and tenderness is predominantly mid-line) 
about what kind of problem would be discovered if it were possible to investigate the 
internal mechanism of the low back. While this is agreed, there is clearly a difference of 
opinion over what this means in the context of the back trouble. 
Interestingly, in the Patient Study, neither the osteopath nor the orthopaedic surgeon 
make their thought processes clear. Both provide well argued conclusions and are clear 
about what they think the main problems are and how to address them, but the process 
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by which they move from information to conclusion is opaque. This is perhaps surprising 
considering the emphasis the orthopaedic surgeon places on acquiring specific data and 
the pains to which he appears to go, to ensure that everything is assessed. The most likely 
explanation here is that the process is so much part of each practitioner's thinking that 
making it explicit is considered unnecessary. For each profession, particular information 
leads to specific conclusions. Any orthopaedic surgeon would come to the same 
conclusion given that information. The processing is part of the tacit knowledge base of 
the practitioner. 46 
The osteopath's decision-making process is even more obscure in that he doesn't identify 
the information he considers relevant before presenting it in his conclusion. We therefore 
have to rely on the assumption that, because it is mentioned, the information is 
considered significant. Like the orthopaedic surgeon though, he explains the rationale 
behind his conclusion. 
There is not enough information from this study to conclude what the clinical decision- 
making process for each practitioner might be, but that is not my interest here. The fact 
that particular (and different) information is selected and given special significance, is 
sufficient to permit analysis based on the kind of information it represents and the way in 
which it matches particular ways of thinking. 
So what information is regarded as significant? It has already been noted that there is 
more agreement than disagreement. Both are interested in how the person's body is 
functioning in the context of their illness experience. They are not (at least in these cases) 
interested in what the patient is wearing, where they went on holiday or what pets they 
46 Most empirical studies, though, suggest that this is not the case. Even when the same, 
apparently straight-forward, information is given to different practitioners who are experts in their field they demonstrate a wide range of variation in the way that they interpret and draw conclusions. This suggests that while practitioners in a discipline believe there is a 
common theoretical basis to their profession, in practice this may not be the case. 
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might have even though these provide information about the person 47 Broadly, the 
orthopaedic surgeons place most emphasis on the results of specific tests including x-rays 
and scans. This further supports the idea that they are following a complex algorithmic 
process where a sign is present or absent, positive or negative, significant or not 
significant. The logical, step by step progression through this (possibly implicit rather 
than explicit) formal structure results in the practitioner 'emerging' at recognised set 
points that mark the diagnosis. For example, in his 'Impression' section, the orthopaedic 
surgeon in the Patient Study offers a number of possible diagnoses (usually ones with 
serious consequences) and then gives reasons why all but one are not likely and therefore 
why he has selected a particular diagnosis. The osteopath, on the other hand, tells a story 
but does not make it clear whether this represents the only possible account, i. e., whether 
the clues compelled him to come to only one conclusion, or whether there were 
alternatives that were rejected. 
The osteopath appears to follow a less well defined route in which a range of factors are 
selected and integrated to produce a story. This story includes some of the medical 
information used by the orthopaedic surgeon, but, more significantly, attempts to 
embrace the story told by the patient. The difficulty here is in identifying how the 
osteopath attaches significance to particular items of information. But, even if we don't 
know how, it is clear that the information that is selected as significant relates to patient 
activities. The aggravating and relieving factors describe patient activities that modify the 
symptoms; so bending, lying on one side, going upstairs and so on, provide the osteopath 
with clues to enable him to come to a view on what is going wrong. This 'subjective' 
information appears not to be so high on the orthopaedic surgeon's agenda, though he 
47 Of course in other clinical situations clothes, holidays and pets might be very important factors; for example in mental illness, suspected malaria and asthma. But even in these 
examples, significance is attached through a particular way of understanding body function. 
111 
Part 2- Function Concepts in Practice 
does report aggravating and relieving factors, while the results of tests is not a high 
priority for the osteopath. 
The tentative conclusion at this stage is that the orthopaedic surgeon is looking for 
information to enable him to place the patient into a particular medical category in order, 
presumably, to facilitate him in selecting the most appropriate course of treatment. The 
osteopath, on the other hand, appears to be telling a story about the patient in which 
deduced structural and functional abnormalities are placed in the context of the patient's 
presenting problem which includes her life history and daily activities. How does this 
relate to the formal process of producing a diagnosis and prescribing treatment? 
3.4.1.2.1 Diagnosis 
Do osteopaths and orthopaedic surgeons understand the same thing by and place the 
same emphasis on diagnosis? It is perhaps surprising that none of the practitioners in the 
Patient Study have a heading of 'diagnosis', though the orthopaedic surgeon in the Case 
Vignette and the GP both refer to it. The practitioners in the Patient Study present their 
conclusions and explain the problem under a range of headings; 'Impression' and 
'Treatment' from the orthopaedic surgeon, 'Aetiology', 'Treatment Plan' and 'Prognosis', 
from the physiotherapist, and 'Opinion' and 'Management plan' from the osteopath. 
Presumably these reflect what each believes diagnosis to entail. Despite the word not 
being used explicitly in the patient studies, I will continue to use diagnosis in its literal 
sense as distinguishing between different possibilities through enquiry. (From dia - 
between, and gnosis - to know. ) 
I noted in the Case Vignette that the orthopaedic surgeon appeared prepared to draw 
conclusions where the osteopath wanted more information. The surgeon was prepared to 
give a pathological diagnosis on the basis of whether spinal tenderness is predominantly 
mid-line or lateral and to say not only what advice he would give, but what the prognosis 
would be. The osteopath wouldn't commit himself to such a position, but made his 
comments in the context of 'an osteopathic management plan'. A further contrast can be 
drawn between the consultant who takes the view that, "We cannot begin to answer any 
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of these questions unless we have a reasonably accurate working diagnosis. " and the 
osteopath who is prepared to say what treatment he would give apparently without 
having come to a diagnostic decision. So at first sight, it appears that diagnosis is less 
important to the osteopath than to the surgeon. But much may rest on what is meant by 
diagnosis; it might be that 'diagnosis' in conventional medicine and 'management' in 
osteopathy are different terms for the same thing. Closer reading of the text, though, 
suggests not. The osteopath sees management as developing through four related stages 
viz.: 
:" Investigating the underlying pathology; 
V Assessing postural and other ergonomic factors; 
:" Considering psychological and other background stress factors; and 
v Developing short-term and long-term management plans. 
The orthopaedic surgeon on the other hand sees diagnosis in this case as the task of 
assigning Bill to one of four diagnostic groups with treatment of the first group being 
dependent on the site of pain: 
"" Myofascial or non-neural or non-radicular pain; 
:" Radicular pain involving the nerve roots or cauda equina; 
:"A mixture of both; 
:" Pain associated with a radiological abnormality such as spondylolisthesis, tumour 
or infection. 
It is possible to see further significant differences between the two approaches. The 
osteopath is more exploratory and inquisitive using the words 'investigating', 'assessing', 
'considering' and 'developing', to introduce each part of the management, while the 
orthopaedic surgeon identifies definite states of affairs; whether or not there is radicular 
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pain or a bony anomaly, for example. The focus for the osteopath is to evaluate the 
situation while for the orthopaedic surgeon it is to categorise it. 
Together these appear to represent different ways of thinking, which at this stage seem 
incompatible, and suggests that orthopaedic surgeons, unlike the osteopath, are using 
some kind of algorithmic reasoning. If so it further suggests that surgeons are working 
from a given number of possible diagnoses and the purpose of the diagnostic process is to 
identify which one defines Bill's problem. It is not obvious that the osteopath is working 
to the same reasoning process. It might be that these just represent different stages in the 
clinical decision-making process, where the osteopath is making the initial analysis more 
explicit, but will next move on to categorise his findings according to some, so far 
unidentified, criteria. The orthopaedic surgeon has quickly and perhaps preconsciously 
carried out his analysis and made the categorisation explicit. The Patient Study suggests 
this is not the case as here also there is a focus by the orthopaedic surgeon on categories, 
and by the osteopath on producing a narrative that brings together into one explanation 
as many factors in the story as possible. In addition, the way in which each incorporates 
the patient's life history and psychosocial factors is significantly different. 
3.4.1.3 Dealing with External Factors 
In the Case Vignette the osteopath and orthopaedic surgeon interpret psychosocial factors 
differently. The surgeon states, "We should also note that strong psychosocial factors 
often influence the amount of distress and disability that back pain causes. " Here, the 
emphasis is on psychosocial factors influencing the distress and disability caused by the back 
trouble and not the back trouble directly. On this account back trouble causes distress 
and disability that is then made worse by psychosocial factors. The inference is that if the 
back trouble is removed, the psychosocial factors will no longer have anything to 
influence and so will drop out of the picture. The osteopath, on the other hand, appears 
to have a different view on this as he states, "This picture (disrupted mechanical 
efficiency) now has to be placed within Mr Marshall's history and environmental 
circumstances - in particular, worries about redundancy and finances. Such factors are 
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potent causes of muscle hypertonia and neural sensitisation. " Here the psychosocial 
factors are seen as causal in the back trouble, not merely aggravating the distress caused 
by the back trouble. If the mechanical factors (which it is agreed are a major part of the 
trouble) were to be removed, the psychosocial factors would still be making a significant 
contribution to the overall trouble whether or not there was pain as a result. The different 
ways in which the disease focus (pathology, congenital abnormality, maladaptation, etc. ), 
external factors (including psychosocial, life-style and medically significant past events) 
and the illness as experienced by the patient, relate to each other will form a key theme in 
my thesis. 
The Patient Study supports this conclusion. In each case, the orthopaedic surgeon's 
diagnosis focuses on local tissues and pathology; in Mrs A it is "mechanical low back pain 
with no involvement of the spinal cord or spinal nerves. It is most likely to be due to facet 
joint degeneration ... " In Mrs B it is "a mechanical type of pain not involving the spinal 
nerves. " Mrs C's problem " is most likely to be mechanical due to degeneration of the 
disc. " This contrasts with the osteopath whose diagnosis is much broader and while not 
disagreeing with the pathological assessment, views this as only part of the trouble. 
3.4.1.4 Concluding comments on the 
orthopaedic surgeon and osteopath 
I have identified prima facie differences between the way osteopathy and conventional 
medicine, exemplified here by orthopaedics, understand musculo-skeletal problems (at 
least in these examples). For the osteopath, the patient's trouble is part of a wider story 
that incorporates past history and adaptation to previous events, current psychosocial 
challenges, the overall efficiency of the whole musculo-skeletal system, plus occupational 
and domestic physical demands. The orthopaedic approach appears to be much 
narrower, focusing primarily on local pathology, as demonstrated by the back trouble in 
the Case Vignette where it is described as a discrete "genuine organic complaint", the 
effects of which are made worse by external circumstances. 
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3.4.2. The physiotherapist and the general 
practitioner 
Comparison between the osteopath and both the GP (in the case vignette) and the 
physiotherapist (in the Patient Study) is secondary to the main purpose of the study 
which is to compare the osteopath with the nearest secondary care equivalent, 
orthopaedics. Nevertheless, comparing the osteopath with both the GP and the 
physiotherapist reveals some interesting differences and similarities. 
The GP is similar to the osteopath in that she takes a broad look at the patient and 
considers a wide range of factors, but finally focuses on a specific problem in a similar 
way to the orthopaedic surgeon. The physiotherapist also considers a wide range of 
factors and although staying with them all in his summing up, aggregates them into a 
number of parallel explanations rather than combining them into a single account. 
The GP's approach to the psychosocial and medical history aspects are interesting. She is 
aware of Bill's situation with regard to work and regards it as significant, though she 
doesn't mention his wife's disability. One particularly illuminating passage comes early 
on where she states, "... before I can decide about management and referral I need to 
know more about the previous episodes. What precipitates the pain? What does Bill do 
when he gets the pain and what treatment and investigations has he had? " This is 
immediately followed by, "Bill should have had my usual chat about 'back care'. " This 
apparent contradiction between seeing the problem in the context of previous episodes 
plus Bill's current way of life, and lumping all 'simple mechanical back pain' together into 
a single category, suggests an implicit conflict between diagnosing categorically, which 
leads to the 'usual back care' advice for that category of problem, and the feeling that 
there is something else going on that is particular to Bill and which has a bearing on the 
outcome of the problem. The 'something else' is assumed to relate to external factors, for 
instance the threat of losing his job, as well as to the previous episode of back trouble. In 
other words, for the GP, psychosocial factors are regarded as significant, but how this 
relates to the 'simple mechanical' problem that Bill is diagnosed as having remains 
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unclear. It suggests that, for the GP, the simple medical model of disease causing illness 
is insufficient on its own fully to explain Bill's complaint and that there is a need to 
include other factors, in this case external and historical events. This notion is 
strengthened later when she says that the referral letter "should contain Bill's social 
history so that the consultant understands the reason for seeing him. " This is somewhat 
strange as the usual reason for referring to a consultant is because the problem is obscure 
or technically challenging, not because of psychosocial factors. Presumably she means 
that he is being referred because he wants to get back to work and is seeking a 'quick fix', 
but she is not expecting the orthopaedic specialist to do anything she can't. This suggests 
a distinction in her mind between the biomechanical problem that is the cause of the 
trouble and the aggravating psychosocial factors that are just complicating it. 
It is not clear what part these factors play in understanding and managing the trouble. 
For example, she wants to know more about previous episodes, aggravating and relieving 
factors, but doesn't say in what way this information would influence her advice and 
action. I am not suggesting that she couldn't provide such an account if pressed - there 
was a 500 word limit on the piece which reduces the scope for such explanations - but 
such an account appears not to have a high priority. In fact the ambiguity expressed here 
may not be very different from the osteopathic gestalt described in the previous section. 
The physiotherapist's reports, as might be anticipated, demonstrate elements of both the 
orthopaedic and osteopathic emphases. A considerable amount of information is 
provided but it is not confined to structural and physiological data; it also includes details 
about patients' histories, occupations and life-styles including modifying factors and 
expectations. However, it doesn't go as far as the osteopath in putting it all together into 
a coherent narrative. The different elements, although all considered and in more detail 
generally than the osteopath, remain as separate elements. So, under the heading 
'Aetiology' in each report there is a list of contributory factors with some linkage between 
them - particularly so in the case of Mrs A- but less attempt to stand back and describe a 
complete picture. Also there are factors reported as part of the 'History' and 'Pain 
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Patterns and Modifying Factors' that don't feature explicitly in the 'Aetiology'. These 
include, in the case of Mrs A, her knee problem and limitations in particular activities. 
Nevertheless, these are differences in emphasis rather than of kind. 
In general then, both the GP and the physiotherapist make the concerns of the patient 
with respect to life-style a more central theme in their analyses than do the orthopaedic 
surgeons. 
3.4.3. Patients and practitioners 
In addition to the differences identified between practitioners in both studies, which may 
reflect different professional values, there are differences in the language used by patients 
to describe their trouble, and that of practitioners to explain the problem. The patients 
described, and the practitioners reported, their trouble in the context of their everyday 
lives 48 The difference comes when the diagnosis (or its equivalent) is made. Here, the 
explanation for the trouble refers not to everyday activities, but to biology and 
mechanisms with an overlay of psychosocial explanation. This suggests that descriptions 
of illness arise from the everyday experiences and interests of patients while practitioners' 
explanations (on behalf of patients) represents their interests in biological matters. It also 
suggests descriptions of different worlds49 which relate to the different experiences, 
48 I am consciously glossing over a rich vein of philosophical interest here. The fact that I have 
allowed only the practitioners' accounts of the patients' troubles means that we do not have 
access to what the patients actually said and can't therefore use their words to access their 
experiences. This bypasses a potentially fruitful exploration of contrasting patients' 
phenomenological experiences with practitioners' medicalising (or 'osteopathising') those 
experiences, (For a fuller account of issues related to the medicalisation of the body, see for 
example, Evans, 2001; Leder, 1992; Toombs, 1992; Zaner, 1992) The whole area of 
embodiment is under-explored in osteopathy despite its obvious links with manual 
treatment, though I try to offer some recognition of it in the following paragraphs. A 
significant exception is Bevis Nathan's work on touch, but patients' perceptions of their bodies and how they link to osteopathic evaluation and treatment requires much more in- depth analysis. (Nathan, 1999) 
49 The use of 'worlds' here and subsequently, requires clarification. I use the term to describe 
a particular focus for understanding a range of experiences rather than as physically different worlds. This latter use of different worlds is frequently used by philosophers to hypothesise situations in order to test logical relationships. In these cases the other world doesn't actually exist (or not that we know of). This is different from the sense in which I 
cont ... 
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interests and expectations of patients and practitioners. Patients' worlds involve 
relationships and activities; getting on with those things that characterise and are valued 
by human beings, as Korr described (See 1.4.2.2.2, p. 32), which focuses on the person 
acting on and in their environment. Practitioners' worlds involve biological mechanisms 
and understanding the machinery that enables the range of activities that people value. 
Its primary focus is internal. 
The difference between these 'worlds' can be seen if we try to map the patient's 
presenting symptoms with the practitioner's explanation in the Patient Study. In his 
report on Mrs A, the orthopaedic surgeon describes the site of pain, the fact that the pain 
is relieved by paracetamol and a reclining chair, that there is tenderness over specific 
points, morning stiffness, tight hamstrings and a straight leg raising test of 80°. There is 
also absence of key 'red flag' signs. However, his Conclusion refers to mechanical pain 
and joint degeneration with possible spinal canal narrowing. These two accounts clearly 
describe different kinds of state, one based broadly on the life of the patient - that she 
feels better for taking an analgesic, sitting back in a comfortable chair but she feels stiff 
when she starts to move in the morning - while the other describes specific parts of her 
constitutive anatomy - joints and spinal canal. Without knowledge of orthopaedic 
reasoning, i. e., how the practitioner translates the patient's world of symptoms into the 
practitioner's world of diagnosis - how symptoms a, b&c become diagnosis x- it is far 
from clear how a conclusion is drawn from observation. There is no direct mapping 
between signs/symptoms and (biological) diagnosis; it isn't possible to use the language 
terms used in one to describe the other. 
am using the term where the different worlds are real - at least as a perception by the 
person concerned - but describe different aspects of an item (rather like the story of men feeling an elephant) or different systems of organisation of events. We therefore talk about 
a 'child's world' in which the child's experiences are interpreted according to certain 
preconceptions about what the world is like and which may be different from an 'adult's 
world'. My point is that the same experiences can be interpreted differently depending on 
the context in which they are perceived. 
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In the osteopath's account different language terms are used to describe the patient's 
signs/symptoms and the diagnosis. For Mrs A he describes the site and quality of pain; 
that the pain is relieved by movement, a reclining chair and by going to bed; that it is 
aggravated by lying on her left side and by bending; that her back stiffens after a 
moderate walk and can wake her after 2-3 hours in bed. The diagnosis is more difficult to 
summarise, but consists of two parts; the tissue(s) believed to be responsible for the 
symptoms, and the aetiological factors that have caused the tissue(s) to behave in this 
way. Here too the language terms used to describe the tissue causing symptoms do not 
map directly onto those used by the patient to describe her complaint and, as with the 
orthopaedic surgeon's account, requires additional interpretation. 
The point I am making is that the process of deciding that, "I am really ill", is different 
from that of deciding which dysfunction or disease is causing the illness. The first is an 
ontological question, the second epistemological. Practitioners are involved in both, but 
have greatest technical expertise in the latter. This reiterates some of the subject matter of 
Chapter 2. 
A core assumption entailed by the medical model is that describing illness as a 
subcategory of disease explains the patient's experiences in terms of disease as biological 
mechanism. This fails to address how patients' descriptions of experiences that disturb 
their lives, such as pain and disability, relate to the biological accounts that purportedly 
explain them. My point is that the different interests/ worlds lead to different kinds of 
enquiry; an ontological question about illness - what experiences form the stuff of illness 
and therefore justify professional intervention - and an epistemological one focussing on 
disease - which disease explains this particular collection of experiences. 
On the assumption that illness can indeed be explained by disease, and that disease is a 
scientific biological phenomenon, it is clear why medicine's primary interest is in the 
epistemological question - technically challenging, but conceptually straightforward. 
Illness, as we have already seen in the studies, is rooted in the subjective experiences of 
the patient while disease belongs to medical theory despite the fact that, in ordinary 
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usage, the terms are frequently interchanged. Boorse criticises Fulford for analysing 
disease according to ordinary usage, though in a footnote he admits that Fulford moves 
from ordinary (in Chapter 2) to technical usage (in Chapter 3)50 (Boorse, 1997 p. 62) 
Boorse's assumption, quoting Ladd, is that "the concept of disease is primarily a technical 
medical concept. " (ibid. ) This is the assumption I am following on the grounds that this 
terminology is now generally accepted. The desire to move to a disease-based practice of 
medicine was put to me by a doctor colleague who said, "Now that we know so much 
about diseases, why do we need a concept of illness? " This view is countered by 
Hesslow, who questions whether the concept of disease contributes substantially to the 
ability to practise (as distinct from theorise about) medicine. (Hesslow, 1993) In addition 
to the illness/disease distinction there is now a (so far unnamed) category of medical 
problem as exemplified by HIV infection, where it is possible to be neither ill nor have a 
disease, but still to require medical treatment on the basis of having a risk factor. 51 As can 
be seen, there is considerable lack of clarity here regarding the use of terms, and without 
attempting to make any claim to improve the conceptual muddle, I am aware that I must 
be clear about what I mean when I use these terms. 
50 Fulford's argument is that even in technical usage, values are implicit 
51 Treatment of risk factors rather than an actual disease is fast gaining ground in medicine. The most common of these is treatment for hypertension and 'high' blood chloresterol levels. Although hypertension is frequently referred to as a disease, both these cases are diseases only in the Boorsian BST definitional sense of falling outside normal limits. There 
is no pathological lesion (unless additional cholesterol is regarded as a pathology), no known aetiological agent, and normally no clinical signs or symptoms. Work on the 
genome project is identifying additional genetic risk factors where the optimism is that gene therapy will prevent diseases from developing. Quite apart from the fact that the gulf between the ability to diagnose genetic disease and provide effective therapy will remain 
wide for some considerable time, there is the problem of knowing how probable it is, or 
under what circumstances a particular genetic defect will result in an illness. (Bayertz, 1998) 
This raises considerable ethical problems for screening and treating of people who are not ill and calls into question our intuitive understanding of health. It is highly likely that 
everyone will be found to have genes that act as risk factors for some disease or other. 
Bayertz, adapting Murphy's wry observation that a healthy person is someone who hasn't 
had enough medical tests, suggests that in future 'health' will be replaced by "universal 
presymptomatic multimorbidity. " 
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My analysis of function will be seen to rest on the way in which the notion of function is 
implicit in concepts of disease and illness. To prepare for that, I need to make clear what 
my initial assumptions about illness are. In the earlier section on terminology, I stated 
that I would be beginning my analysis by assuming one understanding of illness and 
moving to another, more philosophical one. My initial stance is to take illness to be those 
experiences that prompt a patient (or someone on their behalf) to seek medical help; 
patients, as a matter of fact, visit health care practitioners inter alia because they feel they 
are ill. What prompts them to interpret certain experiences as illness and other 
experiences as something else, e. g., hunger, grief or tiredness for example, is a subject for 
further analysis. It follows that the particular experiences that prompt patients to feel 
themselves to be ill are implicit in the language terms used to describe the illness to the 
practitioner. These terms, in turn, encompass the meaning and significance the 
experience has for the patient. 
The role of the practitioner is therefore twofold; first to support (or not) the patient's 
judgement that they are ill, which involves examining the patient's evidence for claiming 
to be ill, i. e., the signs and symptoms, and to make an ontological judgement about 
whether these form the stuff of illness. Secondly, to explain the illness biologically in 
terms of dysfunction or disease. This is made explicit in the Case Vignette where the 
orthopaedic surgeon states that "Mr Marshall ... 
has a genuine organic complaint", i. e., he 
really is ill, from where he moves on to examine him in order to determine "the exact 
location of any tenderness" and to make a diagnosis of either "lumbar instability 
syndrome" or "one of the soft tissue syndromes. " 
The language used by patients and practitioners suggests that they are describing 
different interests and worlds and is not interchangeable - patients' language of signs and 
symptoms cannot be used to describe diagnosis and vice versa. It is also possible that 
practitioners, rather than making judgements that a patient is ill per se, that is, on the same 
criteria that ordinary people normally make these judgements, is assessing to see if there 
is a diagnosis, or likely diagnosis that would fit the symptoms and, on the basis of that, 
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judging whether or not a person is ill. Whichever, it looks as though two processes are 
occurring, each with their own language, that at times might be being muddled, one, 
based on ordinary peoples' experiences of what it is to be ill, and the other, based on 
doctors' views of what causes illness 52 
3.4.3.1 The medical language used to describe 
disease 
How do the accounts of dysfunction and disease described in Chapter 2 echo what is 
found in the Case Studies? Is there evidence that practitioners use predominately 
naturalistic or normative concepts of disease? The evidence is inconclusive. There is a 
tendency for the orthopaedic surgeons to focus on categorical information, data falling 
inside or outside normal limits. This suggests a strong influence from naturalistic 
theories, i. e., that parts and their behaviour can be judged normal or not from routine 
tests. The physiotherapist and to a lesser extent, the osteopath, also use categorical tests 
but place less weight on them. Naturalistic assumptions are strongest in the Case 
Vignette where the orthopaedic surgeon explicitly categorises back pain into four areas 
and seems to assume that all back pain falls into one or other category 53 The 
dysfunctional basis for this is ascribed to one of the following: myofascial dysfunction, 
52 Daniela Mergenthaler reviews Oliver Sack's writings where he explicitly talks about 
patients living in 'other worlds' in which the demarcation between the normal world of 
healthy living and the phenomenological disease world is not based on any notion of real 
disease. (Mergenthaler, 2000) She concludes that although Sacks's "individualizing 
neurology contributes to liberate neurological disease and many other human phenomena 
from devaluating stigmas and to rehabilitate them as other ways of being. ", (p. 283-4) it is 
not helpful to medicine because it is not amenable to categorising due to the 
individualisation which is its strength. My point is that what Sacks (and Mergenthaler) 
refer to as disease worlds are better termed 'illness'. This releases 'disease' as a specific 
term to describe medically significant pathophysiological states. This doesn't undermine 
the main point that analysis of patients' experiences of 'disease worlds' would add 
considerably to practitioners' understanding. 
53 When I presented my findings to the orthopaedic department of my local hospital, the 
surgeons there were quite critical of this categorisation, despite the fact that it was a 
surgeon specialising in spinal problems that had written the paper. It was not clear 
whether they felt it was over-simplistic, or just wrong. 
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nerve root effects, a mixture of both, or where there are radiological abnormalities. 
(Appendix, p. xxviii) 
Evidence for normative judgements are also found in the Studies, explicitly in the 
osteopath and physiotherapists' reports and, implicitly, in the GP's. It is hinted at in the 
orthopaedic surgeon's report of Mrs B, where he suggests that "she would benefit from a 
programme of spinal mobility and muscle strengthening exercises". This is aimed not so 
much at restoring the normal function of parts, as these haven't been identified, but at 
doing something with general beneficial effect for the patient. 
The osteopath is the most explicit about focussing on the general welfare of the patient. 
In the Patient Study his 'Opinion' explains the trouble in the context of a number of 
factors. Information is drawn from a wide source to describe the state of affairs. In the 
Case Vignette, the emphasis is not on making a categorical diagnosis, but on defining the 
state of affairs that has come about, which may be unique to Bill and account for his 
trouble. 
Another interesting observation is that in all the reports value terms were used to describe 
patients' states of affairs. Apparently neutral terms (to the practitioners who use them) 
like 'deformity', 'inappropriate signs', 'tenderness', 'red flag signs', all derive from 
evaluative notions. Deformity is a common value term, but even 'tenderness', which is 
usually taken by doctors to be a synonym for painful, has its etymological roots in the 
French tendre and Latin, tenerum, meaning 'stretched out, delicate' and allied to tenuis, 
which is Latin for 'thin'. In other words, 'something tender that requires great care', 
which is clearly evaluative. Red flag signs are distinguished from other signs on the basis 
that they indicate something seriously wrong which has potentially bad consequences. 
Austin's dictum about 'the first word' is important here, for although physicians may 
think they are using terms in a value-neutral way, their value-laden roots continue to feed 
the meaning. 
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3.4.4. The different interests of primary 
and secondary care practitioners 
Differences between practitioners in the studies may represent differences in primary and 
secondary care rather than between professions per se. If my analysis in the previous 
section is correct, then it is likely that there will be significant differences 
between 
primary and secondary practitioners because primary care practitioners are more 
heavily 
involved in corroborating (or not) patients' claims to be ill, while secondary care 
practitioners receive patients who already have their claim to be ill supported 
by another 
doctor. 
It can be argued that primary care practitioners have a particular duty of care as the first 
point of contact for a patient. This applies especially to general practitioners where the 
duty has statutory force. Although statutory obligations don't apply to all practitioners, 
the primary practitioner is first to take responsibility for understanding and interpreting 
the person's problem then advising on what can be done, either offering treatment 
themselves, or referring to a more appropriate practitioner. This involves hearing the 
patient's story, deciding on whether the problem is one that meets criteria for being dealt 
with by them, coming to a diagnosis and finally explaining the problem to the patient in 
the context of the original story. The need to explain in the context of the presenting 
illness can be one of the most difficult parts of primary care. Frequently it is the GP who 
explains what a diagnosis means, even when the patient has seen a consultant; 
consultants may actually say something to the effect of "Your GP will explain it to you. " 
It is probable that primary care practitioners are particularly interested in the patient's 
story as a means to understanding the person with the illness and what the illness means 
to them. Without that understanding, it may not be possible to communicate the more 
technical side to them. 
Secondary care practitioners, such as the orthopaedic surgeon, are not responsible in the 
first place for deciding whether or not the patient's story represents a real medical 
problem, though of course they may want to check this for themselves. The history they 
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take will be aiming to complete information in order to clarify the diagnosis. Their main 
focus is either technical, as with surgery, on difficult cases - rare, unusual presentations - 
or complex problems. 
Not all professions fall neatly into one or other category. Much depends on the criteria 
used to differentiate primary from secondary care. Professions such as osteopathy, 
physiotherapy, psychiatry and much of CAM, involve elements of primary, secondary 
and even tertiary care to the extent that some patients consult them as first contact, others 
are referred and yet others receive follow-up, supportive or palliative care. 
The reports from the Patient Studies suggest that the orthopaedic surgeon's focus was on 
local tissue states, performing tests to establish the physiological/ pathological state of 
particular areas and ensuring that no pernicious states lie undetected. The osteopath and 
physiotherapist by comparison are more interested in evaluating the total problem in the 
context the whole patient - perhaps more explicitly by the osteopath than by the 
physiotherapist. 
It is probable, then, that some of the differences identified earlier, focussing more broadly 
on the patient in the context of her environment and medical history in one case and on 
the local tissues in another, are differences between primary and secondary practitioners 
rather than between disciplines. 
3.5. Key uses of function to be analysed 
further 
Preliminary analysis suggests that there may be two ways in which the term function is 
being used in practice. The first, and the main focus for secondary care, is the proper 
function of body parts. This is important for diagnosis of disease as it defines dysfunction 
and determines the parameters for intervention. The second, and a focus for primary care 
practitioners is illness as a failure in the ability of a person to engage in those life activities 
they normally take for granted or just expect to be able to do. 
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The Patient Study indicates that in practice the differences between them are not as clear 
cut as the above account suggests. It is more probable that there is a complex mixing of 
foci, terms and ideas. In particular, it may be that the primary care focus on the activities 
of people is covert and implicit in the way that general practitioners, for example, actually 
work and record their findings. 
A key task for the thesis is to examine the logical connections between function, 
dysfunction, illness and disease and analyse the role that function ascriptions play in their 
conceptualisation. As a starting position, two prima facie concepts of function can be 
described. One, the proper function of body parts, and the other global function of a 
person. 
3.5.1. Focusing on the property of parts 
(Fphys) 
An important focus for medical research and, in the first instance for secondary care, is to 
determine the parameters within which a biological part can be said to be functioning, 
that is, operating within normal limits. This is to identify when an item is failing and has 
become a major causal factor in illness. It is therefore important that this information is a 
reliable indicator of normal and abnormal activity as treatment may be based on it. 
Function here is therefore the "proper" activities of body parts. Proper, that is, with 
regard to what is necessary for 'normal' health. 
3.5.2. Focusing on the activities of people 
(Fglob) 
For primary care practitioners the initial focus is not so much on the behaviour of body 
parts but on the way in which disruptions to patients' normal taken-for-granted activities 
leads them to interpret these as medical problems. Patients perceive themselves to be 
going well or not (so) well and this perception, as can be seen from the studies, is related 
to and perhaps based on their perception of how well they are able to function (FgJob) in a 
particular context. Practitioners deal with patients' problems in the 'field', rather than 
through the intermediary of another practitioner, as hospital doctors do. The 
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explanations from the GP and osteopath entails, to some degree at least, the context that 
prompts a patient to seek care, though this may be implicit rather than explicit. 
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Chapter 4. Function Concepts in Clinical 
Practice 
Chapter 4 builds on the analysis of the Case Studies by focusing further on the suggestion, 
generated in Chapters 2 and 3, that practitioners use two concepts of function, focusing 
respectively on the behaviour of body parts (FP,. 5) and the behaviour of the person as a whole 
(Fg, ob). 
A critical question is whether knowledge of and attention to Fs1ob is an essential part of practice or 
merely a veneer of humanity superimposed on the real work of medicine, which is dealing with 
issues arising from Fyhy,. I argue that enquiring into each of these two areas requires different 
strategies, an epistemological strategy to determine whether Fphys is operating normally and an 
ontological strategy to determine which behaviours constitute Fs, o,. 
4.1. The significance of FBIob and Fphys for 
practice 
The outcome of Chapters 2&3 made clear that the concept of function is important for 
practice both theoretically and practically though it may be hidden beneath more familiar 
concepts. But what does it mean for practice? Perhaps the attention to the global 
functioning of the patient is merely a humanitarian gloss put on their work by caring 
practitioners. Put more crudely, competent practitioners correctly diagnose disease and 
prescribe appropriate treatment; if they also demonstrate care and concern for the person, 
all the better, but it's not a key part of their work. Even if their professional governing 
body decides that being a caring person is a necessary part of practice, it still wouldn't 
make it a necessary part of the core work of medicine, which is to diagnose and treat 
diseases. 
4.7.7. Fg, ob as an implicit foundation of 
clinical practice 
To what extent is Fgiob, with all the values and personal expectations it entails, a 
fundamental part of practitioners' judgements? After all, it is possible to diagnose and 
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treat someone knowing only the symptoms related to their problem. What is needed is a 
population of people who either have no biological problems but are still ill, or have 
permanent biological problems but are not necessarily ill, in order to analyse how 
practitioners manage them. Elderly people are a group who suffer more pathologies than 
any other section of society. How do practitioners manage them and is it appropriate? 
4.1.1.1 Fy: ob in the elderly 
Elderly people are a large, though in many ways (medically) unrepresentative, 
population. They suffer disproportionately more illness than younger people. Keith 
Thompson, a General Practitioner, examined the way he and his colleagues were dealing 
with elderly patients. (Thompson, 1986; Thompson, 1992) He reviewed the records of 603 
patients over the age of 70 in his practice and found an average of 3.2 pathologies per 
patient. After excluding the survivors of pathologies from earlier life, he discovered that 
86% of cases: 
had eight diseases so uniformly and widely distributed that I came to believe that if we 
plot our patients against age, rather than against environmental and behavioural 
characteristics, we are really looking at an abnormal process of ageing if such conditions 
have not developed by the eighth decade. (1985, p. 730) 
This 'octad' consists of: 
1. Obesity 
2. Hypertension 
3. Type II diabetes 
4. Atherosclerosis 
5. Cancer 
6. Endogenous depression 
7. Autoimmune disease 
8. Immunodepression 
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Thompson notes that they share the common feature of being of intrinsic origin and must 
have started to develop long before the stage where they could be detected. He "felt that 
these components of my octad could almost be regarded as parts of one super-disease, 
leading to death. " (ibid. p. 730) What are regarded as the diseases of ageing begin their 
development in infancy. The traditional hospital driven model of single diseases that 
requires accurate diagnosis and specific treatment, he argues, is not appropriate to 
general practice treatment of the elderly. Screening will inevitably find evidence of 
'pathology' and no amount of treatment will eradicate it. The focus should be on 
management rather than treatment where this is guided by the "functional ability" of the 
patient. (ibid. ) 
Thompson makes explicit what (I am arguing) is otherwise implicit in the practice of 
medicine. First, that 'disease' is a normal, that is an ubiquitous, fact of life for that 
community. Everyone over the age of 70 will manifest signs of one or more diseases. 
This is a serious finding for Boorse's BST, for assuming Thompson is correct and it is the 
absence rather than presence of these 'diseases' that is abnormal in the elderly, then on 
Boorse's account they cannot be diseases, at least, not without stipulating at what age 
species-typical behaviour is assessed, and if he does that he cannot apply his findings to 
groups other than the one he stipulates. In any case, this stipulation would be difficult to 
do without entailing a further value-judgement. Second, what is important is not the 
presence of disease itself, but its effect on the person's "ability to function", as Thompson 
puts it. In other words, on a normative understanding, illness is defined by its effect on 
the life of the person and their ability to do the things they want to do and not by the 
presence of pathologies. Health consultations and management decisions must take 
account of the person's ability, how the condition affects the person's life now and how it 
is likely to affect them in the future. 
This means that rather than humanitarian concerns for the person as a whole being an 
optional, though important, extra on top of medical diagnosis and treatment, they are 
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embedded in the way practitioners actually work, that is, do core medical work. The 
fact 
that it is normally hidden merely disguises its importance. 
4.1.1.2 Fglob in the non-elderly 
What is explicit in Thompson's account of disease and illness in the elderly is, I claim, 
implicit in all patient consultations. The reason Fglob is covert in most cases is because the 
judgement, to see a practitioner because they "are really ill", is made initially by the 
patient and in most cases corroborated by the practitioner. In the elderly, especially 
where screening programmes pick up pathologies, judgements about whether they "are 
really ill" and deserving of care is made by the practitioner. For example, in all three 
cases in the Patient Study it was pain, plus, in the case of Mrs A, morning stiffness, that 
caused the patients to consult a health practitioner. But this simple observation masks 
much of what is happening behind the pain label. What makes pain a ubiquitous reason 
to seek help? Physical pain can be experienced for a number of reasons that do not 
necessarily prompt someone to visit the doctor - knocking into a table, or pricking oneself 
on a needle for example. Pain per se is not sufficient to warrant medical help, but 
unexplained pain, unremitting pain or pain that disturbs normal life, is. The amount or 
degree of pain is obviously a factor here. Pain that impinges on normal activities, or that 
occurs without sufficient reason, is enough to seek help. For example, in the 
physiotherapist's account of Mrs C, he notes that 
she mentioned two problems that concern her: 1. She is having difficulties lifting her 
youngest child; and 2. She recognises that the constant aching is affecting her, both 
physically and emotionally and, therefore, those around her. (Appendix, p. xx) 
Although Mrs C doesn't consult the practitioner explicitly stating that these are the 
reasons she has come, the physiotherapist elicits, nevertheless, that they are an important, 
perhaps major, part of what prompts the visit. The physiotherapist's report helpfully 
makes the patients' expectations explicit in all three cases. In addition to Mrs C, already 
cited, he quotes Mrs A as wanting "... to ease the pains in her back. Whilst she feels that 
she will never be rid of all her pains she would like to have more 'control' over it. " 
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(Appendix, p. iv); and notes that Mrs B is "Concerned at the increased symptoms this 
year and although she copes with them and they are not obviously stopping her from 
doing anything, there is an undercurrent of frustration. " (Appendix, p. xii) Reference to 
activities is evident throughout all three cases, though the physiotherapist and osteopath 
perhaps make most use of them in their analyses. 
Two linked elements relating to what counts as illness emerge from this; disturbance of 
normal activities, such as being unable to lift a child, and disruption to normal life 
interpreted in the case of Mrs A, for example, as loss of control. This resonates with the 
conclusions of both Nordenfelt and Fulford. Nordenfelt (1995) analyses health and illness 
in terms of ability to achieve vital goals, and Fulford defines illness as "action failure". 
Although there is ambiguity in Nordenfelt's account over whether he is referring to those 
vital goals necessary for a basic level of human life, or to an individual person's vital goals 
as those goals that give meaning to their life, nevertheless the focus on ability is helpful in 
identifying what causes someone to consider that they are ill. For Nordenfelt, illness is 
defined in terms of an incapacity, the consequences of which is a failure to achieve vital 
goals. 
What this means is that instead of Thompson's account of the role of the practitioner 
being to facilitate functional ability in the elderly (rather than simply to treat disease) as 
being the exception, it is actually the norm. It is hidden in most (non-elderly) cases 
because the judgement that "I am really ill" is made by the patient before seeing the 
doctor who tacitly agrees it. But the significant work is to improve Fglob by improving 
(where appropriate) Fphyg. 
4.2. Function in practice: applying the 
analysis of function to its use in 
practice 
It is now looking as though the context for making decisions about Fphyg is Fgiob. Recalling 
what was said at the beginning of Chapter 2, context is important for the concept of 
function because it is implicit in 'the doing of y being the function of x'. Knowing that y is 
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the function of x infers the context in which y is done. I am now suggesting that y as 
biological function is significant only in the context of the patient's global function Fglob. 
Practitioners do need to know about Fphys, but it only has value in practice (rather than 
theoretically) in the context of Fgiob 54 
What evidence is there from the Case Studies that context is such a significant factor in 
practice? It was suggested in Chapter 3 that the orthopaedic surgeons (more than the 
osteopath) equate function with the behaviour of biological parts in the context of local 
structures and general features of the patient such as age and gender, while the osteopath 
(more than the orthopaedic surgeon) views biological behaviour in a broader context 
which includes the whole musculo-skeletal system, the patient's occupational and 
medical history and their current life-style. 
At first sight the difference appears to be one of degree; the orthopaedic surgeon 
considers parts, such as an intervertebral disc, in the context of the low back, while the 
osteopath considers parts in the context of a more global understanding of the person. 
But we need to be sure that both mean the same thing by 'local structure' and that both 
come to a knowledge of it by the same epistemological route. What is the evidence that 
both practitioners are considering the same thing? If they are, it is probable that 
differences are merely of degree with considerable overlap between them, but if they are 
not, if each means something different by 'local structure', it may be that the difference 
represents something significant that may also distinguish osteopathy from conventional 
medicine. 
54 It is important to reiterate here that Fphy, is derived from Fb; o, 
in the sense that physiology is 
a subcategory of biology. F job as the actual global ability to function for the particular 
patient under consideration 
'by 
the practitioner is linked to Fpt which is the patient and 
practitioner's shared assumption of what 'normal' people should be able to do - the things they just for granted. 
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If 'local structure' is understood differently it is likely that each practitioner has a different 
analytical strategy in mind. In this case, we also want to know what that strategy is, 
where the information comes from, and what tenets or guiding principles structure the 
information. The first task, therefore, is to look at the Case Studies in more detail to see if 
they provide clues to these questions. 
4.2.1. Analysing the function of parts 
Both the osteopath and the orthopaedic surgeon work with a notion of 'local part'. For all 
three patients they agree that the main focus is on the tissues of the low back. 
Nevertheless, there are significant differences between them based on how far they 
extend their clinical gaze-55 and what they consider to be significant to the problem. 
The orthopaedic surgeon summarises Mrs A's problem by "suggest{ing) that it is 
mechanical back pain .... It is most likely to be due to facet joint degeneration .... "56 
(Appendix p. ii) He concludes, "this lady has back pain that is mechanical and most 
likely due to facet joint degeneration with perhaps an early element of spinal stenosis. " 
Mrs B's problem is explained as, "a mechanical type of pain ... probably a mixture of the 
old wedge fracture, muscular and possibly intervertebral disc related. " (p. x) 
Finally, Mrs C's problem is summarised as. "mechanical back pain with features that may 
represent discogenic type of back pain ... most likely to be mechanical due to 
degeneration of the disc. " (pp. xviii-xix) 
55 This borrows Sheridan's translation of Foucault's now famous term, "the medical gaze". (see the Translator's Note in Foucault, 1973, p. vii) I am suggesting that what practitioners 
consider to be important to a problem (and what is irrelevant) result from a particular 
construct they give to human problems. My point is that orthopaedic surgeons and 
osteopaths work from different constructs and therefore give different weightings (or value) 
to specific items of information. I will develop this further in looking at ontological enquiry in 4.2.3.2. 
56 I have omitted negative conclusions from the quotes in order to make clear what the 
orthopaedic surgeon's explanation of the problem is. So quotes such as "with no 
cont ... 
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The osteopath explains Mrs A's problem in terms of the symptoms, which "are 
predominantly due to muscle ischaemia affecting the lumbar and thoraco-lumbar erector 
spinae muscles, together with the tensor fascia lata bilaterally. " (p. vii) After this it is 
quite difficult to differentiate descriptions of the state of affairs that constitutes the 
problem from its aetiology, the factors that have contributed to that state of affairs. He 
describes the patient's "severe pes planus which has resulted in eversion of both feet and 
a genu valgum deformity, plus a tendency to internally rotate both hips. These 
mechanical changes in the lower extremity have put strain on the lateral postural muscles; 
in particular the tibialis anterior and peroneus longus. ... Spondylotic changes in the 
lumbar spine have resulted in reduced disc space and further restricted lumbar mobility. " 
(p. vii) 
Mrs B is described as having "a poorly compensated spinal curve with excessive 
muscular activity ... the paraspinal soft-tissues are hypertonic almost to the point of 
spasm. ... The resulting scoliosis is concave to the right ... causing a 'high' side on the left 
thorax. The pelvis is shifted sideways to the right. ... although the (Li wedge) fracture 
itself has healed, the soft-tissue changes have not resolved and the resulting chronic state 
is not functioning fully. " (p. xv) Again, the difficulty is differentiating the explanation of 
Mrs B's presenting problem from the chain of events that has caused it. 
Finally, Mrs C's "problem appears to be the result of a breakdown in the body's attempt 
to compensate for a primary short lower extremity on the left side. There is muscle 
hypertonia and fibrotic changes at the lower lumbar levels particularly on the right side in 
the erector spinae, and also in the tensor fascia lata and gluteal muscles. ... there is 
evidence of {minimal} degenerative change in the lumbar spine ... there is evidence of 
fatigue and ischaemic muscle pain. " (p. xxiv) 
involvement of the spinal cord or spinal nerves. " are missing as they do not contribute to 
cont ... 
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These accounts highlight two linked and possibly significant differences; the first is the 
orthopaedic surgeon's focus on pathology, e. g., "facet joint degeneration", and 
syndromes, e. g., "mechanical back pain", to explain the pain as clearly as possible. This 
involves eliminating those factors that he doesn't consider to have a direct bearing on the 
problem, i. e., those not causing pain. The result describes a state of affairs, degeneration, 
discogenic pain, etc. The osteopath considers a wider range of states of affairs and, more 
significantly, places his emphasis on process, the relationship between states of affairs. 
This is especially true for Mrs A where the description of the process of biomechanical 
breakdown to explain her problem is extensive. As I noted above, it is difficult to 
distinguish between the osteopath's explanation of the patient's problem - the state of 
affairs - and its cause - the process(es) contributing to that state The orthopaedic surgeon 
expresses little interest in process, focussing instead on the pathological state and its 
possible consequences. 
The second difference relates to the extent of the clinical gaze. The orthopaedic surgeon 
focuses mainly on structures in the low back - the intervertebral disc, facets and muscles. 
The osteopath looks much wider not just to find other factors causing the pain, but to 
generate a broad picture of dependency. From the way his Impression is presented it is 
clear that the orthopaedic surgeon has a reductionist clinical approach focusing on the 
core of the problem. Thus he eliminates a range of possible states (particularly potentially 
damaging ones) until he is left with his diagnosis. The osteopath does something similar, 
i. e., attempts to explain the state responsible for the patient's symptoms, but then 
broadens his gaze to consider all the factors that may be maintaining that state and on 
which its continuation is dependent. 
our understanding of what he thinks has happened, only what he things hasn't. 
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From this it is clear that the two practitioners do not have the same view of what is meant 
by 'local structure'. For the orthopaedic surgeon it is those structures that demonstrate 
pathological change and which fit into an acknowledged theoretical explanation, e. g., 
"mechanical back pain". For the osteopath it is an amalgam of processes and states that 
come together in a significant way to explain something more than just what is causing 
pain. 57 This is not to say that either is right or wrong. The clinical interest is different 
and this is influenced to a large extent by the mode of treatment each offers. If they are 
different, is the difference based on fundamental differences of assessment criteria, i. e., is 
each working from different standards of normal function? 
I argued in Chapter 3 that the ability to diagnose depends on knowledge of the functions 
of specific parts. Clinical investigations assess the state of those parts against referential 
standards and the clinician judges whether or not they are contributing to the overall 
condition of the patient. The case studies suggest that the way this is done is different for 
orthopaedic surgeons and for osteopaths. The question for this analysis is to what extent 
this judgement is conditional on contextual factors. Do osteopaths and orthopaedic 
surgeons work within the same context? 
This brief examination of the way each practitioner works with the concept of local 
structure suggests that each has a different understanding of context. The orthopaedic 
surgeon's context is the range of possible conditions that might explain the patient's 
problem and which are signalled by so-called 'red flag' signs. The osteopath's context is a 
57 This is interesting in the context of current debates in the manual therapy world about back 
pain diagnosis. There is little evidence to support many of the claims for back pain being 
caused by specific pathology. As I noted in the Introduction, most people over 40 have disc 
prolapses, everyone over 25 has degeneration of tissue; even heavy manual occupations do 
not necessarily lead to back trouble. There is no clear correlation between back pain and 
any of these factors. The application of traditional medical thinking to back trouble based 
on the triad of symptoms, pathology and aetiology, has failed to come up with a useful 
working model for dealing with these (common) problems. It is argued that treating back 
trouble as a medical problem in the same way that other illnesses are, causes some patients 
to adopt "fear-avoidance-behaviour" which creates disability. (Waddell, Newton, 
cont ... 
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global one of structural integrity where the functional ability of a local part is considered 
in the context of its contribution to the overall global capacity of the patient. Do these 
represent significantly different contexts or different degrees of the same context? The 
orthopaedic surgeon is concerned that the local situation might present a serious threat to 
the patient, hence the focus on red-flag signs. This suggests that global consideration of 
the good of the patient is implicit in his thinking. Local effects are important because of 
their implications for the whole person. This seems to indicate that there is little 
significant difference. However, the global context is different in the sense that the 
osteopath looks at the overall capacity of one particular patient, while the orthopaedic 
surgeon's sense of global is a general one; pernicious pathology in the spine is bad for all 
patients which is why it would be bad for this one. 
This may represent a difference between orthopaedic surgeons (but not necessarily all 
conventional medicine practitioners) and osteopaths; orthopaedic surgeons' concept of 
context is a generalised one that is assumed to be shared by all people. The osteopathic 
concept of context includes a range of generalised assumptions, but has an explicit focus 
on the individual patient and factors that are unique to them. 
4.2.2. Analysing a person's ability to 
function 
Both practitioners, but particularly the orthopaedic surgeon, use a concept of the proper 
function of local parts, without which there cannot be a concept of dysfunction such as 
intervertebral disc degeneration, for example. The difference between them appears to be 
related to what counts as a local part and to the way context informs judgements about 
the diagnostic significance of the local part. Do both practitioners also work with a 
similar concept of the function of a person? Both are aware in a general way that the local 
Henderson, Somerville & Main, 1993) My point is that 'back trouble' is actually a different, 
much broader concept than say, osteoarthritis of the hip. 
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problem exists in the context of a person; they both describe aspects of the patients' lives 
including how long they have suffered, their age, occupation and so on. The question is 
whether these factors form a context for the local changes which also explains the 
patient's illness. 
Primary more than secondary care practitioners work explicitly with patients' global 
inability to function in the context of their environment. While gender, age, occupation 
and other modifying factors play a part in the analysis of the function of organs and 
tissues, they play a very significant role in judging the overall ability of an individual to 
function in their world. As Thompson (1982,1996) makes explicit, the aim of primary 
care is to enable the patient to function and that will mean different things for people 
depending on their goals and expectations. Analysing osteopaths and orthopaedic 
surgeons may not provide a fair comparison; GP's, as demonstrated in the Case Vignette, 
or perhaps physiotherapists, might provide a more equivalent account. Certainly the GP 
is concerned to "help Bill to get back to work", to arrange for an x-ray primarily because 
of its "psychological benefit", and to refer to a specialist for the "reassurance of a second 
opinion". This demonstrates understanding of (or assumptions about) Bill's broader 
needs and it is in this context that she puts her understanding of the problem as "simple 
mechanical back strain". This contrasts with the opinion of the orthopaedic surgeon who 
concludes his account with the doleful view that "it is likely (Bill) will have to retire on 
health grounds. " The surgeon might argue that he is being realistic, but, unlike the GP he 
doesn't appear to be highly motivated by the need to facilitate Bill's social rehabilitation. 
It might be argued that he expects the patient to modify his goals and expectations 
around the biological state rather than the practitioner's r6le being to modify the 
biological to accommodate (as far as possible) the patient's needs. 
Perhaps because there are fewer serious consequences riding on the outcome of the 
Patient Study, differences between the practitioners with respect to the function of 
patients is less evident. Nevertheless, there are pointers to significant differences. The 
orthopaedic surgeon's focus is clearly on the patients' pain, which drives both treatment 
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and management. Consideration of any other aspect to the problem, or of preventative 
measures has lower priority. This contrasts with the physiotherapist and osteopath both 
of whom give equal weight to causal and preventative factors and to the kind of activity 
the patients are engaging in. The physiotherapist explicitly aims to "give ... control over 
her back" to Mrs A; he plans a number of rehabilitation and preventative measures for 
Mrs B; an overall aim for Mrs C is "to develop a long term strategy so that she can return 
to uninhibited activity and to maintain maximal function. " This in not to say that the 
orthopaedic surgeon does not consider these things, but they are not his primary focus. 
For example, he advocates additional treatment from physiotherapists or osteopaths for 
each of the three patients with the aim of muscle strengthening and improving mobility. 
The Case Studies point to the osteopath, the GP and the physiotherapist explicitly 
attempting to bring local factors into a global picture. The differences between them lie in 
the ways in which they do this. The osteopath attempts to provide a cohesive narrative 
that brings all factors into one explanation; the GP follows the standard medical model by 
supplementing the pathological diagnosis with a sophisticated account of the context in 
which the disease is operating, and the physiotherapist provides a number of parallel 
accounts that are factors in the holistic experience of the patient. The orthopaedic 
surgeons' diagnoses focus on evaluating the functional capacity of specific organs and 
tissues more than do the primary care practitioners. 
Careful reading of the reports reveals that even in relatively straight-forward accounts, 
e. g., diagnosis of facet joint degeneration, context plays a significant part in the overall 
clinical judgement of all practitioners, but that it is more explicit for primary than it is for 
secondary care practitioners. This suggests that a dual focus on the function of the local 
part and the function of the person is common to all practitioners though the weight 
given to each may be different depending on their particular interests. 
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4.2.3. Function analysis: different modes 
of enquiry 
My analysis so far suggests that there are two (apparently different) models of function at 
work in practice. One model focusing mostly on the proper behaviour of organs and 
tissues, where the proper goal of the organ and tissue is part of medicine's body of 
knowledge, and the other on the patient's activity where judgements of what is 'proper' 
or normal are complex and unique for each patient. Practitioners have not only to 
discover this information they have to synthesise it into an overall clinical assessment 
This involves combining judgements of whether or not a part is functioning well with 
judgements about the appropriateness of a person's life-style and how that fits with their 
goals and expectations. Hence there are three kinds of diagnostic judgement clinicians 
have to make, the first involves judgements about how well a local part is functioning, 
Fphye, the second, assesses the person, their medical history, occupation, goals and 
expectations describing how they function in their world, Fglob, and third is a judgement 
that combines the first two within a coherent explanatory framework. The remainder of 
this Chapter will reflect on the first two judgements while most of Chapter 7 addresses 
the way practitioners combine judgements. 
Focusing on the function of local parts and focusing on the function of people produces 
different kinds of knowledge which, as I shall demonstrate, require different modes of 
enquiry, an epistemological one that judges whether a part is functioning well, and an 
ontological one that judges which states are constitutive of the problem. These different 
foci are particularly evident in naturalistic and normative accounts of function. 
4.2.3.1 The epistemological focus 
Because, for naturalists, goals are given and context implicit and assumed, their primary 
focus is on the epistemological question, 'does this example function well? ' Diagnosis 
centres around knowing whether or not this case is an example of a particular disease or 
falls within normal physiological parameters. It assumes a body of knowledge that 
describes the proper function of body parts and behaviours. 
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The Case Studies suggest that this is the primary mode of enquiry employed by the 
orthopaedic surgeons, but that it is important to all practitioners. Arguably, the force of 
Western medical investigation lies in its ability to test whether or not a part is 
contributing to the total body economy understood bio-medically. Today's scientific 
knowledge of body mechanisms and the technical ability to modify them extends well 
beyond anything previously available. It is possible to test a wide range of physiological 
parameters and to use biostatistical analyses to form judgements of what is normal. 
Without this knowledge and the belief that it provides information about real states of 
affairs, modern medicine could not operate. 
It is important not to confuse the fact that information of this kind can be generated and 
applied to medical problems with the kind of information it represents, i. e., descriptive 
scientific, or value-laden and normative. Whether or not it is value-free depends on 
whether or not function ascriptions are value-free, a debate that will be explored in 
Chapter 5. Nevertheless, and regardless of whether standards of normal function can be 
described non-evaluatively, practitioners use the information as if it is value-free, and, as 
we have seen, it is an important element in the diagnostic armoury of conventional 
medical practitioners and osteopaths. 
The main judgement involves knowing whether or not a part is behaving within standard 
parameters. This involves testing a particular example against a general body of 
knowledge. This was evident in the Patient Study, particularly from the orthopaedic 
surgeon who used straight leg raising (SLR) tests, neurological tests plus reference to x- 
ray plates to test a range of functions. These are reported non-judgementally as matters of 
fact rather than as information within an evaluative framework. Of course, the 
information must be interpreted, which requires a theoretical framework; the result of 
reflex testing only has significance within an understanding of how the neurological 
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system works But information gained from testing, notwithstanding false positives and 
negatives, is assumed to provide secure knowledge of how well a local part is 
functioning. The optimism, particularly from students and inexperienced practitioners is 
that this information alone will guide them to the correct diagnosis and treatment, but 
this is to ignore the second part of clinical judgement which entails an ontological focus. 
4.2.3.2 The ontological focus 
For the normativist, where goal is conditional on context, which must be explicit, clinical 
judgement is (in part) an ontological issue, based on knowing what is constitutive of 
function in this case. Defining which properties, contexts and relationships play a 
significant role in the problem is an ontological issue. The case studies suggest that this 
kind of enquiry is employed by the osteopath and, though less explicitly, by the GP and 
physiotherapist. 
There are two senses in which consideration of ontology is important to my study, the 
first, which I will develop later in more depth, is the way a practitioner constructs the 
explanation of a particular problem; which factors - physical, psychological social etc. - 
are constitutive elements of the problem, part of the stuff of the illness. The other sense, 
which is foundational to the first one, is the way practitioners perceive human beings in 
illness and health. This is what Foucault termed "the medical gaze", which describes the 
way doctors look at the human body, it determines what is seen, how it is described and 
used to construct understanding. (Evans, 2001; Foucault, 1973; Svenaeus, 1999) The 
professional gaze is implicit in practice values and mores and rarely questioned by 
practitioners. Although I am not directly addressing this issue, it lies just below the 
surface of many of the areas I am examining, in particular the way practitioners (making 
these assumptions) explain illness and construct diagnostic explanations. This, I will 
58 I will ignore the question of whether medicine's body of knowledge is constructed or real as it is outside the remit of my thesis. (See for example, Good, 1994 quoted in Evans, 2001) My 
cont ... 
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argue, entails constructing ontological explanations that are specific for each patient and 
problem. Differences between practitioners lie in the kind and amount of information 
each assumes to be ontologically related to the problem and on which the problem is 
dependent. In the Patient Study this is based, in part, on the extent to which the global 
ability of the patient to act is an important consideration. 
There is debate at present about what back trouble is. (See footnote 57) Although it is 
widely accepted that it is not explained by pathological and biomechanical factors alone 
(and at times not at all), there is no model in conventional medicine (including 
physiotherapy) to explain it other than through the term "biopsychosocial". Although 
acknowledging that a range of factors somehow contribute to the problem, it offers no 
account of how the (ontologically) different elements relate to one another. (This must 
also address, or explicitly avoid, the mind-body problem. ) The most common way of 
conceptualising the role of psychosocial factors in back trouble is as a predictor. (Barnes, 
Smith, Gatchel & Mayer, 1989; Burton, Tillotson, Main & Hollis, 1995; Gatchel, Polatin & 
Mayer, 1995) What is unclear is whether a predictor is also causal. Although most of the 
research is being done by clinical psychologists investigating correlations of back trouble 
with depression, the fundamental question is philosophical - what is the ontological 
status of back trouble? The earliest account of back pain can be found in an Egyptian 
papyrus from 1500 BC, but it was only in the 19th Century that back trouble became a 
medical problem; in 1828 a physician named Brown suggested that it was related to the 
spine and soon afterwards, aided by new compensation laws, it was accepted that back 
trouble could be caused by injury, and the condition termed "railway spine" emerged 
which was reputed to be caused by travelling at speed on the new railways. (Waddell, 
1997) Before this time, back trouble was accepted as a 'normal' part of life - what could 
be taken for granted. 
point is that it is treated as if it is real. 
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My interest is to see which elements, drawn from the Case Studies' patient histories and 
examinations, the practitioners consider to be explanatory, i. e., part of the ontology of 
back trouble (which all three patients suffered from). In my initial analysis of the Case 
Vignette, I noted that the osteopath dealt with psychosocial factors differently from the 
orthopaedic surgeon. For the surgeon, these are external factors that can modify the 
effects of the "organic" back problem, while for the osteopath they are integral factors in 
explaining the problem. To what extent does this distinction manifest in the Patient 
Study? 
The orthopaedic surgeon, although acknowledging the occupations and activities of the 
patients to some extent, doesn't incorporate them into his explanations of the problems. 
His focus is entirely on the biophysical and mechanical with the slight exception of Mrs B 
whose "pain may be modified when she stops her present job ... " 
(p. x) The osteopath 
considers many more factors to be part of the patients' problems, including events from 
their medical history, and other conditions, such as the knee problem of Mrs A, which are 
not considered to be important by the other practitioners. Despite being much broader, 
the focus is still primarily a biomechanical one. The physiotherapist also draws from a 
wide range of factors with the aim of returning the patient to normal activities. He too 
has a tendency to rely on biophysical explanations; his final prognosis for Mrs C opines 
that "It would be reasonable to expect to be able to restore a painless and functional 
spinal unit ... " 
(p. xxii) However, he is different from the osteopath in the way that he 
itemises the various elements rather than trying to synthesise them into a single 
explanation. Where the osteopath tries to develop a single narrative to bring the various 
elements together, the orthopaedic surgeon narrows his focus onto the primary causes of 
the pain, and the physiotherapist deals separately with each clinically significant factor. 
The final difference of significance in the context of ontological enquiry, is the marked 
contrast between the orthopaedic surgeon who categorises the key states - facet joint 
degeneration, mechanical back pain - and the osteopath who describes a unique state for 
each patient, even though it includes many of the same factors identified by the 
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orthopaedic surgeon. The physiotherapist falls between the two in that he identifies a 
wider range of key states than the orthopaedic surgeon, each of which falls into a 
recognised category, but he doesn't go as far as the osteopath in trying to produce a single 
global account. Presumably, the fact that he does consider a range of factors to be 
important in explaining the problem, means that he assumes them to be connected in 
some significant way, but he doesn't make that as explicit as the osteopath does. 
In conclusion, then, all practitioners use epistemological enquiry to judge whether or not 
specific parts function well. Differences lie in what is considered to be normal function 
and the extent of a local part, e. g., whether the focus is on the L5 disc, the lumbar spine or 
the low back. But practitioners also use a second form of enquiry to judge what is or isn't 
relevant; this I have termed ontological as it involves judging what is and isn't part of the 
illness. This is a complex issue as it involves professional practice beliefs and mores at 
one level and the way these are used to interpret the patient's illness at another. This 
latter aspect will form an important focus for my later analysis. 
4.3. Summary of Part 2 
Part 2 has explored the work that function ascriptions perform in practice as evidenced by 
the Case Studies. It has begun to clarify the importance of context and identified a 
number of dualities at work in theory and practice all of which entail function statements 
in some form: 
"3A focus on biological mechanism vs. a focus on the person 
VDisease vs. illness 
VReductionist vs. holistic explanations 
V Primary vs. secondary care 
V Epistemological vs. ontological enquiry 
The next task is to see how this resonates with biological function, because the door is still 
left ajar to Fb; o, being the primary concept for practice if it can be defined non-evaluatively. 
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